John Joseph Haldane

This is the first volume in a series— Handbook [sic.] of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion —of which the author is also editor. Two things strike one immediately: first, it is very impressive in its range and depth of coverage; second, it is outrageously expensive. Kluwer’s pricing policy is a disgrace which reviewers ought not to let pass uncriticized. It is a disservice to individual readers, to institutions, and to writers. The present author has evidently labored long, hard, and fruitfully, yet his work is not likely to be widely read because of an unwarranted cost imposed by the publisher. It is conceivable, though unlikely, that this criticism will affect the pricing of subsequent volumes, but it will be a cruel irony if the editor’s own volume is then the one that is least widely read. Kluwer would be advised to reprice this volume at half the cost.

In recent decades philosophy of mind has undergone a number of important transformations. In the first part of this essay I review a survey of the subject provided by Daniel Dennett some twenty years ago and consider the current state of affairs. Notwithstanding the rise of physicalist causal theories, the field now displays a degree of diversity that suggests disarray. In the second part of the essay I examine three central issues: the nature of persons, of thought, and of action, and present a series of hylomorphic accounts of each.

This slim volume derives from the John Locke Lectures delivered in Oxford in 1991 and expands and develops the themes presented there and in a series of influential articles published during the last decade and a half. McDowell offers the prospect of "re-enchanting" a world laid bare by reductive "bald" naturalism, drawing support in this effort from Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Sellars. Others who feature prominently are Donald Davidson, Gareth Evans, Richard Rorty, and Sir Peter Strawson.

Notwithstanding that there is now widespread interest in the rights of victims, little has been written about the theoretical justification of state compensation. Here we offer an initial exploration of the field in the hope that others might venture further and examine the points at which issues of compensation connect with other general and specific themes in social and political philosophy. For example, there has been much discussion about communitarian conceptions of civil society but the practical implications of such views, other than those relating to multiculturalism, have been largely ignored. The application of theory to social policy needs to take account of existing laws and institutions and these vary from one society and jurisdiction to another. In what follows we are principally concerned with the situation obtaining in the United Kingdom but the underlying issues are general ones [1].

Anyone who comes to read some of Aquinas' works and at the same time looks around for modern discussions of them will be struck by two things: first, the greater part of the latter is the product of American and European Catholic neo-scholasticism; and second, that, with a few distinguished exceptions,1 what is contributed by writers of the analytical tradition is often a blend of uninformed generalizations and some suspicion that what Aquinas presents is not so much independent philosophy as propaganda for the cause of Christian theology

In his paper A Philosophical Approach to Professional Ethics, Professor de Stexhe offers a very rich and interesting set of reflections on the possible foundations of professional ethics. First he constructs a compelling problematic arising from the diverse but intersecting dimensions in which ethical action is located. Then he describes a task, or more accurately a series of tasks, involving a skilfully choreographed set of dialectal movements between the various moments or conditioning features of action.These moments include particular demands and general principles; personal experience and impersonal reasoning; and existing practices and regulative forms. What de Stexhe wants to see, and with this we must all be in agreement, is a reinterpretation in broadly ethical terms of institutionalized practices such, I presume, as medicine, nursing, law, banking, and education, practices which are at risk of becoming, or indeed have already become, ordered to purely instrumental purposes; or, worse, are unwelcoming to the wishes of individuals and of groups to live humanly good lives. If sloganeering were called for we might speak of a concern to ‘recover virtue in professional life’ or even of a demand for ‘reform and renewal’.Again, I sympathize with the ambition, though I am slightly wary of what I suspect may be a tendency to see this task in political terms. The influence of Heidegger and Ricoeur on the argument seems evident and thus far benign; but I think the shadows of Hegel and Marx may also fall upon, or at least fall close to, de Stexhe’s thinking. I may be wrong about this, but if not let me enter a plea to avoid, or at any rate to delay for as long as possible, an appeal to the state as a source of, and as an object for, virtue

In recent years there has been a dramatic expansion of the range of studies, policy directives and initiatives concerned with the environment. For the most part these are unphilosophical, pragmatic responses to perceived threats of pollution and other forms of environmental degradation. However, they invariably presuppose certain conceptual and normative commitments, and the examination and evaluation of these has been a major concern of environmental philosophy. To date the primary focus of interest has been on ethical and political values, but there is a developing sense of the need to consider issues relating to the aesthetics of environment. After outlining a general philosophical structure for understanding the nature of aesthetic experience, its objects and values, a little known theory - that of Aquinas - is explained and defended.

The following essay, whose title has been provided by me for this occasion, is taken from James Ferrier's work The Institutes of Metaphysic where it appears in Section I., the general theme of which is ‘The Epistemology, or Theory of Knowing’. The essay is a statement and elaboration of the ‘ninth proposition’ of the Institutes, and an examination of its implications as these bear upon knowledge of mind and self. The precise source of the text is the 3rd edition of the Institutes of Metaphysic (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons 1875). Ferrier indicates earlier that ‘generally throughout this work the word “cognition” signifi es the known, the cognitum. This remark is necessary lest the reader should suppose that it signifi es the act rather than the object of knowledge’ (p. 156). In the last section of this introduction I list the preceding eight propositions