Gottfried Schweiger

Anerkennung hat sich in den letzten Jahren als ein zentrales Konzept in der politischen Philosophie und Sozialphilosophie etabliert. Ausgehend von seiner Verwendung bei Fichte und Hegel und insbesondere durch seine Aktualisierung im Werk von Axel Honneth, aber auch bei Denker*innen wie Nancy Fraser oder Charles Taylor, wird Anerkennung zur Analyse und Kritik sozialer Verhältnisse herangezogen. Das Vorhaben, soziale Verhältnisse als Anerkennungsverhältnisse sowie soziale Probleme und Konflikte als Kämpfe um Anerkennung zu verstehen und zu beschreiben, wird er auch in den empirisch arbeitenden Sozialwissenschaften vorangetrieben, in denen es detaillierte Studien zu unterschiedlichen Feldern wie Arbeit, Armut oder der Sozialen Arbeit gibt. Im Vordergrund dieses Kapitels aber steht Anerkennung als normatives Konzept, welches dazu geeignet ist, Elemente einer gerechten Gesellschaft festzulegen.

In this short introduction, I highlight the relation between recognition and migration and explore the potentials of a critical theory of recognition. Migration in all its forms and its causes is by no means a new phenomenon, but it has become more intense in some parts of the world, and, especially in Europe, its perception by politics and the population has changed. Migration is also widely discussed in ethics and political philosophy. So what contribution can a critical theory of recognition make here? Recognition is an analytical concept, which can also be employed in empirical research to better understand the claims and living conditions of migrants. Recognition is also a normative and ethical concept, which helps to formulate what a just society owes migrants and to conceptualize their moral rights. Finally, I will also say a few words about the relation of recognition and migration before the background of the COVID-19 pandemic.

ABSTRACT Based on Honneth's distinction of recognition in love, respect and social esteem, the social suffering of refugees is criticized in this contribution as an experience of disrespect. In the first part, I will address the fact that moral claims to recognition have a temporal dimension. Then I will ask what role the duration of their flight, the waiting in camps and until admission play for the social suffering of refugees. I will highlight the particular vulnerability of refugees during this time and distinguish different forms of disrespect - with regard to love, social esteem, and respect and rights - faced by them. In the final section, I pose the question which individuals and institutions are responsible for enabling conditions of recognition for refugees.

This book brings together philosophical, social-theoretical and empirically oriented contributions on the philosophical and socio-theoretical debate on migration and integration, using the instruments of recognition as a normative and social-scientific category. Furthermore, the theoretical and practical implications of recognition theory are reflected through the case of migration. Migration movements, refugees and the associated tensions are phenomena that have become the focus of scientific, political and public debate in recent years. Migrants, in particular refugees, face many injustices and are especially vulnerable, but the right-wing political discourse presents them as threats to social order and stability. This book shows what a critical theory of recognition can contribute to the debate. The book is suitable for researchers in philosophy, social theory and migration research. "A profound examination of how states and societies struggle to recognize migrants as fellow human beings in all their fullness. The contributions are exceptional for combining astute philosophy and social theory with a discussion of actual politics and real lives." Dr. Hugo Slim “This impressive and timely volume offers an innovative way of understanding the issues of migration and integration by using a critical theory of recognition. Recognition theory has rich potential for effectively responding to the issues of autonomy, identity, integration, and empowerment that are at the core of the current public debates on mass migration, displacement, and the refugee crisis. By examining the normative and policy implications of recognition as they apply to migration, the book offers a pathbreaking look at the human dimension of the debate.” Dr. Helle Porsdam

In this paper, we aim to clarify two central assumptions, which allow to specify what justice for children implies in the Capability Approach. First, we argue that an adequate currency of justice for children consists in a bundle of functionings, which develops into a bundle of capabilities in the course of childhood; the currency of justice for children is dynamic, not static. Second, we discuss how the respective functionings and capabilities should be selected. In particular, we suggest four criteria. They imply that there is not only a change through time from a bundle of functionings to a bundle of capabilities as the currency of justice for children, but that the composition of the bundle itself gets modified.

