Life's Form is that rarest of books: an important contribution to advanced scholarship on its subject that is thoroughly accessible to nonspecialists. It immerses its readers in the world of the sixteenth‐ to seventeenth‐century scientia de anima, within which, and out of which, emerges Descartes's decidedly non‐Aristotelian conception of the body‐soul relation that has haunted us ever since. We are treated to lengthy, elegant translations of the Latin texts of the leading Jesuit philosophers of…
Read moreLife's Form is that rarest of books: an important contribution to advanced scholarship on its subject that is thoroughly accessible to nonspecialists. It immerses its readers in the world of the sixteenth‐ to seventeenth‐century scientia de anima, within which, and out of which, emerges Descartes's decidedly non‐Aristotelian conception of the body‐soul relation that has haunted us ever since. We are treated to lengthy, elegant translations of the Latin texts of the leading Jesuit philosophers of the period, principally Toletus, Sudrez, Fonseca, Arriaga, and the Coimbrans, but always accompanied in footnotes by the full Latin text. These authors are portrayed as both intimately familiar with their source text, Aristotle's De Anima, but also highly sensitive to its key problems: Aristotle's insistence that the concept of soul is applicable to those beings that partake only of the capacities of nutrition, and generation reproduction, i.e. plants; his equivocal pronouncements on the relationship between life and soul; the problems that emerge from his definition of soul as form and first actuality of a living body with organs; and his simultaneous insistence that the soul is a unity and has parts. All of the authors examined take these problems seriously and have sustained arguments about how to resolve them. When reading this volume one truly feels the importance of answering these problems for these thinkers and the power of the intellects that are grappling with them.One of the most interesting features of Des Chene's narrative is his ability to put these “in house” disagreements within a wider context. René Descartes's reaction to these debates is shown persuasively to shape those decisive departures from orthodoxy that created a body/soul dualism that was inconceivable to these Aristotelians. There were, of course, serious problems in reconciling the text of Aristotle with Christian doctrine but even here the reconciliations are widely varying and often startlingly unorthodox. The volume is organized into four parts. The first, “Data for the Study of Souls,” provides the reader with a background in both the Aristotelian texts and the chief concerns of the commentators to be discussed. The second, “Defining the Soul,” traces the disputes around Aristotle's definition of the soul canvassed above. “Powers and Parts,” the book's third part, sees these authors facing the problem of how one “counts” the soul's capacities and how, in the end, one prevents the soul from simply being a name for this set of capacities. This leads inevitably to the questions dealt with in Des Chene's final section, entitled “Unity.” How does one preserve the unity of the soul in the face of the radical differences between its various capacities? This becomes especially pressing for a Jesuit commentator, who must allow for the potential immortality of the human soul within an Aristotelian framework that defines it as “substance qua form of a natural body.” Without emphasizing it, there are constant reminders in every chapter that the debate in the philosophy of mind over the past century is decisively shaped by the argument between these Christian Aristotelians and their foes, especially Descartes