Vilius Dranseika

The standard argument for the causal theory of memory relies on intuitions about scenarios in which subjects accurately represent events from their pasts but do so in a “causally defective” manner. Examples include representations based on suggestion and representations based on relearned information. According to causalists, these scenarios, intuitively, are not cases of remembering. This paper applies the methods of experimental philosophy to determine whether laypeople share causalist intuitions. We find that, in scenarios in which all of the causal theory’s requirements for remembering are fulfilled and in scenarios in which none of these requirements are fulfilled, laypeople’s intuitions align with the causal theory’s verdicts: they clearly ascribe remembering in the former scenarios and clearly deny remembering in the latter scenarios. In causally defective scenarios—scenarios in which some but not all of the requirements of the causal theory are fulfilled—a more complex pattern of responses is observed, with some participants ascribing remembering even in cases that do not satisfy causalist requirements. In particular, while many participants deny that remembering occurs in relearning, many do the opposite. These results suggest that folk ascriptions of remembering only partly align with the causal theory of memory.

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.

The article defends the pluralist policy of death determination. According to this view, competent persons should be free to choose the criteria under which they should be diagnosed as dead. Our argument partly relies on the diagnosis of the current state of the discussion in the bioethical literature on death determination and partly on empirical evidence that lay intuitions about death determination differ, that is, that there is interpersonal psychological pluralism about death determination. The article then introduces empirical evidence for intrapersonal psychological pluralism about death determination. We argue that intrapersonal psychological pluralism strengthens the case for the pluralist policy of death determination.

We respond to Gillon’s critique of our data-driven analysis of the history of Journal of Medical Ethics (JME), in which we used a topic model to trace intellectual trends in the journal’s first 50 years. Gillon, drawing on his personal memories as JME’s second (and longest serving) editor, challenges several of our findings, particularly those concerning the prominence and classification of topics such as Ethics education. In this reply, we clarify misunderstandings that led to part of his criticisms of our method. At the same time, we also briefly discuss some nuances of topic modelling, in particular, its reliance on simplified representations of text, sensitivity to modeling choices and topic interpretations. Rather than viewing computational models and editorial memory as competing sources of insight, we propose that they are complementary: each illuminates different dimensions of the journal’s evolution. Gillon’s engagement with our work ultimately highlights the importance of methodological transparency and the value of combining digital humanities tools with lived experience in the historiography of academic disciplines.

The topic of this chapter is pre-theoretical beliefs about phenomenological similarities and differences between mental states. I report the results of a set of exploratory studies on folk beliefs about phenomenological differences and similarities between dreaming, remembering, perceiving, imagining, and hallucinating. Study participants were inclined to treat some pairs of mental states as phenomenologically relatively similar (dreaming and imagining; hallucinating and dreaming) and other pairs as phenomenologically relatively different (hallucinating and remembering; dreaming and seeing). Similarity judgments, however, were often sensitive to the order of comparison. For instance, study participants were much more inclined to agree that hallucinating feels like seeing than that seeing feels like hallucinating, and much more inclined to agree that dreaming feels like seeing than the other way around. Furthermore, beliefs about phenomenological similarity were associated with beliefs about how likely various metacognitive mistakes are.

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.

We report three studies on knowledge attributions in Gettier cases and their closely matched control cases (CMCs), i.e., scenarios similar in wording but lacking Gettierization. Although there is rich empirical literature on Gettier cases, CMCs are rarely used. Study 1 tested two scenarios that played an important role in the literature and found that most participants deny knowledge in both Gettierized and CMC variants of these scenarios. We hypothesized that these Gettier cases, besides Gettierization, possess another feature that affects knowledge attributions: skeptical pressure. Study 2 tested this hypothesis by employing ‘depressurized’ versions of Gettier cases (scenarios devoid of elements exerting skeptical pressure) and found that depressurization significantly increases knowledge attributions in CMCs. Study 3 is a pre-registered replication of the main findings. We suggest that some previous studies on Gettier cases confounded two factors, Gettierization and skeptical pressure, and that the impact of these factors on knowledge attributions can be separated by the proper design of study materials.

