Lisa Maria Herzog

Joseph Heath argues that we should reject the idea of a ‘just wage’ because market prices are supposed to signal scarcities and thereby to promote overall efficiency, rather than reward contributions. This argument overlooks the degree to which markets are institutionally, socially, and culturally embedded. Their outcomes are hardly ever ‘pure’ market outcomes, but the result of complex interactions of economic and other factors, including various forms of power. Instead of rejecting moral intuitions about wage justice as misguided, we can often understand them as pointing towards questions about the embeddedness of markets, or lack thereof. At least in some cases, changes in the framework of markets can both increase efficiency and get us closer to conventional notions of fair wages, e.g. when gender discrimination is reduced. Thus, while an abstract notion of a ‘just wage’ remains problematic, we can and should recognize that some wages are unjust.

This paper takes a social epistemology perspective on markets in general and trade deals in particular. Normatively, it is based on considerations of democratic accountability and contestation. Empirically, it is based on the assumption that all markets are embedded in institutional frameworks. Knowledge plays an important role in the institutional framework of markets: it matters both at the level of content – which knowledge has to be processed in what way, according to the market rules? – and at the level of process – whose knowledge counts in setting the rules? While these considerations apply to both domestic and international markets, there are good reasons to allocate certain epistemic tasks to the frameworks of international markets, for example trade deals. While the TTIP and CETA negotiations fell short of democratic standards about transparency, the debate about them indicates growing public awareness of the importance of the institutional frameworks for international trade.

This paper discusses the phenomenon of misleading about “the game you are in.” Individuals who mislead others in this way draw on the fact that we rely on social norms for regulating the levels of alertness, openness, and trust we use in different epistemic situations. By pretending to be in a certain game with a certain epistemic situation, they can entice others to reveal information or to exhibit low levels of alertness, thereby acting against their own interests. I delineate this phenomenon from direct lies and acts of misleading by implication, and discuss some variations of it. I then ask why and under what conditions it is morally wrong to mislead others about the game they are in. I distinguish three normative angles for understanding the phenomenon: deontological constraints, free-riding on a shared cultural infrastructure, and implicit discrimination against outsiders and atypical candidates. I conclude by briefly discussing some practical implications.

This article examines the ways in which Adam Smith and G. W. F Hegel conceptualize the identity of workers in a market economy. Although both see human beings as shaped in and through social rela- tionships, the relation between the worker and his work is seen in different ways. For Smith, workers “have” human capital, while for Hegel workers “are” brewers, butchers or bakers;; their profession is part of their identity. This conceptual difference, which is reflected in different “varieties of capitalism” today, shows that not only degrees, but also kinds of embeddedness need to be taken into account in discussions of the relation between individual and society.

This article analyses a hitherto neglected problem at the transition from ideal to non‐ideal theory: the problem of knowledge. Ideal theories often make idealising assumptions about the availability of knowledge, for example knowledge of social scientific facts. This can lead to problems when this knowledge turns out not to be available at the non‐ideal level. Knowledge can be unavailable in a number of ways: in principle, for practical reasons, or because there are normative reasons not to use it. This can make it necessary to revise ideal theories, because the principle of ‘ought implies can’ rules out certain theories, at least insofar as they are understood as action‐guiding. I discuss a number of examples and argue that there are two tendencies that will increase the relevance of this problem in the future: the availability of large amounts of sensitive data whose use is problematic from a normative point of view, and the increasing complexity of an interrelated world that makes it harder to predict the effects of institutional changes. To address these issues, philosophers need to cooperate with social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences. Normative theorising can then be understood as one step in a long process that includes thinkers from different disciplines. Ideal theory can respond to many of the charges raised against it if it is understood along these lines and if it takes the problem of knowledge and its implications seriously.

This paper discusses, in a comparative perspective, the two institutions in Hegel’s account civil society in the Philosophy of Right that aim at ‘taming’ the free market: the police and the corporations. It argues that although Hegel claims to have taken up the insights of the economists of his day, he has done so in a rather limited way, and he remains sceptical about many of the ‘laws’ formulated by economists. In order to derive such laws, economists reduce individual preferences to a few categories and take these to be constant. This methodology implies that in order to tame the market the framework of rules and incentives needs to be changed – this is also the model of the Hegelian police. With regard to the corporations, however, Hegel takes on a sociological perspective and asks how the individuals’ preferences are actually formed. His theory of the corporations can be read as a theory about the social spaces in which people’s ethos is formed, which not only influences their behaviour in the market, but also prepares the ground for the political ethos of the state. I argue that these two ways of looking at economic phenomena, and the ensuing suggestions for how to curb the negative effects of the free market, have parallels in contemporary discussions about economic ethics. In order to find solutions for the problems of today’s capitalism, it is worth focussing not only on the economic perspective of the police, but also on the sociological perspective of the corporations.

