•  89
    14 Ex nihilo nihil fit: Arguments New and Old for the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation, Bradford. pp. 4--291. 2007.
  •  85
    One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics
    University of Notre Dame Press. 2012.
    This important philosophical reflection on love and sexuality from a broadly Christian perspective is aimed at philosophers, theologians, and educated Christian readers. Alexander R. Pruss focuses on foundational questions on the nature of romantic love and on controversial questions in sexual ethics on the basis of the fundamental idea that romantic love pursues union of two persons as one body. _One Body_ begins with an account, inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas, of the general nature of love as …Read more
  •  87
    We give a comparison inequality that allows one to estimate the tail probabilities of sums of independent Banach space valued random variables in terms of those of independent identically distributed random variables. More precisely, let X1, . . . , Xn be independent Banach-valued random variables. Let I be a random variable independent of X1, . . . , Xn and uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n}. Put ˜.
  •  302
    Conditional probabilities
    Analysis 72 (3): 488-491. 2012.
    A simple argument is given that shows that conditional probabilities do not supervene on unconditional probabilities. In particular, one cannot in general define conditional probabilities using the ratio formula P ( U | V ) = P ( U & V )/ P ( U ), or using any more sophisticated method based on unconditional probabilities
  •  216
    The A-theory of time and induction
    Philosophical Studies 152 (3). 2011.
    The A-theory of time says that it is an objective, non-perspectival fact about the world that some events are present, while others were present or will be present. I shall argue that the A-theory has some implausible consequences for inductive reasoning. In particular, the presentist version of the A-theory, which holds that the difference between the present and the non-present consists in the present events being the only ones that exist, is very much in trouble
  •  390
    Incompatibilism proved
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4): 430-437. 2013.
    (2013). Incompatibilism proved. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. ???aop.label???
  •  336
    Review of Graham Oppy, Arguing About Gods (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5). 2007.
  •  169
    Cosmological and design arguments
    with Richard M. Gale
    In William J. Wainwright (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of religion, Oxford University Press. pp. 116--137. 2005.
    The cosmological and teleological argument both start with some contingent feature of the actual world and argue that the best or only explanation of that feature is that it was produced by an intelligent and powerful supernatural being. The cosmological argument starts with a general feature, such as the existence of contingent being or the presence of motion and uses some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to conclude that this feature must have an explanation. The debate then focus…Read more
  •  140
    Problems with plurals
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9. 2015.
    Plural quantification, often used to evade Russell paradoxes, will lead back to them, given certain assumptions about propositions. This chapter provides a more generalized version of the path to paradox by showing that any theory that makes possible the construction of an appropriate packaging relation falls prey to a Russell paradox. It gives examples of widely-held metaphysical theories that require such a relation. It shows that the paradoxes that can result from plural quantification are mo…Read more
  •  93
    Freedom, Will, and Nature
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81 25-27. 2007.
  •  334
    Possibility is not consistency
    Philosophical Studies 172 (9): 2341-2348. 2015.
    We shall use Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem to show that consistency is not possibility, and then argue that the argument does serious damage to some theories of modality where consistency plays a major but not exclusive role
  •  29
    Much of the discussion had focussed on the question of whether religious experiences are veridical, but then Richard M. Gale asked a more fundamental question: Are they even cognitive? An experience is cognitive if it takes an intentional accusative, such as “red cube” in “I see a red cube,” as opposed to the cognate accusative exemplified by the use of the word “waltz” in “I am dancing a waltz” which is synonymous with “I am dancing waltzily.” Cognitive experiences are objective in the sense th…Read more
  •  402
    The ontological argument and the motivational centres of lives
    Religious Studies 46 (2): 233-249. 2010.
    Assuming S₅, the main controversial premise in modal ontological arguments is the possibility premise, such as that possibly a maximally great being exists. I shall offer a new way of arguing that the possibility premise is probably true
  •  18
    I argue that standard functionalism leads to absurd conclusions as to the number of minds that would exist in the universe if persons were duplicated
  •  155
    Philosophy and Language
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84 213-222. 2010.
