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317Spotty Scope and Our Relation to FictionsNoûs 46 (2): 243-58. 2012.Whatever the attractions of Tolkein's world, irrealists about fictions do not believe literally that Bilbo Baggins is a hobbit. Instead, irrealists believe that, according to The Lord of the Rings {Bilbo is a hobbit}. But when irrealists want to say something like “I am taller than Bilbo”, there is nowhere good for them to insert the operator “according to The Lord of the Rings”. This is an instance of the operator problem. In this paper, I outline and criticise Sainsbury's (2006) spotty scope a…Read more
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557Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary languageSynthese 197 (1): 33-57. 2020.Amie Thomasson and Eli Hirsch have both attempted to deflate metaphysics, by combining Carnapian ideas with an appeal to ordinary language. My main aim in this paper is to critique such deflationary appeals to ordinary language. Focussing on Thomasson, I draw two very general conclusions. First: ordinary language is a wildly complicated phenomenon. Its implicit ontological commitments can only be tackled by invoking a context principle; but this will mean that ordinary language ontology is not a…Read more
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334The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy ArgumentProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3): 261-289. 2014.Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument …Read more
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312Knot and Tonk: Nasty Connectives on Many-Valued Truth-Tables for Classical Sentential LogicAnalysis 76 (1): 7-19. 2016.Prior’s Tonk is a famously horrible connective. It is defined by its inference rules. My aim in this article is to compare Tonk with some hitherto unnoticed nasty connectives, which are defined in semantic terms. I first use many-valued truth-tables for classical sentential logic to define a nasty connective, Knot. I then argue that we should refuse to add Knot to our language. And I show that this reverses the standard dialectic surrounding Tonk, and yields a novel solution to the problem of ma…Read more
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175Hyperloops do not threaten the notion of an effective procedureLecture Notes in Computer Science 5635 68-78. 2009.This paper develops my (BJPS 2009) criticisms of the philosophical significance of a certain sort of infinitary computational process, a hyperloop. I start by considering whether hyperloops suggest that "effectively computable" is vague (in some sense). I then consider and criticise two arguments by Hogarth, who maintains that hyperloops undermine the very idea of effective computability. I conclude that hyperloops, on their own, cannot threaten the notion of an effective procedure.
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2405The Limits of RealismOxford University Press UK. 2013.Tim Button explores the relationship between words and world; between semantics and scepticism. A certain kind of philosopher – the external realist – worries that appearances might be radically deceptive. For example, she allows that we might all be brains in vats, stimulated by an infernal machine. But anyone who entertains the possibility of radical deception must also entertain a further worry: that all of our thoughts are totally contentless. That worry is just incoherent. We cannot, then, …Read more
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405Dadaism: Restrictivism as Militant QuietismProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3): 387-398. 2010.Can we quantify over everything: absolutely, positively, definitely, totally, every thing? Some philosophers have claimed that we must be able to do so, since the doctrine that we cannot is self-stultifying. But this treats restrictivism as a positive doctrine. Restrictivism is much better viewed as a kind of militant quietism, which I call dadaism. Dadaists advance a hostile challenge, with the aim of silencing everyone who holds a positive position about ‘absolute generality’
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539Review of: Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy, by Colin McGinn (review)Analysis 73 (3): 577-580. 2013.In Truth by Analysis (2012), Colin McGinn aims to breathe new life into conceptual analysis. Sadly, he fails to defend conceptual analysis, either in principle or by example.
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175The chair that is used to sit in. Review of: The American Pragmatists by Cheryl Misak (review)Times Literary Supplement 18. 2013.In The American Pragmatists (2013), Cheryl Misak casts Peirce and Lewis as the heroes of American pragmatism. She establishes an impressive continuity between pragmatism and both logical empiricism and contemporary analytic philosophy. However, in casting James and Dewey as the villains of American pragmatism, she underplays the pragmatists' interest in action.
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482The Metamathematics of Putnam’s Model-Theoretic ArgumentsErkenntnis 74 (3): 321-349. 2011.Putnam famously attempted to use model theory to draw metaphysical conclusions. His Skolemisation argument sought to show metaphysical realists that their favourite theories have countable models. His permutation argument sought to show that they have permuted models. His constructivisation argument sought to show that any empirical evidence is compatible with the Axiom of Constructibility. Here, I examine the metamathematics of all three model-theoretic arguments, and I argue against Bays (2001…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Mathematics |
Metaphysics |
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Higher-Order Logic |
Methodology in Metaphysics |
Set Theory as a Foundation |