Philip Devine

If someone abstains from meat-eating for reasons of taste or personal economics, no moral or philosophical question arises. But when a vegetarian attempts to persuade others that they, too, should adopt his diet, then what he says requires philosophical attention. While a vegetarian might argue in any number of ways, this essay will be concerned only with the argument for a vegetarian diet resting on a moral objection to the rearing and killing of animals for the human table. The vegetarian, in this laense, does not merely require us to change or justify our eating habits, but to reconsider our attitudes and behaviour towards members of other species across a wide range of practices.

It is commonplace that negative duties are more stringent than positive duties. it is also commonplace that this distinction requires defense, in particular against those who regard it as a mere apology for the privileges of the wealthy and secure. i conclude, though real, the distinction between negative and positive duties is not as deep as some philosophers have supposed--that it makes best sense in terms of a deeper distinction between the intended and the foreseen consequences of our actions

Raising the war on political correctness to a new and higher intellectual level, Philip Devine sheds fresh light on the whole question of cultural standards and the fashionable notion of multiculturalism. While acknowledging the diversity of ways of life and the differing belief systems that arise from and justify those ways of life, the author attacks the current exploitation of diversity to justify a militantly intolerant relativism. His wide-ranging and erudite work connects cultural issues to our real-world existence as biological and historical beings, pulling together ideas of bioethics, education, and the structure and purpose of families. This work will be of interest to those fighting the culture wars across the humanities and social and behavioral sciences.

The following objection to the ‘ontological’ argument of St Anselm has a continuing importance. The argument begs the question by introducing into the first premise the name ‘God’. In order for something to be truly talked about, to have properties truly attributed to it—it has been said—it must exist; a statement containing a vacuous name must either be false, meaningless, or lacking in truth-value, if it is not a misleading formulation to be explained by paraphrase into other terms. In any case the question of the divine existence is begged.

In recent years, analytically trained philosophers have given extensive attention to various issues involved in the “culture wars,” including abortion, same-sex marriage, stem-cell research, and assisted suicide. There are, however, moral judgments that virtually no one questions. Defenses of adult-child sex, for example, are rare. There is also “conventional immorality”—the breach of conventional moral standards within roughly defined limits that at least limit the resulting damage to third parties and social institutions. These phenomena frame moral discussion even when, as often happens, conventional people are in serious moral disagreement. In this essay I try to make sense of the phenomenon; in a subsequent essay I will show how conventional morality contains within itself the seeds of its collapse, and hence requires support from human nature, either rationally discovered or understood through revelation accepted in faith.

This book presents a defense of the reality of God in the sense in which Nietzsche proclaimed His death. It explores various contemporary versions of Nietzsche's maxim God is dead and proposes an alternative to them. Philip E.Devine critically examines three views that, in one way or another, accept the death of God and take it as central to the intellectual life: pragmatism, which asserts that the only end of the intellectual life is the pursuit of worldly goods other than truth; relativism', which admits a multiplicity of truths corresponding to the modes of life pursued by human beings; and nihilism, to which the pursuit of truth is a deception. Devine then defends his own position on the nature of God and religion and argues for a convergence between the concerns of faith and philosophy.