Gottfried Schweiger

Although the philosophical literature on both poverty and childhood is certainly increasing, the status of children living in poverty has been largely ignored as a philosophical subject. The condition of children and the justice-related issues that derive from it compel us to look more deeply into the sources and responsibilities of and towards poverty during childhood. We highlight four challenges raised by studying child poverty, and the mechanisms through which philosophical analysis may aid in addressing them. Philosophy can work as an important tool to conceptualise what child poverty is, assess the limitations of current research on the subject, normatively evaluate how to address this condition, and offer guidelines for how society, law and the polity ought to act in response to it. Child poverty must be looked at from what it is in itself, and how it intersects with other features of the child’s life which may exacerbate it. The role of the family is fundamental in any evaluation of what child poverty is, and how to tackle it. Understanding child poverty in the vacuum omits fundamental sources of it, and solutions to it. Other intersecting conditions such as the social and cultural ethos, citizenship status, gender or disability may play a fundamental role also. The second section provides an overview of the volume.

As a matter of justice children have several claims and are entitled to a range of goods. In this paper I will argue that one of these goods is positive self-relations. Since poverty during childhood distorts the proper development and experience of these three self-relations it violates children’s claims to justice. I will defend this argument in three steps: I will introduce and examine three types of positive self-relations and argue that children are entitled to all of these; I will move on to examine the concept of humiliation and argue that acts of humiliating are unjust even if the victims do not experience them as humiliating; finally, I will provide six arguments as to why it is humiliating for children to live in poverty. The six arguments presented in the last section are: poverty is connected to other forms of injustice; poverty is undeserved and represents an arbitrary feature of affected children for which they cannot be held responsible; poverty is widespread among children; poverty is imposed on children because they are part of a larger social group; poverty is an enduring humiliation and not just an occasional incident; the humiliation caused by poverty targets the particular vulnerability of children as developing beings. Based on the humiliating nature of poverty, which violates children’s claims to the aforementioned types of positive self-relations, I can conclude that it is unjust for children to live in poverty.

Was macht ein Kind zu einem Kind? Sind Kinder ihren Eltern zur Dankbarkeit verpflichtet? Ist die Schulpflicht eine legitime staatliche Vorgabe? Gibt es ein Recht darauf, Kinder zu haben? Das Handbuch liefert einen systematischen Überblick über die zentralen Konzepte und Theorien sowie die wichtigsten Diskussionsfelder der Philosophie der Kindheit. Zur Debatte stehen neben dem moralischen, rechtlichen und politischen Status von Kindern auch Fragen nach dem instrumentellen oder intrinsischen Wert der Kindheit sowie nach historischen Veränderungen im gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit Kindern.

This brief introduction frames a guest-edited collection of eleven contributed articles in the Journal of Global Ethics focused on global justice and childhood. On a general level, there is widespread consensus that there is a strong need for improvement in the lives of children around the globe. What global justice demands in this regard, however, has never been fleshed out in detail and there is only a little philosophical literature on this topic. Against this background, five aspects of the question of global justice for children need to be addressed. First, one has to take into account the debate between cosmopolitanism and particularism, as well as the debate as to whether and to what extent individual, collective or institutional actors should be prioritized. Secondly, a theory of global justice for children must explain how the content of global justice for children is founded and justified, and what it comprises. Third, different principles can be used to assess global justice for children. Only two prominent alternatives are mentioned here: egalitarianism and sufficiency. Fourthly, the temporal dimension of global justice is of particular importance for children. Fifthly, an approach focusing on the examination of injustices is equally necessary.

In this paper I am interested in the question of whether and why states should prioritize child refugees over adult refugees in cases where they are not able to grant refuge to all those who are entitled to it. In particular I discuss three grounds on which such a prioritization could be based: (a) vulnerability, (b) efficiency and (c) life phase and life span. As can be shown, these grounds also apply, to some extent, to particular groups of adults such as women, the elderly, or people with special needs. Based on this I conclude that states should invest significant resources into filtering out those who are the most needy and vulnerable although there are several limitations to doing that. Only if such a selection process were impossible, or so costly and time-consuming that it would result in significantly fewer refugees being admitted, would states have good moral reasons to prioritize children without further screening.

