•  1
    6. Self-Deception as Rationalization
    In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. pp. 157-169. 1988.
  •  11
    Causal Asymmetries (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1): 243-246. 2001.
  •  6
    Perception, Common Sense, and Science
    Philosophy of Science 45 (1): 163-165. 1978.
  •  120
    Distinctness and non-identity
    Analysis 65 (4). 2005.
    The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.
  •  4
    Illusions and Sense-Data
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1): 371-385. 1981.
  •  23
    From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1): 149-154. 1986.
  •  3
    Experience and the Objects of Perception
    Noûs 21 (3): 435-438. 1987.
  •  40
    Resemblance and Identity: An Examination of the Problem of Universals (review)
    Philosophical Review 77 (3): 386-389. 1968.
  •  5
    How Plausible is the Principle of Plenitude?
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2): 149. 1978.
    The cardinality of incompatible possibilities whose actuality requires at least N seconds exceeds the cardinality of disjoint intervals at least N seconds long. Therefore, not all logical possibilities can be actual in the long run, even if the long run is infinite.
  •  9
    Begging the question
    Analysis 32 (6): 197-199. 1972.
  •  24
    Difficulties for the Reconciling and Estranging Projects: Some Symmetries
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 240-244. 2007.
    Suppose that Susan did not go to the movies. The reconciling project attempts to show that this plus Determinism does not imply that Susan could not have gone to the movies. The estranging project attempts to show the opposite. A counter‐entailment argument is of the form A is consistent with C, and C entails not‐B, therefore A does not entail B. An instance of the counter‐entailment arguments undermines a central argument for the reconciling project. Another instance undermines a central argume…Read more
  •  10
    No Title available: New Books (review)
    Philosophy 61 (238): 547-550. 1986.
  •  1
    Infinite regress arguments
    In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Principles of philosophical reasoning, Rowman & Allanheld. pp. 93--117. 1984.
  • Review of Linda Bruns (review)
    Mind 102 (1): 357--60. 1993.
  •  24
    Causes and Coincidences (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 18 (1): 86-88. 1995.
  •  5
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 102 (406): 357-360. 1993.
  •  4
    Chisholm on Brentano's thesis
    In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Open Court. pp. 25--201. 1997.
    Roderick Chisholm provides, in different places, two formulations of Brentano's thesis about the relation between the psychological and the intentional: (1) all and only psychological sentences are intentional; (2) no psychological intentional sentence is equivalent to a nonintentional sentence. Chisholm also presents several definitions of intentionality. Some of these allow that a sentence is intentional while its negation is nonintentional, which ruins the prospects of defending the more plau…Read more
  •  47
    The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Time
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1): 53-75. 1984.
    I revise J L Mackie's first account of casual direction by replacing his notion of "fixity" by a newly defined notion of "sufficing" that is designed to accommodate indeterminism. Keeping Mackie's distinction between casual order and casual direction, I then consider another revision that replaces "fixity" with "one-way conditionship". In response to the charge that all such accounts of casual priority beg the question by making an unjustified appeal to temporal priority, i maintain that one-way…Read more
  •  103
    Locke thought it was a necessary truth that no two material bodies could be in the same place at the same time. Leibniz wasn't so sure. This paper sides with Leibniz. I examine the arguments of David Wiggins in defense of Locke on this point (Philosophical Review, January 1968). Wiggins’ arguments are ineffective.
  •  46
    Vague numbers
    Acta Analytica 17 (2): 63-73. 2002.
    If there are vague numbers, it would be easier to use numbers as semantic values in a treatment of vagueness while avoiding precise cut-off points. When we assign a particular statement a range of values (less than 1 and greater than 0) there is no precise sharp cut-off point that locates the greatest lower bound or the least upper bound of the interval, I should like to say. Is this possible? “Vague Numbers” stands for awareness of the problem. I do not present a serious theory of vague numbers…Read more
  • What is a Truth Functional Component?
    Logique Et Analyse 52 4483-486. 1970.
    Although the truth value (falsity) of "Henry knows that (dogs live in trees and beavers chew wood)" remains unchanged no matter what sentence is substituted in it for "beavers chew wood", we want not to regard the second as a truth functional component (tfc) of the first. Many definitions of "tfc" (e.g., Quine's) fail to insure satisfaction of the following principle: if p is a component of r which is in turn a component of q, then p is a tfc of q if and only if 1) p is also a tfc of r, and 2) r…Read more
  •  103
    Infinity and vagueness
    Philosophical Review 84 (4): 520-535. 1975.
    Many philosophic arguments concerned with infinite series depend on the mutual inconsistency of statements of the following five forms: (1) something exists which has R to something; (2) R is asymmetric; (3) R is transitive; (4) for any x which has R to something, there is something which has R to x; (5) only finitely many things are related by R. Such arguments are suspect if the two-place relation R in question involves any conceptual vagueness or inexactness. Traditional sorites arguments sho…Read more
  •  2
    The perception of shape
    In Carl Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge And Mind: Phil Essays, Oxford University Press. 1983.
    The central text of this article is Thomas Reid’s response to Berkeley’s argument for distinguishing tangible from visual shape. Reid is right to hold that shape words do not have different visual and tangible meanings. We might also perceive shape, moreover, with senses other than touch and sight. As Reid also suggests, the visual perception of shape does not require perception of hue or brightness. Contrary to treatments of the Molyneux problem by H. P. Grice and Judith Jarvis Thomson, I …Read more
  •  1
    Downing on positive and negative terms
    Analysis 30 (5): 167-172. 1970.
  •  20
    The anastylosis of reason: Fitting together Stich's fragments
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 35 (1). 1992.
    Anastylosis is the reconstruction of a monument using the original fragments and filling in the missing parts with an easily distinguishable modern material. This long review of "The Fragmentation of Reason; Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation" (MIT, 1990) by Stephen P Stich reconstructs, while preserving their original shapes, the conceptions of reason, truth, and rationality that Stich attempts to shatter. The review agrees with Stich's Chapter 3 which is itself highly critic…Read more
  •  200
    Causal necessity and logical necessity
    Philosophical Studies 28 (2). 1975.
    Myles Brand and Marshall Swain advocate the principle that if A is the set of conditions individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the occurrence of B, then if C is a set of conditions individually necessary for the occurrence of B, every member of C is a member of A. I agree with John Barker and Risto Hilpinen who each argue that this principle is not true for causal necessity and sufficiency, but I disagree with their claim that it is true for logical necessity and sufficiency. The ori…Read more