In many Western capitalist economies, private indebtedness is pervasive, but it has received little attention from political philosophers. Economic theory emphasizes the liberating potential of debt contracts, but its picture is based on assumptions that do not always hold, especially when there is a background of structural injustice. Private debt contracts are likely to miss their liberating potential if there is deception or lack of information, if there is insufficient access to (regular forms of) credit, or if credit is overly expensive. Markets for private debt can be mechanisms of structural injustice: rather than playing a neutral role, they reinforce injustices, because the failures of debt to be liberating disproportionately hit individuals in disadvantaged positions. By individualizing what are in fact structural problems, private debt can contribute to stigmatization, social exclusion and oppression. What is at stake, from a perspective of structural justice, is not only the distribution of income, but also the distribution of risk. The problems of private debt markets therefore require political attention. In addition to fighting the structural injustices that form the background condititions of private debt, it is also worth addressing private debt markets themselves.

A case of Moral Luck occurs whenever we normatively assess agents for things that depend on factors beyond their control. The paper takes a comparative approach and examines how morality and law deal with such cases. The comparative perspective allows us to explain the problem of Moral Luck as a tension inherent in normative orders: While normative orders are based on a strong connection between responsibility and voluntariness, this idealist assumption is at least partly at odds with their functional requirements as social orders. The paper examines how law and morality converge and differ in resolving this tension in cases of Moral Luck. Finally, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of some more general features of the normative orders of morality and the law that follow from this "bottom-up" analysis of Moral Luck

Many political theorists think about how to make societies more just. In recent years, with interests shifting from principles to their institutional realization, there has been much debate about feasibility and the role it should play in theorizing. What has been underexplored, however, is how feasibility depends on the attitudes and perceptions of individuals, not only with regard to their own behaviour, but also with regard to the behaviour of others. This can create coordination problems, which can be described as “feasibility gridlocks”. These problems are interesting from a normative perspective, not only because they arguably play an important role for the feasibility of institutions, but also because they contain a normative element themselves: individual might be willing to cooperate in order change the “feasibility frontier” Political ideals and the feasibility frontier. Econ Philos), but only if others are also willing to do their bit, which contains a judgment about the fair distribution of burdens. Beliefs about the selfish nature of human beings, however, can make feasibility gridlocks more likely. This is why what I call, for the sake of brevity, “economic ideology”, i.e. an account of human nature as fundamentally self-interested, can be harmful. Finding a way out of such equilibriums therefore is an important task for political theorists and social reformers.

In the late 1740s a young man who had just returned from Oxford to his native Scotland gave a series of lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres in Edinburgh. This man was no other than Adam Smith, who would soon become famous for his writings about moral philosophy and, most of all, economic issues. Smith the moral philosopher and Smith the economist quickly overshadowed Smith the theoretician of rhetoric. Even in today’s scholarly perception the curious fact that the founder of economics made his first public appearance as a lecturer on rhetoric is not given the attention it deserves. This means that an important resource for understanding Smith’s self-conception as an author and the society he envisaged is ..

It is not clear what the intellectual history of the last 200 years would have looked like without the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, but it is clear that it would have looked different. His vast intellectual system was taken up by thinkers from left to right, and from very different philosophical schools. This volume brings together accessible, concise essays from leading scholars that present important currents of Hegelian thought in different European countries, including pre-revolutionary Russia, from the 19th to the 21st century. It unites a range of very different forms of (Non-Marxian) Hegelianisms and Anti-Hegelianisms, showing similarities as well as differences. Embedding them in their cultural and intellectual contexts, it demonstrates the various encounters between philosophy, politics and personal lives that Hegel's philosophy inspired.

adam smith1 is often taken to be an heir to the natural jurisprudence tradition, to which he explicitly refers in several places in his oeuvre.2 He combines it with an account of the moral sentiments, in which he sees the origin of morality and justice.3 The moral sentiments, as explored in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, are the basis for justice, which, embodied in positive law, is the framework for commercial society, the economy of which Smith explores in the Wealth of Nations. in this sense, Smith is seen by many scholars as a being a moral philosopher in the first place, and an economist in the second place.4 The challenge that remains, and which Smith addresses by a number of rhetorical strategies,5 is to ..