This paper is concerned with child poverty from an ethical perspective and applies the normative concept of vulnerability for this purpose. The first part of the paper will briefly outline children’s particular vulnerability and distinguish important aspects of this. Then the concept will be applied to child poverty and it will be shown that child poverty is a corrosive situational vulnerability, with many severe consequences. In this part of the paper normative reasoning and empirical literature will be brought together. Then, the next section will establish why this increased vulnerability of poor children and the harm to their well-being and well-becoming, which they suffer for this reason, are of ethical concern. It will be discussed that child poverty is a structural problem based on social, political and economic factors. The concluding section will then briefly outline why it is imperative to protect children from the vulnerabilities associated with poverty.

In this chapter, I will provide a philosophical commentary on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which will play a key role in global poverty reduction in the next 15 years. In particular, I will focus on five issues: possible trade-offs, the task of prioritization, the vagueness of the SDGs, the required coordination to implement the SDGs and the establishment of a system of sanctions against actors who fail to achieve the SDGs. Firstly, moving forward with measures to realize the SDGs will most likely demand trade-offs between certain goals; therefore, it is urgent to identify which trade-offs are likely to occur and understand how to choose those goals that should be pursued under such circumstances. Secondly, in addition to possible trade-offs, it is likely that some goals are more easy to achieve than others and that states, as well as international institutions, will have to decide where to invest the money. This probably means that some goals will be prioritized over others, with investments focused more on their achievement, at least in the short-term. Thirdly, although the SDGs cover 17 goals with a total of 169 targets, many of them are still very vague. It will be necessary to set measureable and feasible benchmarks, which can be used to track progress. Fourthly, the SDGs are ambitious and, therefore, the possibility that they will not be achieved is, unfortunately, rather high, especially if the vagueness of some of the targets is not exploited in order to achieve at least low levels of progress. Until now, not much is known about the strategies behind achieving the SDGs and how this global effort will be coordinated, as well as whether the current global framework of institutions is fit for that task. Fifthly, it is certain that, if the SDGs fail the poor and other vulnerable populations, there will be no fearful consequence for other populations, particularly those in rich countries.

GOTTFRIED SCHWEIGER,GUNTER GRAF | : In this paper, we want to examine the particular vulnerability of children from an ethical perspective. We want to defend three claims: Firstly, we will argue that children’s vulnerability is best understood as a dynamic quality, meaning that as children progress through childhood, their vulnerability also undergoes particular changes. To capture this, we want to discriminate among physical, mental, social, and symbolic vulnerability, which vary according to certain features, such as age, maturity, gender, and race. These different traits are furthermore important in order to understand what we owe children from an ethical perspective. In a nutshell, children have moral claims not to be harmed and to be protected against threats to their well-being and well-becoming, and these claims have to be explicated via the dynamic vulnerability of children. Finally, we will argue that one of the main issues is to balance the protection of children and their autonomy claims, which both enhance and diminish their vulnerability. | : Cet article examine la vulnérabilité particulière des enfants d’un point de vue éthique. Nous défendrons trois thèses. Premièrement, nous soutiendrons que la vulnérabilité des enfants est mieux comprise en tant que qualité dynamique, ce qui signifie que lorsque les enfants progressent durant l’enfance, leur vulnérabilité subit également des changements particuliers. Pour le mettre en relief, nous distinguerons la vulnérabilité physique, mentale, sociale et symbolique, qui varie en fonction de certaines caractéristiques telles que l’âge, la maturité, le sexe et la race. Ces différents traits sont en outre importants pour comprendre ce que nous devons aux enfants d’un point de vue éthique. En un mot, les enfants ont des exigences morales à ne pas être blessés et à être protégés contre les menaces à leur bien-être et à leur bien-devenir, et ces revendications doivent être expliquées par la vulnérabilité dynamique des enfants. Enfin, nous soutiendrons que l’un des principaux enjeux est d’équilibrer la protection des enfants et leurs revendications d’autonomie, qui à la fois renforcent et diminuent leur vulnérabilité.

Unemployment is one of the greatest social problems all around the world including in modern capitalistic welfare states. Therefore its social critique is a necessary task for any critical social philosophy such as Axel Honneth's recognition approach, which understands social justice in terms of social conditions of recognition. This paper aims to develop an evaluation of unemployment and its moral weight from this perspective. I will lay out the recognition approach and present a moral evaluation of unemployment as socially unjust based on the knowledge of its negative consequences for those affected. I will then discuss two objections to this conclusion, namely that a mere correlation of suffering and moral wrongness is not enough and that there are legitimate differences in the experience of recognition which could justify the existence of unemployment as deserved. In the next section, I will then refute both objections and first show that unemployment can be understood as socially unjust based on the knowledge that it is involuntary and that the unemployed are not responsible for their condition. Then I will discuss the relationship between the idea of meritocracy and unemployment to examine the assumption of unemployment as being deserved. I will finally conclude that unemployment is not a necessary side effect of meritocracy and that there are good reasons to argue for a moral and justified obligation to provide an actual access to paid work for all who want to work. However, such changes face serious obstacles and are not likely to happen under the current interpretation of meritocracy and social esteem which are one-sided and flawed. Keywords: unemployment, recognition, meritocracy, social critique, Axel Honneth.