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Text werde ich zwei Thesen entfalten: Erstens, dass romantische Liebe Teil einer guten Jugend ist. Liebe als Teil einer guten Jugend hat mehrere Bestandteile: Jugendliche sollten romantische Liebe erleben können, wenn sie es wollen. Sie sollten das Wissen und die Fähigkeiten erlangen, romantische Liebe zu verstehen und adäquat mit den positiven Potentialen und auch den Risiken umgehen zu können. Jugendliche sollten lernen, die möglichen Enttäuschungen, die mit romantischer Liebe verbunden sein können, adäquat zu verarbeiten und darin gegebenenfalls Unterstützung erfahren. Jugendliche sollten darin befähigt werden, die sozialen und kulturellen Normen und Praktiken, die die Vorstellungen romantischer Liebe prägen, zu reflektieren und zu hinterfragen. Zweitens ist zu klären, welche moralischen Rechte und Pflichten die Eltern und staatliche Institutionen haben. Ich plädiere dafür, diese so zu verstehen, dass sie Jugendliche in der Erlangung und adäquaten Auslebung romantischer Liebe unterstützen und ihnen bei der Entwicklung dieser Fähigkeiten die notwendigen Ressourcen zur Verfügung stellen sollten.

Die philosophische Forschung zu Fragen der Armut hat zuletzt auch im deutschsprachigen Raum zugenommen. Im Fokus stehen dabei zumeist Fragen der Ethik und politischen Philosophie, etwa jene danach, worin das moralische Übel der Armut besteht oder nach der individuellen, kollektiven und institutionellen Verantwortung gegenüber Menschen in Armut. Die Aktualität der Armutsfrage ist dabei unbestritten sowohl im Hinblick auf ihr globales Ausmaß und die teils verheerenden Folgen für die betroffenen Personen als auch im Hinblick auf das Politikum Armut in entwickelten Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Das Ziel des Handbuchs ist es, den aktuellen Stand der philosophischen Forschung umfassend abzubilden. Dabei werden nicht nur die klassischen Fragestellungen der politischen Philosophie und Ethik behandelt, sondern auch jene aufgegriffen, die bislang weniger intensiv diskutiert wurden. Das betrifft etwa ethische Fragen der Armutsforschung oder die Verhandlung der Armut in den verschiedenen historischen Epochen und Strömungen.

This book brings together philosophical approaches to explore the relation of recognition and poverty. This volume examines how critical theories of recognition can be utilized to enhance our understanding, evaluation and critique of poverty and social inequalities. Furthermore, chapters in this book explore anti-poverty policies, development aid and duties towards the (global) poor. This book includes critical examinations of reflections on poverty and related issues in the work of past and present philosophers of recognition. This book hopes to contribute to the ongoing and expanding debate on recognition in ethics, political and social philosophy by focusing on poverty, which is one highly important social and global challenge. “If one believed that the theme of “recognition” had been theoretically exhausted over the last couple of years, this book sets the record straight. The central point of all the studies collected here is that poverty is best understood in its social causes, psychic consequences and moral injustice when studied within the framework of recognition theory. Regardless of how recognition is defined in detail, poverty is best captured as the absence of all material and cultural conditions for being recognized as a human being. Whoever is interested in the many facets of poverty is well advised to consult this path-breaking book.” Axel Honneth, Columbia University.

Although the philosophical literature on both poverty and childhood is certainly increasing, the status of children living in poverty has been largely ignored as a philosophical subject. The condition of children and the justice-related issues that derive from it compel us to look more deeply into the sources and responsibilities of and towards poverty during childhood. We highlight four challenges raised by studying child poverty, and the mechanisms through which philosophical analysis may aid in addressing them. Philosophy can work as an important tool to conceptualise what child poverty is, assess the limitations of current research on the subject, normatively evaluate how to address this condition, and offer guidelines for how society, law and the polity ought to act in response to it. Child poverty must be looked at from what it is in itself, and how it intersects with other features of the child’s life which may exacerbate it. The role of the family is fundamental in any evaluation of what child poverty is, and how to tackle it. Understanding child poverty in the vacuum omits fundamental sources of it, and solutions to it. Other intersecting conditions such as the social and cultural ethos, citizenship status, gender or disability may play a fundamental role also. The second section provides an overview of the volume.