The relevance of leader ethicality has moti- vated ethical leadership theory. In this paper, we emphasize the importance of moral identity for the concept of ethical leadership. We relate ethical leadership incorporating an internalized moral identity to productive deviant workplace behavior. Using qualitative empirical data we illustrate the relevance of critical situations, i.e., situations in which hypernorms and organizational norms diverge, for the distinction of ethical leaders with or without internalized moral identities. Our paper takes a multidisciplinary approach integrating insight from management as well as humanities and social sciences toward a comprehensive sense of ethical leadership.

In this paper, I analyze the moral responsibili- ties that companies have with regard to the development of their sector, especially when there are path dependences that can lead sectors on more or less morally accept- able paths, e.g., with regard to market access for disad- vantaged groups. The interdependencies between companies in a sector are underexplored in the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Reflections on the normative status of profit-seeking and on the normative bases of CSR, however, provide us with reasons for seeing sector-related responsibilities as an important component of CSR. Based on a case study of a financial institution, I analyze various morally relevant ways in which the strategic decisions of companies relate to those of other companies in their sector. I argue that companies have a co-responsibility to contribute to the development of the moral dimensions of their sectors, especially when they deal with vulnerable customers.

This paper asks how property rights in the financial system can be nor- matively justified. It argues that in the current financial system, we find property rights with very different normative bases, some of which are stronger than others. In fact, there is a systematic gap between the normative priorities (which property rights deserve protection?) and the de facto priorities (which property rights are in fact protected?). I draw on the three traditional approaches for justifying property rights, along Hegelian, Lockean and consequentialist lines, and ask how relevant they are for the property rights that one finds in today’s financial system. As it will turn out, Hegelian and Lockean justifications are better suited for the “real economy” than for the financial system; whereas the most promising approach for justifying many property rights within the financial system (if they can be justified at all) is a consequentialist one. This implies that reform proposals, for example with regard to higher capital ratios for banks, cannot be countered by holding that they interfere with property rights, for the property rights that are interfered with cannot claim to have stronger normative bases than the normative principles involved in the reform proposals.

This paper discusses Adam Smith's views of social justice. It first describes Smith's optimistic view of markets, for example with regard to the absence of negative externalities, which implies that he considered certain normative problems to be the exception rather than the rule. Then, Smith's views on redistribution are discussed: although he is sympathetic to progressive taxation, his main focus remains on free markets, which can partly be explained by his distrust of politicians. If one takes a closer look as Smith's views of markets, however, it turns out that one of the reasons why he endorses them is their distributive features. He saw them as an antidote to the inequalities of the feudal age, offering all individuals an opportunity to work their way up to a decent standard of living and leading to more equality in the long run. Thus, Smith's account, while out-dated in certain ways, can serve as an inspiration for thinking about distributive justice not only as a question of redistributive taxation but also as a question of the institutional design of markets

This essay analyses the role of different forms of trust in the context of financial markets. It argues that rather than being caused by a lack of trust, the financial crisis of 2007 can be characterized by a shift from personal trust, with its normative and epistemic implications, towards too much “systemic trust”. Through a process of legalization and formalization, loans became standardized, and lenders relied not on the trustworthiness of borrowers, but on their legal claims and the ability of markets to evaluate these correctly. As recent research in social philosophy and legal studies shows, however, markets built on “systemic trust” run into paradoxes, both with regard to their epistemic features and with regard to their ability to deal with the fundamental uncertainty of the future. This fact raises serious questions about the epistemic control of complex market systems, and about the justice of institutional structures in which only some people’s or organization’s trust pays off, while other people’s trust is betrayed.

Motivation crowding out can lead to a reduction of ‘higher’ virtues, such as altruism or public spirit, in market contexts. This article discusses the role of virtue in the moral and economic theory of Adam Smith. It argues that because Smith’s account of commercial society is based on ‘lower’ virtue, ‘higher’ virtue has a precarious place in it; this phenomenon is structurally similar to motivation crowding out. The article analyzes and systematizes the ways in which Smith builds on ‘contrivances of nature’ in order to solve the problems of limited self-command and limited knowledge. As recent research has shown, a clear separation of different social spheres can help to reduce the risk of motivation crowding out and preserve a place for ‘higher virtue’ in commercial society. The conclusion reflects on the performative power of economics, arguing that the one-sided focus on models of ‘economic man’ should be embedded in a larger context