In this paper I sketch a possible answer to the question of what professional athletes deserve for their sporting activities. I take two different backgrounds into account. First, the content and meaning of desert is highly debated within political philosophy and many theorists are sceptical if it has any value for social justice. On the other hand sport is often understood as a meritocracy, in which all prizes or wins should be solely awarded based on merit. I will distinguish three possible goods that can be deserved for doing professional sport – money, social status and appreciation – and show that athletes deserve them according to their achievements and that this justifies certain inequalities in their distribution. These legitimate disparities have nevertheless been embedded within a broader framework of social justice, which limits them based on a strong understanding of social equality.

This book addresses the endangerment of children’s bodies in affluent societies. Bodily integrity is an important part of a child’s physical and mental well-being, but it can also be violated through various threats during childhood; not only affecting physical health but also causing mental damage and leading to distortions in the development of the self. The authors give an account of three areas, which present different serious dangers: (1) body and eating, (2) body and sexuality, and (3) body and violence. Through an in-depth examination of the available theoretical and empirical knowledge, as well as a thorough ethical analysis, the central injustices in the mentioned areas are identified and the agents with responsibilities towards children displayed. The authors conclude by providing invaluable insight into the necessity of an ethical basis for policies to safeguard children and their bodies.

Our concern is with the ethical issues related to girlhood and bodily integrity—the right to be free from physical harm and harassment and to experience freedom and security in relation to the body. We defend agency, positive self-relations, and health as basic elements of bodily integrity and we advocate that this normative concept be used as a conceptual tool for the protection of the rights of girls. We assume the capability approach developed by Martha Nussbaum as an ethical framework that enables us to evaluate girls’ well-being and well-becoming in relation to the potential, and often subtle, threats they face. The capability approach can be understood as a theory of justice, and, therefore, as an ethical and political approach. An enriched concept of bodily integrity can help in the design of better policies to address gender biases against girls because it could contribute to seeing them as active agents and valid participants.

In this paper I explore the philosophical debate about poverty. Although there is a significant amount of philosophical research on poverty – especially on world wide and absolute poverty – there is little reflection on what philosophical poverty research could be as a distinct research agenda and also little reflection on certain questions regarding the concept and normative evaluation of poverty. Here, I explore two important questions: What is poverty, which relates to conceptual issues and the definition of poverty. How can poverty be evaluated, which brings forward the normative substance of poverty and its special relation to morality and ethics. In the last section I conclude with further remarks on such a philosophy of poverty.

This paper is based on the assumption that the high incomes of some professional sports athletes, such as players in professional leagues in the United States and Europe, pose an ethical problem of social justice. I deal with the questions of what should follow from this evaluation and in which ways those incomes should be regulated. I discuss three different options: a) the idea that the incomes of professional athletes should be limited, b) the idea that they should be vastly taxed by the state, and c) the idea that there is a moral obligation for the athletes to spend portions of their incomes on good causes. I will conclude that in today’s circumstances there are good reasons to advocate both option one (limitation) and option two (taxation), but that priority should be given to taxation.

Recognition and UnemploymentThis paper aims to explore the case of unemployment from the perspective of recognition theory as it was conceived by Axel Honneth. In the first part I present a shortened form of recognition theory and afterwards, in the second part, its take on work and labor in modern societies. Finally, the third part elaborates how unemployment can be understood and evaluated from this viewpoint. I argue that unemployment itself is not a form of misrecognition and therefore not moral evil. But what has to be criticized are the negative effects of unemployment and the degrading treatment of unemployed people.

This volume explores the questions related to the theory, practice, and policy of the well-being and well-becoming of children. It does so in a truly interdisciplinary way with a focus on the social sciences and philosophy, giving therefore justice to the growing insight that studying and promoting the well-being of children has a strong ethical component. It is dependent on the questions of good life, its conditions and cannot be separated from the concept of social justice and moral entitlements of children and their families. In this book, philosophers and social scientists, in close dialogue, shed light on some of the most challenging matters involved.

