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59I and NowProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89. 1989.D. H. Mellor; VI*—I and Now, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 79–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/89.1.79.
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70Micro-compositionRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 65-80. 2008.Entities of many kinds, not just material things, have been credited with parts. Armstrong , for example, has taken propositions and properties to be parts of their conjunctions, sets to be parts of sets that include them, and geographical regions and events to be parts of regions and events that contain them. The justification for bringing all these diverse relations under a single ‘part–whole’ concept is that they share all or most of the formal features articulated in mereology . But the conc…Read more
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20Inexactness and explanationPhilosophy of Science 33 (4): 345-359. 1966.The paper discusses the problems raised by the inexactness of experiential concepts for a deductivist account of theoretical explanation. The process of theoretical explanation is explicated in terms of the devising of exact forms of inexact concepts. Analysis of the adjustments of concepts and their exact forms to each other reveals an implicit criterion of adequacy for theories which is related to the principle of connectivity
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33The article is derived from the accompanying radio portrait. It was published in 1995 in Philosophy 70, 243-262, and is reproduced here by permission of the Editor. Page numbers after quotations from Ramsey refer to F. P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers, edited by D. H. Mellor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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20From Translations to TruthmakersIn Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong, De Gruyter. pp. 219-232. 2016.
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35God and ProbabilityReligious Studies 5 (2). 1969.My object in this paper is to consider what relevance, if any, current analyses of probability have to problems of religious belief. There is no doubt that words such as ‘probable’ are used in this context; what is doubtful is that this use can be analysed as other major uses of such words can. I shall conclude that this use cannot be so analysed and hence, given the preponderance of the other uses that can, that it is misleading.
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34Connectivity, chance, and ignoranceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (63): 209-225. 1965.
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Connectivity, chance, and ignoranceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3): 235-238. 1967.
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31Cambridge Philosophers I: F. P. RamseyPhilosophy 70 (272): 243-262. 1995.Frank Plumpton Ramsey was born in February 1903, and he died in January 1930—just before his 27th birthday. In his short life he produced an extraordinary amount of profound and original work in economics, mathematics and logic as well as in philosophy: work which in all these fields is still, over sixty years on, extremely influential.
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77Connectivity, chance, and ignoranceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (63): 209-225. 1965.
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62Experimental error and deducibilityPhilosophy of Science 32 (2): 105-122. 1965.The view is advocated that to preserve a deductivist account of science against recent criticism, it is necessary to incorporate experimental error, or imprecision, in the deductive structure. The sources of imprecision in empirical variables are analyzed, and the notion of conceptual imprecision introduced and illustrated. This is then used to clarify the notion of the acceptable range of a functional law. It is further shown that imprecision may be ascribed to parameters in laws and theories w…Read more
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56Contingent facts: a reply to Cresswell and RiniAnalysis 71 (1): 62-68. 2011.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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29Cambridge Philosophers I: F. P. RamseyPhilosophy 70 (272). 1995.Frank Plumpton Ramsey was born in February 1903, and he died in January 1930—just before his 27th birthday. In his short life he produced an extraordinary amount of profound and original work in economics, mathematics and logic as well as in philosophy: work which in all these fields is still, over sixty years on, extremely influential.
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58Conscious beliefProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 87-101. 1978.D. H. Mellor; VI*—Conscious Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 87–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.
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ACHINSTEIN, P. "Law and Explanation: An essay in the philosophy of science" (review)Mind 83 (n/a): 146. 1974.
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1Consciousness and degrees of beliefIn Prospects for Pragmatism, Cambridge University Press. 1980.
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52The Facts of CausationPhilosophical Books 38 (1): 1-11. 1997.Everything we do relies on causation. We eat and drink because this causes us to stay alive. Courts tell us who causes crimes, criminology tell us what causes people to commit them. D.H. Mellor shows us that to understand the world and our lives we must understand causation. The Facts of Causation , now available in paperback, is essential reading for students and for anyone interested in reading one of the ground-breaking theories in metaphysics. We cannot understand the world and our place in …Read more
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312There is no Question of PhysicalismIn Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, Routledge. pp. 65. 1995.Many philosophers are impressed by the progress achieved by physical sciences. This has had an especially deep effect on their ontological views: it has made many of them physicalists. Physicalists believe that everything is physical: more precisely, that all entities, properties, relations and facts are those which are studied by physics or other physical sciences...
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109Science, belief, and behaviour: essays in honour of R. B. Braithwaite (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 1980.This volume is a collection of original essays by eminent philosophers written for R. B. Braithwaite's eightieth birthday to celebrate his work and teaching. In one way or another, all the essays reflect his central concern with the impact of science on our beliefs about the world and the responses appropriate to that. Together they testify to the signal importance of his contributions in areas of philosophy bearing on this concern: the philosophy of science, especially of the statistical scienc…Read more
Hugh Mellor
(1938 - 2020)
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
Philosophy of Probability |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Probability |
Philosophy of Physical Science |