As a matter of justice children have several claims and are entitled to a range of goods. In this paper I will argue that one of these goods is positive self-relations. Since poverty during childhood distorts the proper development and experience of these three self-relations it violates children’s claims to justice. I will defend this argument in three steps: I will introduce and examine three types of positive self-relations and argue that children are entitled to all of these; I will move on to examine the concept of humiliation and argue that acts of humiliating are unjust even if the victims do not experience them as humiliating; finally, I will provide six arguments as to why it is humiliating for children to live in poverty. The six arguments presented in the last section are: poverty is connected to other forms of injustice; poverty is undeserved and represents an arbitrary feature of affected children for which they cannot be held responsible; poverty is widespread among children; poverty is imposed on children because they are part of a larger social group; poverty is an enduring humiliation and not just an occasional incident; the humiliation caused by poverty targets the particular vulnerability of children as developing beings. Based on the humiliating nature of poverty, which violates children’s claims to the aforementioned types of positive self-relations, I can conclude that it is unjust for children to live in poverty.

Was macht ein Kind zu einem Kind? Sind Kinder ihren Eltern zur Dankbarkeit verpflichtet? Ist die Schulpflicht eine legitime staatliche Vorgabe? Gibt es ein Recht darauf, Kinder zu haben? Das Handbuch liefert einen systematischen Überblick über die zentralen Konzepte und Theorien sowie die wichtigsten Diskussionsfelder der Philosophie der Kindheit. Zur Debatte stehen neben dem moralischen, rechtlichen und politischen Status von Kindern auch Fragen nach dem instrumentellen oder intrinsischen Wert der Kindheit sowie nach historischen Veränderungen im gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit Kindern.

This brief introduction frames a guest-edited collection of eleven contributed articles in the Journal of Global Ethics focused on global justice and childhood. On a general level, there is widespread consensus that there is a strong need for improvement in the lives of children around the globe. What global justice demands in this regard, however, has never been fleshed out in detail and there is only a little philosophical literature on this topic. Against this background, five aspects of the question of global justice for children need to be addressed. First, one has to take into account the debate between cosmopolitanism and particularism, as well as the debate as to whether and to what extent individual, collective or institutional actors should be prioritized. Secondly, a theory of global justice for children must explain how the content of global justice for children is founded and justified, and what it comprises. Third, different principles can be used to assess global justice for children. Only two prominent alternatives are mentioned here: egalitarianism and sufficiency. Fourthly, the temporal dimension of global justice is of particular importance for children. Fifthly, an approach focusing on the examination of injustices is equally necessary.

In this paper I am interested in the question of whether and why states should prioritize child refugees over adult refugees in cases where they are not able to grant refuge to all those who are entitled to it. In particular I discuss three grounds on which such a prioritization could be based: (a) vulnerability, (b) efficiency and (c) life phase and life span. As can be shown, these grounds also apply, to some extent, to particular groups of adults such as women, the elderly, or people with special needs. Based on this I conclude that states should invest significant resources into filtering out those who are the most needy and vulnerable although there are several limitations to doing that. Only if such a selection process were impossible, or so costly and time-consuming that it would result in significantly fewer refugees being admitted, would states have good moral reasons to prioritize children without further screening.

This paper is concerned with child poverty from an ethical perspective and applies the normative concept of vulnerability for this purpose. The first part of the paper will briefly outline children’s particular vulnerability and distinguish important aspects of this. Then the concept will be applied to child poverty and it will be shown that child poverty is a corrosive situational vulnerability, with many severe consequences. In this part of the paper normative reasoning and empirical literature will be brought together. Then, the next section will establish why this increased vulnerability of poor children and the harm to their well-being and well-becoming, which they suffer for this reason, are of ethical concern. It will be discussed that child poverty is a structural problem based on social, political and economic factors. The concluding section will then briefly outline why it is imperative to protect children from the vulnerabilities associated with poverty.

In this chapter, I will provide a philosophical commentary on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which will play a key role in global poverty reduction in the next 15 years. In particular, I will focus on five issues: possible trade-offs, the task of prioritization, the vagueness of the SDGs, the required coordination to implement the SDGs and the establishment of a system of sanctions against actors who fail to achieve the SDGs. Firstly, moving forward with measures to realize the SDGs will most likely demand trade-offs between certain goals; therefore, it is urgent to identify which trade-offs are likely to occur and understand how to choose those goals that should be pursued under such circumstances. Secondly, in addition to possible trade-offs, it is likely that some goals are more easy to achieve than others and that states, as well as international institutions, will have to decide where to invest the money. This probably means that some goals will be prioritized over others, with investments focused more on their achievement, at least in the short-term. Thirdly, although the SDGs cover 17 goals with a total of 169 targets, many of them are still very vague. It will be necessary to set measureable and feasible benchmarks, which can be used to track progress. Fourthly, the SDGs are ambitious and, therefore, the possibility that they will not be achieved is, unfortunately, rather high, especially if the vagueness of some of the targets is not exploited in order to achieve at least low levels of progress. Until now, not much is known about the strategies behind achieving the SDGs and how this global effort will be coordinated, as well as whether the current global framework of institutions is fit for that task. Fifthly, it is certain that, if the SDGs fail the poor and other vulnerable populations, there will be no fearful consequence for other populations, particularly those in rich countries.