Both the capability and the recognition approach are influential and substantial theories in social philosophy. In this contribution, we outline their main assumptions in their assessment of poverty. The two approaches are set in relation to each other, focusing mainly on (a) their moral evaluation of poverty, (b) issues of justification of their central normative claims, and (c) the role that is attributed to subjective experiences, feelings and emotions in these theories. This comparison reveals that in spite of significant differences, both lead to the claim that poverty can never be adequately assessed without putting it into the context of a comprehensive ethical theory about the nature and function of societies. Drawing on this result, we conclude that the critical function of social philosophy plays an irreducible role in the study and understanding of poverty.

Zusammenfassung: In diesem Beitrag wird der normative Gehalt von Armut und sozialer Exklusion im Wohlfahrtsstaat untersucht. Dazu wird der Grundriss der Gerechtigkeitstheorie von David Miller in Zusammenhang mit dem Konzept der materiellen Deprivation diskutiert, einem von der Europäischen Union verwendeten Indikator für soziale Exklusion. Kernthese ist dabei, dass materielle Deprivation sozial ungerecht ist, da sie die drei Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien des Bedarfs, des Verdienstes und der Gleichheit verletzt. Dieser Befund wird sowohl theoretisch als auch anhand ausgewählter empirischer Erkenntnisse expliziert. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird zum Anschluss dann das Verhältnis von Armutsforschung und Sozialphilosophie und politischer Philosophie diskutiert. Schlagwörter: soziale Gerechtigkeit, Armut, materielle Deprivation, David Miller Social Justice in the Welfare State. On the normative weight of material deprivation Abstract: This paper explores the normative relevance of poverty and social exclusion in the welfare state. I discuss David Miller's theory of social justice and one indicator of poverty and social exclusion utilized by the European Union, namely that of material deprivation. The main thesis is that material deprivation is socially unjust as it violates the three principles of social justice: need, desert, and equality. This finding will be explored on the theoretical level as well as considering empirical insights. Against this background, I will conclude with remarks on the possible contribution of social and political philosophy to poverty research.

As a matter of justice children are entitled to many different things. In this paper we will argue that one of these things is positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem), and that this implies that they must not be humiliated. This allows us to criticize poverty as unjust and to conclude that it should be alleviated. We will defend this claim in three steps: (1) we will introduce and examine three types of positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) and argue that children are entitled to all of these; (2) we will move on to examine the concept of humiliation and argue that acts of humiliating are unjust even if the victims do not experience them as humiliating; (3) finally, we will provide five arguments as to why it is humiliating for children to live in poverty. The five arguments presented in the last section are: (a) poverty is connected to other forms of injustice; (b) poverty is undeserved and represents an arbitrary feature of affected children for which they cannot be held responsible; (c) poverty is widespread among children; (d) poverty is imposed on children because they are part of a larger social group; (e) poverty is an enduring humiliation and not just an occasional incident.

Poverty is more than a ‘welfare status’ among others. In this paper I want to show that poverty is not only a failure of distribution of income but that it is a state of humiliation. In the first section I will examine poverty knowledge, how poverty is conceptualised and what norms are inherent in the measures of the poor. In the second section I will show that poverty is humiliating because it is bound to failure and deficiency. To be poor means to be unable to take care for oneself. In the third and final section I will turn to social critique and its relation to the subjects of poverty. There are good reasons to be sceptical of the poor and their judgements and to seek for objective criteria, but this cannot replace the subject and their experience.

Die progressive Besteuerung von Einkommen und Vermögen ist ein politisch viel diskutiertes, aber sozialethisch wenig reflektiertes Thema. In diesem Beitrag wird dargelegt, wie progressive Steuern auf Einkommen und Vermögen in einem Wohlfahrtsstaat aus Perspektive der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, wie sie von David Miller konzipiert wird, gerechtfertigt werden können. Um das Argument so einfach wie möglich zu gestalten, orientiert sich die Fragestellung dabei an der notwendigen Funktion der Bekämpfung von Armut, derer sich Wohlfahrtsstaaten als einer Forderung der sozialen Gerechtigkeit zu verpflichten haben. Progressive Steuern auf Einkommen und Vermögen sind somit genau dann und in genau jener Höhe gerechtfertigt, als sie zur Bekämpfung von Armut notwendig sind. Darüber hinaus kann gezeigt werden, dass die progressive Besteuerung von Einkommen und Vermögen einfach und effizient dieses Ziel erreichen kann, da sie, anders als Massensteuern oder die einheitliche Besteuerung von Einkommen und Vermögen, nicht wohlfahrtsstaatlich ausgeglichen werden müssen.