Mark Sagoff

Four dogmas have shaped modern neoclassical economics. The first proposes that markets may fail to allocate resources efficiently, that is, to those willing to pay the most for them. The second asserts that choices, particularly within markets, reveal preferences. The third is the assumption that people always make the choices they expect will benefit them or enhance their welfare. The fourth dogma holds that perfectly competitive markets will allocate resources to their most beneficial uses. This is the doctrine of the invisible hand. I argue that these dogmas of applied welfare economics should be abandoned. One consequence of doing so will be an increased interest in the institutional context of production. A second will be a turn toward empiricism

This essay explores three case studies that illustrate the exemplary use of economic analysis in environmental decision-making. These include: 1) the creation of a market in tradable grazing rights in the American West; 2) a cost analysis that facilitated a negotiated rulemaking at a power plant in Arizona; and 3) a conception of production-based pollution allowances that led to an agreement for regulating Intel microprocessor production plants. The paper argues that cost–benefit analysis may be less useful than other kinds of economic analysis that can guide and inform rather than judge and second-guess the outcome of negotiated and collaborative decision-making

Original paintings and forgeries are not sufficiently the same sort of thing to have many comparable aesthetic qualities. 1) many aesthetic quality predicates have the form of attributives: they are two-place relations between an object and a class of objects and have a semantic account which requires that the object belongs to the class to which it is related; 2) there is no useful semantic class which contains an original and its forgery and 3) therefore these paintings are not to be compared in at least many aesthetic qualities. attention is given to style predicates, which are defined

ABSTRACT In this essay, I argue that large‐scale technologies may be more threatening to open democratic institutions than to ecological systems. I describe the threat in terms of an alliance between bureacrats and entrepreneurs to govern society according to their own methods, e.g., cost‐benefit analysis, and thus to usurp the rule of law. In America, though not in England, blue‐collar and environmentalist constituencies have on occasion beaten back this threat, a triumph of democracy. I use ‘grid‐group’ theory, as developed by Mary Douglas and her students, to make these arguments about the relation between technology and democracy.

Conservation biologists and other environmentalists confront five obstacles in building support for regulatory policies that seek to exclude or remove introduced plants and other non-native species that threaten to harm natural areas or the natural environment. First, the concept of “harm to the natural environment” is nebulous and undefined. Second, ecologists cannot predict how introduced species will behave in natural ecosystems. If biologists cannot define “harm” or predict the behavior of introduced species, they must target all non-native species as potentially “harmful”. an impossibly large regulatory task. Third, loss of species richness may constitute harm to an environment, but introduced organisms typically, generally, and significantly add to species richness in ecosystems. If species richness correlates with desirable ecosystem properties, moreover, such as stability and productivity, as some ecologists believe, then introduced organisms, by increasing species richness, would support those desirable properties. Fourth, one may plausibly argue that extinction constitutes environmental harm, but there is no evidence that non-native species, especially plants, are significant causes of extinction, except for predators in certain lakes and other small island-like environments. Fifth, while aesthetic, ethical, and spiritual values may provide a legitimate basis for invasive species policy, biologists often cite concepts such as “biodiversity” and ecosystem “health” or “integrity” to provide a scientific justification. To assert that non-native species threaten biodiversity or undermine ecosystem health, however, may be to draw conceptual entailments or consequences from definitions of “biodiversity” and “integrity” that arbitrarily exclude non-native species or make the presence of exotic species a per se indicator of decline

This paper argues that the occurrence of a non-native species, such as purple loosestrife, on one's property does not constitute a nuisance in the context of background principles of common law. No one is injured by it. The control of non-native species, such as purple loosestrife, does not constitute a compelling public interest, moreover, but represents primarily the concern of an epistemic community of conservation biologists and ecologists. This paper describes a history of cases in agricultural law that establish that a public authority may enter private property to destroy a tree or other species but only to protect a compelling public interest, such as the apple industry in Virginia or the citrus industry in Florida, and only if it pays all the costs including just compensation. The paper argues a fortiori that if a public authority enters private property to control non-native or “invasive” species it must pay all the costs and indemnify the owner—contrary to what many state laws contemplate and the Environmental Law Institute recommends.

Surplus-not simply scarcity-provides a reason to preserve the natural environment. Although advances in biotechnology have made it possible to manipulate, alter, and replace ecological and evolutionary processes in order vastly to increase the production of economically valuable commodities, e.g., seafood in estuaries, the huge surpluses likely to result threaten fishing communities with the same economicdepression and social dislocation that farming communities have already experienced. In this context, protecting the biological status quo not only expresses an admirable affection and respect for nature, but also makes economic sense by taking unneeded resources out of production.

This paper interprets Kant's theory of right on analogy with his theory of truth. The familiar distinction is presented between the mental act and its object: e.g. between the act of believing and the belief; the perceiving and the thing perceived; the act of willing and the action willed. The act of mind is always private; different people, however, can perceive and believe the same or contradictory things. The notion of truth depends (for Kant) on the intersubjectivity or universalizability of the mental object. It might seem that the act intended as well as the act of intending must be private, however, because I can will only my own actions; but Kant suggests that I may will not as myself but as one of a community: the logical subject of the intending may not be I but We. Kant had in mind the community of rational beings; Bradley and Green relativize the community to national groups.

In this paper, I adopt the view that if general forces or processes can be detected in ecology, then the principles or models that represent them should provide predictions that are approximately correct and, when not, should lead to the sorts of intervening factors that usually make trouble. I argue that Lotka–Volterra principles do not meet this standard; in both their simple “strategic” and their complex “tactical” forms they are not approximately correct of the findings of the laboratory experiments and historical studies most likely to confirm them; nor do they instruct ecologists where to look for likely intervening factors. Evidence drawn from long-term case studies and other available data sets suggests that the populations of predators and their prey are not regulated by an interaction between them but are controlled by transient, contingent, and accidental events that affect each animal and each population individualistically. This paper argues that the presence of general forces or processes in ecology should be determined by comparing competing models of these forces not just to each other or to a null model but also to case studies that may challenge theoretical approaches with convincing individualistic causal accounts of the phenomena