GOTTFRIED SCHWEIGER,GUNTER GRAF | : In this paper, we want to examine the particular vulnerability of children from an ethical perspective. We want to defend three claims: Firstly, we will argue that children’s vulnerability is best understood as a dynamic quality, meaning that as children progress through childhood, their vulnerability also undergoes particular changes. To capture this, we want to discriminate among physical, mental, social, and symbolic vulnerability, which vary according to certain features, such as age, maturity, gender, and race. These different traits are furthermore important in order to understand what we owe children from an ethical perspective. In a nutshell, children have moral claims not to be harmed and to be protected against threats to their well-being and well-becoming, and these claims have to be explicated via the dynamic vulnerability of children. Finally, we will argue that one of the main issues is to balance the protection of children and their autonomy claims, which both enhance and diminish their vulnerability. | : Cet article examine la vulnérabilité particulière des enfants d’un point de vue éthique. Nous défendrons trois thèses. Premièrement, nous soutiendrons que la vulnérabilité des enfants est mieux comprise en tant que qualité dynamique, ce qui signifie que lorsque les enfants progressent durant l’enfance, leur vulnérabilité subit également des changements particuliers. Pour le mettre en relief, nous distinguerons la vulnérabilité physique, mentale, sociale et symbolique, qui varie en fonction de certaines caractéristiques telles que l’âge, la maturité, le sexe et la race. Ces différents traits sont en outre importants pour comprendre ce que nous devons aux enfants d’un point de vue éthique. En un mot, les enfants ont des exigences morales à ne pas être blessés et à être protégés contre les menaces à leur bien-être et à leur bien-devenir, et ces revendications doivent être expliquées par la vulnérabilité dynamique des enfants. Enfin, nous soutiendrons que l’un des principaux enjeux est d’équilibrer la protection des enfants et leurs revendications d’autonomie, qui à la fois renforcent et diminuent leur vulnérabilité.

Unemployment is one of the greatest social problems all around the world including in modern capitalistic welfare states. Therefore its social critique is a necessary task for any critical social philosophy such as Axel Honneth's recognition approach, which understands social justice in terms of social conditions of recognition. This paper aims to develop an evaluation of unemployment and its moral weight from this perspective. I will lay out the recognition approach and present a moral evaluation of unemployment as socially unjust based on the knowledge of its negative consequences for those affected. I will then discuss two objections to this conclusion, namely that a mere correlation of suffering and moral wrongness is not enough and that there are legitimate differences in the experience of recognition which could justify the existence of unemployment as deserved. In the next section, I will then refute both objections and first show that unemployment can be understood as socially unjust based on the knowledge that it is involuntary and that the unemployed are not responsible for their condition. Then I will discuss the relationship between the idea of meritocracy and unemployment to examine the assumption of unemployment as being deserved. I will finally conclude that unemployment is not a necessary side effect of meritocracy and that there are good reasons to argue for a moral and justified obligation to provide an actual access to paid work for all who want to work. However, such changes face serious obstacles and are not likely to happen under the current interpretation of meritocracy and social esteem which are one-sided and flawed. Keywords: unemployment, recognition, meritocracy, social critique, Axel Honneth.

The issue of income justice in professional sports, while a topic of high ethical and social interest, is nevertheless not at the forefront of research. The differences between team and individual sports are significant, and this article will focus on team sports, where income is generally set by fixed contracts rather than bonuses or money prizes. First, I will illustrate the overall problem by presenting some figures on the relation of athletes' salaries from Major League Baseball (MLB) to the median income of the overall population in the USA. I will then outline a model of income justice based on David Miller's definition of social justice, and will discuss two separate claims against which player salaries ought to be justified: those of fellow US citizens and those of fellow MLB players. Incomes are just if they fulfill both demands. Finally, I conclude that the disproportionately high salaries of professional athletes such as those in MLB are socially unjust, and therefore should be limited either by the governing bodies of the respective leagues or by the state.