Mark Sagoff

ABSTRACT In this essay, I argue that large‐scale technologies may be more threatening to open democratic institutions than to ecological systems. I describe the threat in terms of an alliance between bureacrats and entrepreneurs to govern society according to their own methods, e.g., cost‐benefit analysis, and thus to usurp the rule of law. In America, though not in England, blue‐collar and environmentalist constituencies have on occasion beaten back this threat, a triumph of democracy. I use ‘grid‐group’ theory, as developed by Mary Douglas and her students, to make these arguments about the relation between technology and democracy.

In this paper, I adopt the view that if general forces or processes can be detected in ecology, then the principles or models that represent them should provide predictions that are approximately correct and, when not, should lead to the sorts of intervening factors that usually make trouble. I argue that Lotka–Volterra principles do not meet this standard; in both their simple “strategic” and their complex “tactical” forms they are not approximately correct of the findings of the laboratory experiments and historical studies most likely to confirm them; nor do they instruct ecologists where to look for likely intervening factors. Evidence drawn from long-term case studies and other available data sets suggests that the populations of predators and their prey are not regulated by an interaction between them but are controlled by transient, contingent, and accidental events that affect each animal and each population individualistically. This paper argues that the presence of general forces or processes in ecology should be determined by comparing competing models of these forces not just to each other or to a null model but also to case studies that may challenge theoretical approaches with convincing individualistic causal accounts of the phenomena.

This paper describes two frameworks—utilitarian and Kantian—society uses to make decisions concerning environmental management and, in particular, species protection. The utilitarian framework emphasizes the consequences of choices for prior preferences. A perfectly competitive market, on this model, correctly values environmental resources. The Kantian approach identifies rules appropriate to recognized situations given the identity of the decision maker. It relies on democratic political processes and institutions to provide the means by which citizens determine the identity of their community—its moral character and aspirations—and match appropriate rules to recognized situations. This paper argues that markets do not fail in any general way in measuring the economic value of plants and animals. Market prices, in general, correctly represent the marginal or exchange value of species. If society legislates against extinction, this must be understood as an exercise in Kantian decision making in view of the moral value of species, not as an attempt to “correct” a market failure or to promote social welfare or utility.

Many consumers view genetically engineered foods with suspicion partly because the food industry has taught them to do so. Consumers learn from advertisements and labels that the foods they buy are all natural only to realize that that is not the case. The food industry wishes to embrace the efficiencies offered by advances in genetic engineering, but this technology belies the image of nature to which the food industry constantly and conspicuously appeals. Consumers who believe genetically modified foods are not “natural” will regard them as risky and undesirable.

David Steen and co-authors in this journal offer a philosophical argument to support an “Evolutionary Community Concept” to identify what they call “evolutionary communities.” They describe these as “unique collections of species that interact and have co-evolved in a given geographic area” and that include “co-evolved dependencies between different parts of a community.” Steen et al. refer to the coevolution of assemblages, collections, communities, dependencies, interspecific and abiotic interactions, and traits, but they do not define “co-evolution” or provide an example in which co-evolution has been demonstrated. There may be as many ways to explain interactions among species as these interactions themselves; they may result, for example, from ecological fitting and phenotypic plasticity. In this paper, I argue that standard Darwinian Theory explains intraspecific microevolution or descent with modification within an interbreeding and potentially continuous population. The power, mechanism, or force that causes interspecific co-evolution, especially at the community scale, requires further explanation.