Lisa Maria Herzog

The experience of parenthood, and particularly motherhood, is often used as an example of a ‘transformative experience’ that cannot be understood by non-parents (the ‘non-understanding claim’). We argue against this interpretation of the epistemic challenges of parenthood, suggesting that there is instead a lack of communication caused by various epistemic injustices (the ‘non-communication claim’). Drawing on testimonies about parenthood, we grant that like all deeply embodied experiences, it has dimensions that are difficult to verbalise. But the greater problem, also described in artistic testimonies about parenthood and especially motherhood, is that the dominant social script of the ‘ideal mother’, in combination with other epistemic blockades, often leads to a lack of communication, including about those dimensions of parenthood that are very well communicable. Moreover, this lack of communication may even be reinforced by an emphasis on the transformative dimensions of these experiences. We show that the non-understanding claim is harmful in various ways, perpetuating injustices in how parenthood is treated in society, and thus is in urgent need of address.

Discussions on the relationship between science and society frequently advocate for direct engagement between scientists and lay people. While such engagement is often framed as a remedy for declining trust in science, it introduces a distinct set of ethical challenges. One such challenge concerns the risk of epistemic trespassing, the overstepping of disciplinary boundaries. Another arises when individual scientists, by virtue of their public role, are seen as representatives of “science” as a whole. These issues are further complicated by a less-discussed form of trespassing: the ethical tensions that emerge when scientists draw on non-epistemic sources of authority, such as charismatic or traditional authority (in the Weberian sense), to bolster their public claims. This paper argues that addressing these challenges requires a nuanced, context-sensitive approach. In some cases, the most ethically defensible strategy and pragmatically viable strategy may be not to communicate individually, but rather to contribute to collective efforts that facilitate responsible public communication. By reframing public engagement as a team task, scientists can mitigate the risks of trespassing while still fulfilling their role in fostering trust in science.

In today's societies, political and economic issues are closely intertwined, and political philosophy has turned more and more to economic issues. This Element introduces some key questions of economic philosophy: How to think about the relation between political and economic power? Can markets be 'tamed'? Which values are embedded in the economy and how do those relate to political values? It answers these questions by considering arguments from three theoretical perspectives – liberal egalitarian approaches, neorepublicanism, and critical theory or socialist thought – explaining their different background assumptions but also shared grounds. To illustrate these topics, it zooms in on the future of work: How could work be made more just, democratic, and sustainable? In the conclusion, some implications for research strategies in economic philosophy are explored.

This paper proposes re-reading Tawney’s The Acquisitive Society as a contribution to economic philosophy that contains important arguments on topics such as markets, workplace democracy, and the ‘greening’ of economic institutions. Central to Tawney’s account is his notion of ‘social functions’ towards which economic activity should be oriented, away from an unconditional understanding of property rights and especially “functionless property”. A ‘functional society’, Tawney argues, would create opportunities for meaningful work and social recognition for all workers. To organize work around the fulfilment of social functions, he recommends governance structures in which both workers and other stakeholders, e.g. customers, have a voice, and in which transparency and public oversight are key. From a contemporary perspective, Tawney’s account may require some updates, for example, with regard to the democratic determination of ‘social functions’ in a pluralistic society. Such updates, however, are possible, and make Tawney an interesting interlocutor for those trying to rethink our economic system in the face of the current social and ecological crises, especially in three respects: the discussion about the ‘asset economy’, the debate over ‘green growth’ versus ‘post growth’, and the call for a greater reflexivity of institutions.

In this short paper I explore whether a pro tanto argument for an unconditional basic income can be developed from a specific normative basis: the idea of epistemic equality as applied to organizations. In a broad sense, epistemic equality describes the idea that every individual has an equal right to speak up and to be heard if she has relevant information or knowledge to share, questions to ask, or complaints to bring forward. Epistemic equality has moral, instrumental, and instrumentally moral value in organizations. Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice (2009), I argue that we have good reasons to postulate epistemic equality as a normative ideal for organizations, even if – and precisely because – they are otherwise hierarchically structured. The hypothesis I then proceed to explore is that an unconditional basic income, by providing better opportunities for “exit”, might be a step that would strengthen epistemic equality in organizations.

What can a Hegelian perspective contribute to addressing the ecological crisis? This paper argues that, for Hegel, a transformative yet sustainable relation with nature is a requirement for a free form of life. Drawing on both the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right, it contends that Hegel’s notions of work, bad infinity and habit help us understand how societies become entrenched in unsustainable practices. At the same time, by pointing to the notion of limit, these concepts illuminate what an alternative form of life could look like. Modern subjective and objective structures that resemble a ‘bad infinity’—in the sense of an imperative of endless wealth accumulation—come at the cost of human and non-human nature. To respond to this, work must be reoriented toward social needs, mutual recognition and cooperation. However, achieving this vision requires more than individual moral commitments; it demands the transformations of sedimented habits, socio-economic relationships and their material expressions.