    I shall discuss the problem of the definition of lying and the formulation of the duty of truthtelling. I shall argue that the morality of assertion is a special case of the morality of endorsement, and that a criterion of adequacy for an account of lying is that it handles certain cases of dishonest endorsement as well. Standardviews of lying fail to do so. I shall offer an account of the duty of honest endorsement in terms of the intention to avoid falsehood. But, in the end, we may simplyhave…Read more
  •  18
  •  1
              The production of a number of vaccines involves the use of cell-lines originally derived from fetuses directly aborted in the 1960s and 1970s. Such cell-lines, indeed sometimes the very same ones, are important to on-going research, including at Catholic institutions. The cells currently used are removed by a number of decades and by a significant number of cellular generations from the original cells. Moreover, the original cells extracted from the bodies of the aborted f…Read more
  •  502
    A response to Oppy, and to Davey and Clifton
    with Richard M. Gale
    Religious Studies 38 (1): 89-99. 2002.
    Our paper ‘A new cosmological argument’ gave an argument for the existence of God making use of the weak Principle of Sufficient Reason (W-PSR) which states that for every proposition p, if p is true, then it is possible that there is an explanation for p. Recently, Graham Oppy, as well as Kevin Davey and Rob Clifton, have criticized the argument. We reply to these criticisms. The most interesting kind of criticism in both papers alleges that the W-PSR can be justifiably denied by the atheist, a…Read more
  •  326
    The cardinality objection to David Lewis's modal realism
    Philosophical Studies 104 (2): 169-178. 2001.
    According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every waythat a world could be is a way that some concretely existingphysical world really is. But if the worlds are physicalentities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereasI show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is nota set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of theLewisian framework.
  •  66
    Complicity, Fetal Tissue, and Vaccines
    The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 6 (3): 461-470. 2006.
  •  12
    Case 1 (transplant) . You are a surgeon doing an appendectomy on Fred, who is otherwise healthy. You know from his file that, just by chance, his heart, lungs, bone marrow, liver and two kidneys are a perfect match for fifteen patients in your hospital who need various organs or bone marrow, of both of which there is a severe shortage of these organs; Fred, however, has refused to donate anything. If the fifteen patients do not receive the transplants today, they will die. You skillfully use you…Read more
  •  17
    Fatalism and Some Varieties of Contrastive Explanation
    In Leigh Vicens & Peter Furlong (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives, Cambridge University Press. 2022.
    In the first chapter of Romans, Paul tells us that the power and deity of God are evident from what he has created. One reading of this is that there is an argument from the content of what has been created. Thus, the Book of Wisdom, which may well have been the source of Paul’s ideas here, says that “from the greatness and beauty of created things their original author, by analogy, is seen” (13:5, NAB). This is a kind of teleological or design argument. But one might also argue instead from gen…Read more
  •  47
    I argue against psychological theories of identity that claim that in cases where one’s personality and memories are moved into the brain of another, we move with them. I am not entirely convinced by my arguments here, I must confess, but I think they deserve some thought.
  •  241
    Prophecy without middle knowledge
    Faith and Philosophy 24 (4): 433-457. 2007.
    While it might seem prima facie plausible that divine foreknowledge is all that is needed for prophecy, this seems incorrect. To issue a prophecy, God hasto know not just how someone will act, but how someone would act were the prophecy issued. This makes some think that Middle Knowledge is required.I argue that Thomas Flint’s two Middle Knowledge based accounts of prophecy are unsatisfactory, but one of them can be repaired. However the resources needed for repair also yield a sketch of a forek…Read more
  •  30
    The A-theory of time states that there is an absolute fact of the matter about what events are, respectively, in the past, present and future. The B-theory says that all there is to temporality are the relations of earlier-than, later-than and simultaneous-with, and the past, present and future are merely relative.
  •  266
    Time without Creation?
    Faith and Philosophy 31 (4): 401-411. 2014.
    We introduce three arguments for the thesis that time cannot exist prior to an original creation event. In the first argument, we seek to show that if time doesn’t depend upon creation, then time is infinite in the backwards direction, which is incompatible with arguments for a finite past. In the second and third arguments, we allow for the possibility of backwards-infinite time but argue that God could not have a sufficiently good reason to refrain from creating for infinitely many moments—eit…Read more
  •  25
    The pseudonymous author of this article argues that neither Kierkegaard nor Climacus in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript are claiming that Christian beliefs are nonsense or contradictory, but that it is contrary to universal epistemic norms to believe these beliefs or even to believe they can be believed. In an appendix for which the rest of the article is a preparation the author gives an interpretation of the pseudonymity and form-content contradiction and of how Kierkegaard in a sense a…Read more