The analysis of citation flow from a collection of scholarly articles might provide valuable insights into their thematic focus and the genealogy of their main concepts. In this study, we employ a topic model to delineate a subcorpus of 1,360 papers representative of bioethical discussions on enhancing human life. We subsequently conduct an analysis of almost 11,000 references cited in that subcorpus to examine quantitatively, from a bird’s-eye view, the degree of openness of this part of scholarship to the specialized knowledge produced in biosciences. Although almost half of the analyzed references point to journals classified as Natural Science and Engineering (NSE), we do not find strong evidence of the intellectual influence of recent discoveries in biosciences on discussions on human enhancement. We conclude that a large part of the discourse surrounding human enhancement is inflected with “science-fictional habits of mind.” Our findings point to the need for a more science-informed approach in discussions on enhancing human life.

In this paper, we take a data-driven approach to analyse intellectual trends over the first five decades of the Journal of Medical Ethics (JME). Our data set, comprising all texts published in the JME since 1975, reveals not only the most distinctive topics of the JME in comparison to other key journals with similar profiles but also diachronic fluctuations in the prominence of certain topics. Overall, the distribution of topics shifted gradually, with each editorial period at the JME showing continuity with its immediate predecessor. However, a significant drift in topic distribution is evident over the 50 years, with some editorial periods being more ‘disruptive’ than others. These disruptions were influenced by external events (eg, Public health emergencies), broader trends in bioethics (eg, the recent growth of topics such as Race, Privacy and Vaccination) or editors’ preferences (eg, Ethics education). Additionally, our data provides insights into editorials where editors outlined their visions for the journal or reflected retrospectively on their past editorship.

The present chapter explores conceptual links in folk cognition between death, existence and personal identity. There is some evidence that people’s judgments about death determination differ relatively widely (Dranseika and Neiders 2018, Neiders and Dranseika 2020). If folk judgements about death differ between people, however, can those differences at least in some degree be driven by people’s beliefs about what we are, when we cease to exist and whether ceasing to exist is identical to death (so-called Termination Thesis)? In order to answer these questions, we conducted two studies. The first study looks into how people think about when they begin and cease to exist as well as when they are born and die. The second study replicates the findings of the first study in a different language and country and also extends these results by also looking at what people think about ‘what we are’, and whether their position on the latter issue is associated to their thinking about when they begin and cease to exist as well as when they are born and die. The studies presented in this chapter show that, first, people seem to hold a considerable variety of different views about death, coming into existence, ceasing to exist and what we are. The studies also recovered a number of conceptual links between these concepts. These results potentially bear on a number of issues in bioethics, i.e., not only discussions on death determination, but also on abortion or embryonic research. As for death determination, the results can be taken to provide further support for the so-called pluralist proposal. Second, study results provide little evidence for the claim that people’s beliefs about death are driven by their assumptions about personal identity, i.e., their understanding of ‘what we are’. In particular, there is little evidence that differences among people on death result from differences among people on personal identity. Finally, the studies show that people don’t reason in accordance with the Termination Thesis. The link between folk ascriptions of death and cessation of existence, while present, is weak.

Based on a large cross-cultural study, David Rose et al. (in: Lombrozo et al. (eds) Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, Vol. 3, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 158–174, 2020) argue that the Ship of Theseus story is a genuine puzzle in the sense that people who consider it feel inclined to assert two prima facie inconsistent propositions (_Ambivalence_). In response, Marta Campdelacreu et al. (Dialectica 74(3):551–559, 2020) argue that the data reported by Rose et al. (2020) fail to support _Ambivalence_. Namely, the data show sharp _interpersonal_ disagreement among different readers of the Ship of Theseus story, but they fail to demonstrate an _intrapersonal_ conflict or indecision. Should _intrapersonal Ambivalence_ be demonstrated, this, according to Campdelacreu et al. (2020), would be a good indicator of the presence of a puzzle. Here, I provide empirical evidence for _intrapersonal Ambivalence_ about the Ship of Theseus story.

