• Colours and shapes
    In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence, Oxford University Press. 2018.
  •  71
    On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 51-73. 1998.
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief---about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated---as usual---using the locution of ‘knowing what it’s like’ but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why ‘knowing what it's like’ does not serve the purposes of tho…Read more
  •  182
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who…Read more
  •  35
    Transtemporale Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56 (4): 513-534. 2008.
    Unser natürliches Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen unterscheidet sich grundlegend von unserem Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität von Dingen, die wir nicht für bewusstseinsfähig halten. Der Unterschied beruht letztlich auf begrifflichen Besonderheiten unseres selbstbezogenen Denkens. Wir haben ein von Kriterien der transtemporalen Identität freies Verständnis der eigenen transtemporalen Identität und diese Kriterienfreiheit überträgt sich auf unsere Gedan…Read more
  •  86
    The Illusion of Illusionism
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 160-171. 2016.
    A central thesis of Frankish's argument for illusionism is the claim that illusionism is possibly true. This is what the realist about phenomenal consciousness must deny. Frankish's argument for that premise is based on a widely shared understanding of phenomenal consciousness as being a matter of certain events instantiating special properties. I argue that the illusionist's reasoning is difficult to avoid if one accepts this common account. A positive argument for the thesis that the mere poss…Read more
  •  38
    Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious Beings
    In Katharina Neges, Josef Mitterer, Sebastian Kletzl & Christian Kanzian (eds.), Realism - Relativism - Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, De Gruyter. pp. 279-292. 2017.
  •  113
    A Puzzle About Colors
    Dialectica 60 (3): 321-336. 2006.
    I propose a description of one aspect of the philosophical problem about the ontology of colors by formulating and motivating six plausible premises that seem to be hard to deny in isolation but that are jointly incoherent. I briefly sketch a solution and comment on the views presented in this volume from the perspective of the puzzle.
  •  186
    Dualist emergentism
    In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2007.
  •  164
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1): 55-82. 2017.
    Is a subject who undergoes an experience necessarily aware of undergoing the experience? According to the view here developed, a positive answer to this question should be accepted if ‘awareness’ is understood in a specific way, - in the sense of what will be called ‘primitive awareness’. Primitive awareness of being experientially presented with something involves, furthermore, being pre-reflectively aware of oneself as an experiencing subject. An argument is developed for the claims that pre-r…Read more
  •  1
    Phenomenal belief and phenomenal concepts
    In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford University Press. 2006.
  •  144
    Doings and subject causation
    Erkenntnis 67 (2). 2007.
    In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent error to human ex…Read more
  •  257
    Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims about Phenomenal Structure
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2). 2009.
    We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We discuss whe…Read more
  •  3
    Pseudonormal vision and color qualia
    In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III, Mit Press. 1999.
  •  97
    Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency
    Erkenntnis 83 (1): 61-87. 2018.
    Free action and microphysical determination are incompatible but this is so only in virtue of a genuine conflict between microphysical determination with any active behavior. I introduce active behavior as the veridicality condition of agentive experiences and of perceptual experiences and argue that these veridicality conditions are fulfilled in many everyday cases of human and non-human behavior and that they imply the incompatibility of active behavior with microphysical determination. The ma…Read more
  •  1
    An argument from transtemporal identity for subject-body dualism
    In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  303
  •  163
    The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 702-714. 2013.
    In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument e…Read more
  •  78
    Phenomenal character and the transparency of experience
    In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 309--324. 2008.
  •  64
    The view is defended that the mere lack of language in a creature does not justify doubts about its capacity for genuine and complex thinking. Thinking is understood as a mental occurrent activity that belongs to phenomenal consciousness. Specific kinds of thinking are characterized by active or passive attending to the contents present to the subject, by the thinking being goal-directed, guided by standards of rationality or other standards of adequacy, and finally by being a case of critical r…Read more