Business ethics theories often start from an assumption of moral egalitarianism: the equal moral value of all humans. But if combined with theories of value, they may inadvertently reinforce unequal valuations of products, services, and ultimately human beings. This paper joins recent debates about value and value production, critiquing the dominant Western view that value can be expressed in price. We build on feminist and environmental critiques of this view, but our main contribution is to argue for adding a decolonial perspective. This perspective exposes overlooked dimensions of value creation, in particular geopolitical power and race. We illustrate the implications of a decolonial perspective on value creation by discussing a case study: the political controversies about the value(s) created by waste pickers in Brazil. We thereby demonstrate the ethical and political stakes of theories of value creation and show that a deeper rethinking is needed, going beyond existing critiques. The dialogue with decolonial approaches can help challenge biases in Western conceptions and promote more equitable global practices.

This essay – an excerpt from De toekomst van werk. Van hierarchie naar democratie – explores the role of hierarchies at work. It argues that these hierarchies have many dysfunctional features and often deny individuals the moral respect they are owed as equal citizens. Instead, more democratic forms of work should be tried out, where appropriate by help of digital communication tools. An example are deliberative mini publics, which have been tried and tested in the political realm, but could also be implemented in the workplace, as a step towards not only political, but also economic democracy.

This article explores what is problematic about the “fissuring” of work—the breaking up of large work organizations through subcontracting or franchising—from a democratic perspective. After describing the empirical evidence on fissuring, it explores two types of arguments. Arguments from “good work” ask whether fissured work is less likely to offer conditions of such good work. Here, however, one must expect a lot of variety; many arguments can be reduced to general criticisms of bad working conditions rather than offering specific criticisms of fissured work. A more successful type of argument stems from considerations of social cohesion, which concern citizens’ opportunities to get to know each other, fairness in remuneration, and chances for democratic experiences at work. For these reasons, fissuring is undesirable from a democratic perspective, even if one abstracts from its more obvious harms, for example, unjustifiable safety risks. The article concludes with some brief reflections on policy implications.

This article makes a positive case for an ethnographic sensibility in political theory. Drawing on published ethnographies and original fieldwork, it argues that an ethnographic sensibility can contribute to normative reflection in five distinct ways. It can help uncover the nature of situated normative demands (epistemic argument); diagnose obstacles encountered when responding to these demands (diagnostic argument); evaluate practices and institutions against a given set of values (evaluative argument); probe, question and refine our understanding of values (valuational argument); and uncover underlying social ontologies (ontological argument). The contribution of ethnography to normative theory is distinguished from that of other forms of empirical research, and the dangers of perspectival absorption, bias and particularism are addressed.

The arrival of “big data” promises new degrees of precision in understanding human behavior. Could it also allow drawing a finer line between “choice” and “circumstances”? In a culture in which individual responsibility continues to be celebrated, this raises questions about new opportunities for institutional design with a stronger focus on individual responsibility. But what is it that can be learned from big data? In this paper I argue that we should not expect a “god’s eye view” on choice versus circumstances from big data. “Responsibility” is a social construct that depends on the logic of different social situations, as well as our epistemic access to certain counterfactuals (e.g., whether an agent “could have acted differently”). It is this epistemic dimension that changes with the arrival of big data. But while this might help overcome some epistemic barriers, it might also create new problems, e.g., because of polluted and hence biased data. This is not just a theoretical problem; it is directly connected to the regulation of insurance. The new developments force us to directly confront questions about mutualist versus solidaristic forms of insurance, and more generally about how much weight to ascribe to individual responsibility, given all we know about unequal background circumstances.

When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of institutions. These are commonly regarded as self-stabilizing. Yet, they can also be subject to endogenous processes of decay, or so we argue. We explain this in terms of psychological and cultural processes, which can change even if the formal structures remain unchanged. One key implication is that the extent to which norms, values, and ideals motivate individuals to comply with institutions is limited.

In this paper, we attempt to de-naturalize the prevailing economistic imaginary of work that Max Weber and later commentators described as ‘protestant work ethic,’ epitomized in the figure of homo economicus. We do so by contrasting it with the imaginary of skillful work that can be found in vignettes about artisans in the Zhuangzi. We argue that there are interesting contrasts between these views concerning 1) direct goal achievement vs. indirect goal achievement through the cultivation of skills; 2) the hierarchization of mental versus physical dimensions of work; 3) the crafting of non-dominating relationships between the working subject, their object, and their instruments of work, which leads to questions about the sustainability of these relationships; and 4) the relationship between work and well-being, which the Daoist texts conceptualize in a much more holistic, but also more presentist way than Western economic rationality. We conclude by pointing out the relevance of these differences for several contemporary debates about work, by denaturalizing a dominant imaginary of work, by distinguishing different forms of work, by suggesting a different relation between work and nature, and by raising questions about the desirability of the automation of work.

“Home office” has become a reality for many employees. What is normatively at stake in this shift in the geography of work, given the various forms of structural injustice in our societies? Drawing on the normative criteria of employee well-being and protection from harm, autonomy, non-discrimination, environmental impact, and the role of workplaces as spaces of social encounters, I defend two claims: First, decisions about where individuals work need to be proceduralized on a fair basis, giving employees a voice. Second, giving up the workplace requires a broader discussion about alternatives spaces for social integration.