In this paper, we present a set of preregistered studies inspired by both Lockean pluralism about individuation and discussions of conjoined twinning in the contemporary personal identity debate. In combination, these studies provide evidence of folk pluralism about individuation of “individuals like us” and also ways in which individuation judgments are integral to practical interests. First, our studies show that individuation judgments depend on a sortal supplied. Study participants tend to see two people or persons but only one organism in case of dicephalic twins, and they do not find these two verdicts inconsistent. Second, study participants tend to be pluralist in a sense that they find it acceptable to consider dicephalic twins to be—at the same time—two persons sharing one body and one two‐headed person. Third, while both perspectives are available, when reasons for counting are made salient, study participants tend to resolve pluralism in line with practical interests relevant in the context.

Research ethics committees and institutional review boards spend considerable time developing, scrutinising, and revising specific consent processes and materials for survey-based studies conducted on crowdsourcing and online recruitment platforms such as MTurk and Prolific. However, there is evidence to suggest that many users of ICT services do not read the information provided as part of the consent process and they habitually provide or refuse their consent without adequate reflection. In principle, these practices call into question the validity of their consent. In this paper we argue that although the ‘no read problem’ and the routinisation of consent may apply to research participants’ consent practices for studies on crowdsourcing platforms, this is not a serious problem. Furthermore, given that the informational requirements for informed consent in these contexts are minimal, we argue that these participants are, nevertheless, sufficiently informed to give valid consent. We conclude that research ethics committees and institutional review boards should only agonise over the precise details of the informed consent process and materials in those rare cases where appreciable risks to research participants need to be managed.

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges.

People across cultures consider everyday choices in the context of perceived various external life-determining forces: such as fate and gods (two teleological forces) and such notions as luck and chance (two non-teleological forces). There is little cross-cultural evidence (except for a belief in gods) showing how people relate these salient notions of life-determining forces to prosociality and a sense of well-being. The current paper provides preliminary cross-cultural data to address this gap. Results indicate that choice is the most important life-determining factor. Regression analyses indicate that choice and belief in gods and fate emerged as significant predictors of prosociality towards strangers. Moreover, luck was a significant predictor of decreased prosociality. A relation between life-determining forces and life satisfaction followed the same pattern: choice, gods, and fate emerged as significant predictors of greater life satisfaction, whereas luck was associated with decreased life satisfaction. The overall pattern of results indicates that participants across different cultures might sense being bounded to share or not to care depending on the perceived intentional agency and meaning in the external forces.

Occasional reports in the literature suggest that biological samples collected and stored for scientific research are sometimes accessed and used for a variety of forensic purposes. However, donors are almost never informed about this possibility. In this paper we argue that the possibility of forensic access may constitute a relevant consideration at least to some potential research subjects in deciding whether to participate in research. We make the suggestion that if some type of forensic access to research collections is likely to be perceived by the subjects as a reason against donating their biological materials, there are good ethical reasons to make this type of access impossible or at least severely restricted. We also provide an ethical argument for the claim that, if a total ban on this type of forensic access cannot be achieved, potential research subjects should be informed about the extent to which this type of forensic access is possible.

Blumenthal-Barby and her colleagues (2022) situate their discussion of philosophy and bioethics in the context of (reportedly) widely held assumption that, when compared to the early days of bioethics, the role of philosophy is now diminished across the field – the assumption we call the Disconnection Thesis. This assumption can be summarized, to use the authors’ own words, by the phrase “philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over“. While in no place of the article they explicitly endorse the Disconnection Thesis, at least some of the authors had previously endorsed it in print (Savulescu 2015). Such expressions of collective expert wisdom might be a valuable source of information on the discipline's history, but they should not be accepted uncritically. Given the explosion in the size and scope of bioethical research in recent decades, any scholar’s familiarity with the area is necessarily based on selective reading and might be biased. Hence, in this commentary, we examine what kind of more rigorous evidence could corroborate the Disconnection Thesis. In other words, if the role of philosophy in bioethics has been indeed diminishing, what kind of observable patterns should we expect to see? Drawing on our previous research (Bystranowski, Dranseika, Żuradzki 2022), here we focus on two useful perspectives: citation analysis and topic modeling. While the first approach allows us to indirectly measure the level of engagement of bioethicists with philosophical literature (by measuring the proportion of references from articles published in journals in bioethics that cite philosophy journals), the latter provides a window into the content and argumentative style of bioethical texts.

