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47The truth about neptune and the seamlessness of truthPhilosophical Studies 58 (1-2). 1990.This comment on Steven Boer's “Object-Dependent Thoughts” develops two examples: (1) a counterexample to the "axiom of the seamlessness of truth," namely, that there are no propositions, one true and one false, such that knowing the true one requires believing the false one; (2) a story about the first sighting of Neptune, by John Galle on September 23, 1846, that illustrates how one can understand Galle's remark "That is the planet whose position Leverrier calculated" without believing that the…Read more
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44Review: Armstrong's Theory of Universals (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (1). 1980.
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41Volume and solidityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3). 1967.This Article does not have an abstract
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41What could have happenedNoûs 10 (3): 313-326. 1976.Morton White proposes two patterns of expansion for sentences of the form "Possible (x is Q)" in "On What Could Have Happened" (Philosophical Review, 1968). His attempts in "Ands and Cans" (Mind, 1974) and in "Positive Freedom, Negative Freedom, and Possibility" (Journal of Philosophy, 1973) to simplify these two patterns and his argument for abandoning the first pattern are mistaken. Although I question a number of White's claims, my purpose is to improve his treatment of possibility rather tha…Read more
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40Resemblance and Identity: An Examination of the Problem of Universals (review)Philosophical Review 77 (3): 386-389. 1968.
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37The Inductive Support of Inductive Rules: Themes from Max BlackDialectica 44 (1‐2): 23-41. 1990.Overall, Max Black's defense of the inductive support of inductive rules succeeds. Circularity is best explained in terms of epistemic conditions of inference. When an inference is circular, another inference token of the same type may, because of a difference of surrounding circumstances, not be circular. Black's inductive arguments in support of inductive rules fit this pattern: a token circular in some circumstances may be noncircular in other circumstances.
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36The Fallacy of Begging the Question: A Reply to BarkerDialogue 16 (3): 485-498. 1977.According to John A Barker, whether an argument begs the question is purely a matter of logical form. According to me, it is also a matter of epistemic conditions; some arguments which beg the question in some contexts need not beg the question in every context. I point out difficulties in Barker's treatment and defend my own views against some of his criticisms. In the concluding section, "Alleged difficulties with disjunctive syllogism," I defend the validity of disjunctive syllogism against t…Read more
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33Causal Dependence and MultiplicityPhilosophy 60 (232): 215-230. 1985.Ted Honderich's ‘Causes and If p, even if x, still q ’ contains many good points I shall not discuss. My discussion is restricted to some of the points Honderich makes about causal priority in the final two sections of his paper. He considers several proposals, new and old, for accounting for causal priority before he presents a tentativeproposal of his own. He thinks that some of these proposals, besides having difficulties peculiar to themselves, share the deficiency of lacking the proper char…Read more
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31Impartial PerceptionPhilosophy 58 (225). 1983.Wittgenstein remarks in the "Tractatus" that the eye is not in the visual field. I question the claim of Michael Dummett and P T Geach that reflection on this remark helps one conceive of an observer perceiving objects in space without having any location in that space. The literal meaning of "point of view" is illustrated by the visual field. Reflection on the fact that the point of view is not itself normally an object of sight is no help in conceiving perception from no point of view.
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31Causal Dependence and MultiplicityPhilosophy 60 (232): 215-230. 1985.In "Causes and "If P, Even If X, still Q," Philosophy 57 (July 1982), Ted Honderich cites my "The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship," journal of Philosophy 73 (April 22, 1976) as an example of an account of causal priority that lacks the proper character. After emending Honderich's description of the proper character, I argue that my attempt to account for one-way causation in terms of one-way causal conditionship does not totally lack it. Rather than emphasize the singul…Read more
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28From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against BeliefPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1): 149-154. 1986.
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28Begging the question as involving actual belief and inconceivable without itMetaphilosophy 19 (1). 1988.This article answers John Biro's "Knowability, Believability, and Begging the Question: a Reply to Sanford" in "Metaphilosophy" 15 (1984). Biro and I agree that of two argument instances with the same form and content, one but not the other can beg the question, depending on other factors. These factors include actual beliefs, or so I maintain (against Biro) with the help of some analysed examples. Brief selections from Archbishop Whatley and J S Mill suggest that they also regard reference to a…Read more
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28Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting By Daniel C. Dennett Clarendon Press, 1985, x + 200 pp., £17.50, £7.95 paper (review)Philosophy 61 (238): 547-. 1986.
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26The asymmetry of the by-relationMind 93 (371): 410-411. 1984.Sam signaled a turn by extending his arm out the window. Difficulties in explaining the asymmetry of the by-relation in such examples by reference to acceptable and unacceptable counterfactual conditionals are explored by Hugh McCann in "The Trouble with Level-Generation" ("Mind", October 1982). I refine and defend the following alternative account of one-way dependence of y on x: not only is x necessary for y, but something else, independent from x, is also necessary for y; but there is nothing…Read more
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25Red, green and absolute determinacy: A reply to C. Radford's incompatibilities of coloursPhilosophical Quarterly 16 (October): 356-358. 1966.
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24Symposium Contribution on Events and Their Names by Jonathan BennettPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3). 1991.
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24Difficulties for the Reconciling and Estranging Projects: Some SymmetriesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 240-244. 2007.Suppose that Susan did not go to the movies. The reconciling project attempts to show that this plus Determinism does not imply that Susan could not have gone to the movies. The estranging project attempts to show the opposite. A counter‐entailment argument is of the form A is consistent with C, and C entails not‐B, therefore A does not entail B. An instance of the counter‐entailment arguments undermines a central argument for the reconciling project. Another instance undermines a central argume…Read more
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23The anastylosis of reason: Fitting together Stich's fragmentsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 35 (1). 1992.Anastylosis is the reconstruction of a monument using the original fragments and filling in the missing parts with an easily distinguishable modern material. This long review of "The Fragmentation of Reason; Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation" (MIT, 1990) by Stephen P Stich reconstructs, while preserving their original shapes, the conceptions of reason, truth, and rationality that Stich attempts to shatter. The review agrees with Stich's Chapter 3 which is itself highly critic…Read more
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21Causation and IntelligibilityPhilosophy 69 (267): 55-67. 1994.I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori, but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.
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19Intermediate conclusionsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1). 1975.A statement q is a conclusion intermediate between p and h if and only if (1) p justifies h, (2) p justifies q, and (3) (p and not-q) justifies h to a significantly lesser degree than p justifies h. I contend that Gettier-type counterexamples to definitions of factual knowledge violate the following principle: if one knows that h on the basis of p, then all the conclusions intermediate between p and h are true. This principle does not refer to anyone's beliefs that intermediate conclusions are t…Read more
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13Book Review:Perception, Common Sense, and Science James W. Cornman (review)Philosophy of Science 45 (1): 163-. 1978.
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12Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes's MeditationsPhilosophical Review 82 (1): 120. 1973.
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