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160Deep Disagreements and Rational ResolutionTopoi (5): 1-13. 2018.The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumentation theory in a way that will advance the relevant debates. While these literatures can intersect in many ways, I will explore how some of views pertaining to deep disagreements in argumentation theory can act as an objection to a prominent view of the epistemology of disagreement—the Equal Weight View. To do so, I will explain the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement and show how it entails …Read more
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149Is there a well-founded solution to the generality problem?Philosophical Studies 172 (2): 459-468. 2015.The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Several recent responses to the generality problem have claimed that the problem has been unfairly leveled against reliabilists. In particular, these responses have claimed that the generality problem is either (i) just as much of a problem for evidentialists, or (ii) if it is not, then a parallel solution is available to reliabilists. Along these lines, Juan Comesaña has recently proposed solution to the gener…Read more
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142Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of ConciliationistsJournal of the American Philosophical Association 1-24. 2022.Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or “sticking to one’s guns” in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, …Read more
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135Moral Caution and the Epistemology of DisagreementJournal of Social Philosophy 47 (2): 120-141. 2016.In this article, I propose, defend, and apply a principle for applied ethics. According to this principle, we should exercise moral caution, at least when we can. More formally, the principle claims that if you should believe or suspend judgment that doing an action is a serious moral wrong, while knowing that not doing that action is not morally wrong, then you should not do that action. After motivating this principle, I argue that it has significant application in applied ethics. The applicat…Read more
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133Science Communication and Epistemic InjusticeSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (1): 1-9. 2019.Epistemic injustice occurs when someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower.[1] More and more attention is being paid to the epistemic injustices that exist in our scientific practices. In a recent paper, Fabien Medvecky argues that science communication is fundamentally epistemically unjust. In what follows we briefly explain his argument before raising several challenges to it.
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120The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2014.How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from philosophy and psychology. The first section explores the ethics of belief from an individualistic framework. It begins by examining the question of doxastic voluntarism-i.e., the extent to which people have control over their beliefs. It then shifts to focusing on the kinds of character that epistemic agents should cultivate, what their epistemic …Read more
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104The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective SubjectsErkenntnis 85 (4): 829-840. 2020.In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
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95Epistemic Autonomy (edited book)Routledge. 2021.This is the first book dedicated to the topic of epistemic autonomy. It features original essays from leading scholars that promise to significantly shape future debates in this emerging area of epistemology. While the nature of and value of autonomy has long been discussed in ethics and social and political philosophy, it remains an underexplored area of epistemology. The essays in this collection take up several interesting questions and approaches related to epistemic autonomy. Topics include…Read more
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86Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical TheismFaith and Philosophy 28 (3): 323-331. 2011.Recently Trent Dougherty has claimed that there is a tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology—that the more plausible one of these views is, the less plausible the other is. In this paper I explain Dougherty’s argument and develop an account of defeaters which removes the alleged tension between skeptical theism and common sense epistemology.
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75Gritty FaithAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3): 499-513. 2018.In this paper, I will connect some of the philosophical research on non-doxastic accounts of faith to some psychological research on grit. In doing so I hope to advance the debate on both the nature and value of faith by connecting some philosophical insights with some empirical grounding. In particular, I will use Duckworth’s research to show that seeing faith as grit both captures the philosophical motivations for non-doxastic accounts of faith and comes with empirical backing that such fait…Read more
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49Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of ConciliationistsJournal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (3): 426-449. 2023.Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or ‘sticking to one's guns’ in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, …Read more
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48Why Think for Yourself?The Philosophers' Magazine. 2022.This article explores the tension between intellectual autonomy and love of truth.
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36Knowledge and Entailment (review)Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10): 55-58. 2018.
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34Why It's OK Not to Think for YourselfRoutledge. 2023.We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK. In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan Matheson shows how 'expert testimony' and 'the wisd…Read more
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32Why Think for Yourself?The Philosophers' Magazine 98 26-32. 2022.This public facing article explores the tension between intellectual autonomy and a love for truth.
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30Moral Experts, Deference & DisagreementIn Jamie Carlin Watson & Laura K. Guidry-Grimes (eds.), Moral Expertise: New Essays From Theoretical and Clinical Bioethics, Springer Verlag. 2018.We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue.The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more:What would it ta…Read more
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19Matthew Benton and Jonathan Kvanvig, eds., Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford University Press, 2022, 304 pp., $85.00 (hc) (review)International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 93 (3): 259-263. 2023.
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19Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the QuestionInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1-17. forthcoming.In this paper, I examine Thomas Kelly’s account of the epistemic significance of bias presented in Bias: A Philosophical Study. Kelly draws a parallel between the skeptical threat from bias and the skeptical threat from disagreement, and crafts a response to these skeptical threats. According to Kelly, someone who is not biased can rely on that fact to conclude that their disagreeing interlocutor is biased. Kelly motivates this response by drawing several parallels to recent lessons in epistemol…Read more
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Epistemic relativismIn Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, Continuum. 2012.This paper examines an argument for epistemic relativism explored in Boghossian's Fear of Knowledge as well as Boghossian's response. I argue that both the argument and Boghossian's response fail, and that embracing epistemic circularity provides the most promising way out of the problem.
Jacksonville, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Epistemology of Disagreement |
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Disagreement |