Topic modeling—a text‐mining technique often used to uncover thematic structures in large collections of texts—has been increasingly frequently used in the context of the analysis of scholarly output. In this study, we construct a corpus of 19,488 texts published since 1971 in seven leading journals in the field of bioethics and philosophy of medicine, and we use a machine learning algorithm to identify almost 100 topics representing distinct themes of interest in the field. On the basis of intertopic correlations, we group the content‐based topics into eight clusters, thus providing a novel, fine‐grained intellectual map of bioethics and philosophy of medicine. Moreover, we conduct a number of diachronic analyses, examining how the “prominence” of different topics has changed across time. In this way, we are able to observe the distinct patterns in which bioethics and philosophy of medicine have evolved and changed their focus over the past half a century.

When a terminally ill patient kills herself, using a drug prescribed by a physician for this purpose, in bioethical literature this would be described as a case of physician-assisted suicide. This would also be a case of suicide according to the standard account of suicide in the philosophical literature. However, in recent years, some authors have argued that terminally ill self-killing in fact should not be considered suicide. In this paper, we don’t try to address the philosophical merits of such arguments. Instead, we ask whether these considerations align with the way non-philosophers think about suicide. We present empirical evidence from four studies that address different concerns raised about terminally ill self-killing being a suicide. We conclude that the raised concerns cannot be supported by the folk understanding of suicide.

In this commentary paper, we are taking one step further in questioning the central assumptions in the bioethical debates about reproductive technologies. We argue that the very distinction between “person affecting” and “identity affecting” interventions is based on a questionable form of material-origin essentialism. Questioning of this form of essentialist approach to human identity allows treating genome editing and genetic selection as more similar than they are taken to be in the standard approaches. It would also challenge the idea that normative reasons we have in these two types of cases markedly differ in strength.

In a recent paper, Justin D’Ambrosio (2020) has offered an empirical argument in support of a negative solution to the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger—namely, the question of whether, in the famous scene from Shakespeare’s play, Macbeth sees a dagger in front of him. D’Ambrosio’s strategy consists in showing that “seeing” is not an existence-neutral verb; that is, that the way it is used in ordinary language is not neutral with respect to whether its complement exists. In this paper, we offer an empirical argument in favor of an existence-neutral reading of “seeing”. In particular, we argue that existence-neutral readings are readily available to language users. We thus call into question D’Ambrosio’s argument for the claim that Macbeth does not see a dagger. According to our positive solution, Macbeth sees a dagger, even though there is not a dagger in front of him.

In his article “The Ontology of Musical Versions: Introducing the Hypothesis of Nested Types,” Nemesio Puy raises a hypothesis that continuity of the purpose is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for musical work’s identity. Puy’s hypothesis is relevant to two topics in cognitive psychology and experimental philosophy. The first topic is the prevalence of teleological reasoning about various objects and its influence on persistence and categorization judgments. The second one is the importance of an artist’s intention in the categorization of artworks. We tested the teleological hypothesis across three studies. Vignettes in these three studies describe a musical work being changed in some of these aspects: purpose either changed or retained; score either changed or retained; change is made either by the same or a different composer. The results suggest that teleological considerations impact judgments on the persistence of musical works, but this impact appears to be relatively weak. The results also suggest that persistence judgments strongly depend on whether acoustical properties were changed, while whether the change was made by the original composer seems to be relatively unimportant.

My aim in this paper is to explore the idea of human moral responsibility for (the outcomes) of natural disasters. First, I discuss the claim that there is often a human causal contribution to negative outcomes of even such paradigmatic natural disasters as earthquakes, typhoons, and volcano eruptions. Second, I attempt to move away from discussions attributing human causal responsibility to discussions attributing human moral responsibility for such outcomes (and to the obstacles to such attributions). I suggest that in most (perhaps even all) cases of moral responsibility for the outcomes of natural disasters moral responsibility is grounded in culpable negligence, including culpable failure to prevent the side-effects of our actions or omissions.