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Zur Frage der Übertragbarkeit intentionaler Begriffe auf physische ZuständeEthik Und Sozialwissenschaften 3 (4): 484. 1992.
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36Buchkritik Subjektivität. Wissen von innenDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6): 1001-1005. 2010.
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175The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigmSynthese 195 (8): 3361-3387. 2018.According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties is presented and defended as preferable. It is argued that the choice between these two frameworks makes a substantial difference for theoretical purposes.
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176Phenomenal presence and perceptual awareness: A subjectivist account of perceptual openness to the world1Philosophical Issues 21 (1): 352-383. 2011.
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De-re-versus de-dicto-Bewertungen der Existenz von Personen: eine anomalie der Ex-post-facto-Beurteilung von EntscheidungenConceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 26 (68-69): 97-105. 1992.
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26What about the emergence of consciousness deserves puzzlement?In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 6--149. 2010.
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202Self-AwarenessReview of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1): 55-82. 2017.Is a subject who undergoes an experience necessarily aware of undergoing the experience? According to the view here developed, a positive answer to this question should be accepted if ‘awareness’ is understood in a specific way, - in the sense of what will be called ‘primitive awareness’. Primitive awareness of being experientially presented with something involves, furthermore, being pre-reflectively aware of oneself as an experiencing subject. An argument is developed for the claims that pre-r…Read more
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1Phenomenal belief and phenomenal conceptsIn Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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124Grasping phenomenal propertiesIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is more intimate then if you just have some concept or other…Read more
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1Chisholm on personal identity and the attribution of experiencesIn Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Open Court. 1997.
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135The Notion of a Conscious Subject and its Phenomenological Basis in Prereflexive Self-awarenessRivista di Filosofia 104 (3): 485-504. 2013.
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4Pseudonormal vision and color qualiaIn Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III, Mit Press. 1999.
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1Is the naturalization of qualitative experience possible or sensible?In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, Pittsburgh University Press. 1997.
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410Dualist emergentismIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2007.
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346What Mary couldn't know: Belief about phenomenal statesIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 219--41. 1995.
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170The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity DefendedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 702-714. 2013.In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument e…Read more
Lugano, Ticino, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |