David Sedley

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. From 2000 OSAP is being published not once but twice yearly, to keep up with the abundance of good material submitted; and it is being made available in paperback as well as hardback, in response to demand from scholars wishing to purchase it. This volume, the second of 2000, features contributors from Michael Wedin and Dominic Scott, and discusses issues ranging from Socratic Intellectualism to Aristotle on animal psychology. 'standard reading among specialists in ancient philosophy' Brad Inwood, Bryn Mawr Classical Review.

Le chapitre 4 du premier livre des Mémorables de Xénophon était quasiment un texte canonique pour la théologie des premiers stoïciens : il contient la première version de « la preuve par la providence » (the Argument from Design) et constitue un témoignage capital et négligé concernant la théologie de Socrate. Les idées qui y sont exposées ne dérivent en effet pas de Diogène d'Apollonie, dont le rôle dans l'histoire de la pensée téléologique a été largement surestimé. Je défends la thèse que le texte du Contre les savants IX, 88-110 de Sextus Empiricus constitue un témoignage unique qui permet de comprendre comment les premiers stoïciens se sont efforcés d'extraire une preuve rigoureuse de l'existence de dieu du chapitre de Xénophon ainsi que du Timée de Platon (29b-30b), et comment ils ont ensuite corrigé leurs syllogismes pour les soustraire aux réfutations parodiques (parabolai) d'Alexinus. On peut ainsi observer la manière dont les stoïciens ont forgé leurs armes théologiques à partir de la tradition dont ils prétendaient être les héritiers.

‘Atheism’ is a term that has historically carried a wide range of meanings and connotations. Popular speech, in particular, admits of a range of definitions, but the same is true of contemporary scholarly usage also. This chapter therefore surveys the sheer variety of ways of defining ‘atheism’, before outlining the pressing need for a generally agreed-upon usage in the growing—and, thus far, Babel-like—field of scholarship on atheism. It then outlines and explains the precise definition used throughout the Handbook: an absence of belief in the existence of a God or gods. The utility of such a broad definition, taking atheism to be an ‘umbrella concept’ that admits of a range of subdivisions, is then explored and defended at length.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback. This volume features essays on Empedocles, Xenophon, and Socrates, with several on each of Plato and Aristotle. 'unique value as a collection of outstanding contributions in the area of ancient philosophy.' Sara Rubinelli, Bryn Mawr Classical Review.

Antiochus of Ascalon was one of the seminal philosophers of the first century BC, an era of radical philosophical change. Some called him a virtual Stoic, but in reality his programme was an updated revival of the philosophy of the 'ancients', meaning above all Plato and Aristotle. His significance lies partly in his enormous influence on Roman intellectuals of the age, including Cicero, Brutus and Varro, and partly in his role as the harbinger of a new style of philosophy, which thereafter remained dominant for the remainder of antiquity. Yet much remains controversial about his ideas. This volume, the first in English to be devoted entirely to Antiochus, brings together a team of leading scholars to discuss every major aspect of his life, work and significance. In addition, it contains the first full guide to his testimonia in any modern language.

This paper examines Plato's ideas on cause-effect relations in the "Phaedo." It maintains that he sees causes as things (not events, states of affairs or the like), with any information as to how that thing brings about the effect relegated to a strictly secondary status. This is argued to make good sense, so long as we recognise that aition means the "thing responsible" and exploit legal analogies in order to understand what this amounts to. Furthermore, provided that we do not pre-suppose that we already know what can and what cannot count as a cause, Plato proves to have an attractive case for his principle that all causation is a matter of like causing like. Once we appreciate this, we are a little closer to understanding his more idiosyncratic principle, which although puzzling is ubiquitous in his writings and often invoked as a premise in key arguments, that opposites cannot cause opposites. The last part of the paper turns to formal causes, defending Plato's advocacy of them, and examining their role in the "Parmenides'" Third Man Argument. The main proposal is that Plato's conception of Forms as causes opens the door to a better version of that argument's "Non-identity" premise than those currently available