David Sedley

In these brief comments the author focuses primarily on the issue raised at the start of Daniel Russell’s chapter, that is, the question of the inferential connection between the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, for the Stoics, and the thesis that virtue is the only good. The author emphasizes in particular that Stoic ethical inferences such as those Daniel Russell scrutinizes in his paper are not usually meant to be understood as autonomous, but as tacitly presupposing premises drawn from elsewhere in the system, for example that virtue and happiness are kinds of perfection, not admitting of degrees.

Zeno of Elea challenged pluralism with a series of puzzles, which included his small/large paradox and his place paradox. Evidence on how these two paradoxes were interpreted by the Peripatetic Eudemus of Rhodes points to Eudemus as the source or conduit of a heterodox tradition according to which Zeno, far from being either a pluralist or a Parmenidean monist, was in fact a nihilist. Working out how this interpretation was extracted, or corroborated, by a selective use of Zeno’s own text provides new clues to the precise content of that text, and thereby to Zeno’s own dialectical strategy.

The _Timaeus_, I argue, encodes in its cryptic opening lines Plato’s confirmation that the dialogue represents his own views. This corresponds to the fact that a series of metaphysical, psychological, and ethical theses defended by the main speakers of other dialogues are displayed in Timaeus’ speech as components of a global system. Which in turn provides neglected support for the too often dismissed ‘mouthpiece theory’. Although these doctrines can look a little unfamiliar when they reappear in the _Timaeus_, that need not represent a change of mind on Plato’s part, just the fact that they are being viewed from the point of view of physics—the physics of tripartition, the physics of Form-participation, etc. Once we see how Timaeus’ presentation draws on Platonic doctrine, I argue, we can use this lesson to see how yet another Platonic doctrine, that of Recollection, puts in a hitherto unnoticed appearance in the dialogue.

This chapter revisits two outstanding problems in the interpretation of Parmenides’ critique of human ‘naming’: (1) the text and meaning of B8.38 DK, _tōi pant’ onomastai_, and (2) the mistake made by mortals in choosing to name two cosmological principles, B8.54 DK. To help resolve these, the author calls on a ‘dictum’ of Parmenides preserved verbatim by Simplicius, which is here argued to be Parmenides’ own self-exegesis, hitherto unrecognized because it is, as commentary usually is, written in prose. The same dictum is argued to throw new light on Parmenides’ conceptions of contrariety, separation, and Being. The chapter also develops the speculation that mortals’ naive dualism is modelled on that of Hesiod’s _Theogony_.

This article is a preliminary edition — introduction, text, translation, commentary — of a previously unknown commentary on Aristotle’s _Categories_, recently discovered in the Archimedes Palimpsest. The two lemmas covered (both incompletely) in the fourteen surviving pages are 1a20–b15, concerning the distinction between ‘said of a subject’ and ‘in a subject’, and 1b16–24, where Aristotle maintains that different genera are divided by different differentiae. By extrapolating from this sample, the commentary can be inferred to have been considerably longer than the longest _Categories_ commentary to survive intact, that of Simplicius. On this and other grounds, we argue that it is probably a fragment of Porphyry’s monumental lost commentary, the _Ad Gedalium_. A prominent feature of the new commentary is its extensive concentration on resolving puzzles raised against the _Categories_. Some of the material is completely absent from the remainder of the surviving _Categories_ tradition. The earlier commentators and critics cited by name in it are Andronicus, Boethus, Nicostratus and Herminus.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback. In this volume, articles range from Socrates to Alexander of Aphrodisias, with several on each of Aristotle and Plato.Editor: David Sedley, Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy, University of Cambridge.'unique value as a collection of outstanding contributions in the area of ancient philosophy.' Sara Rubinelli, Bryn Mawr Classical Review.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback. This volume features essays on Empedocles, Xenophon, and Socrates, with several on each of Plato and Aristotle. 'unique value as a collection of outstanding contributions in the area of ancient philosophy.' Sara Rubinelli, Bryn Mawr Classical Review.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. From 2000 OSAP is being published not once but twice yearly, to keep up with the abundance of good material submitted; and it is being made available in paperback as well as hardback, in response to demand from scholars wishing to purchase it. This volume, the second of 2000, features contributors from Michael Wedin and Dominic Scott, and discusses issues ranging from Socratic Intellectualism to Aristotle on animal psychology. 'standard reading among specialists in ancient philosophy' Brad Inwood, Bryn Mawr Classical Review.