John Joseph Haldane

The rise of the phenomenon of virtue ethics in recent years has increased at a rapid pace. Such an explosion carries with it a number of great possibilities, as well as risks. This volume has been written to contribute a multi-faceted perspective to the current conversation about virtue. Among many other thought-provoking questions, the collection addresses the following: What are the virtues, and how are they enumerated? What are the internal problems among ethicists, and what are the objections and replies to contemporary virtue ethics? Additionally, the practical implications following from the answers to these questions are discussed in new and fascinating research. Fundamental concepts such as teleology and eudaimonism are addressed from both a historical and dialectical approach. This tome will contribute not only to providing further clarity to the current horizons in virtue ethics, but also to the practical conclusion following from the study: to challenge the reader toward a greater pursuit of the virtuous life.

A philosophical inquiry into the nature of information and communication media raises conceptual and ontological questions. This analysis provides conceptual mappings and also raises the question of what is involved in the emergence of media out of some prior state from which they were absent, and again in subsequent phases of higher-level emergent phenomena. “Emergence” can be understood in a number of ways: epistemically, causally, or metaphysically, and there is a danger of equivocating between these different senses in general or in considering particular levels of media emergence alone, and drawing the wrong conclusions. In describing and attempting to understand recent developments in “emerging media” it may be useful to consider an analogy with developments in the visual arts involving the transition from figurative naturalism to abstractionism, then to minimalism, and from these to performance art and conceptualism.

_In this book two philosophers, each committed to unambiguous versions of belief and disbelief, debate the central issues of atheism and theism._ Considers one of the oldest and most widely disputed philosophical questions: is there a God? Presents the atheism/theism issue in the form of philosophical debate between two highly regarded scholars, widely praised for the clarity and verve of their work. This second edition contains new essays by each philosopher, responding to criticisms and building on their previous work.

_In this book two philosophers, each committed to unambiguous versions of belief and disbelief, debate the central issues of atheism and theism._ Considers one of the oldest and most widely disputed philosophical questions: is there a God? Presents the atheism/theism issue in the form of philosophical debate between two highly regarded scholars, widely praised for the clarity and verve of their work. This second edition contains new essays by each philosopher, responding to criticisms and building on their previous work.

In recent decades philosophy of mind has undergone a number of important transformations. In the first part of this essay I review a survey of the subject provided by Daniel Dennett some twenty years ago and consider the current state of affairs. Notwithstanding the rise of physicalist causal theories, the field now displays a degree of diversity that suggests disarray. In the second part of the essay I examine three central issues: the nature of persons, of thought, and of action, and present a series of hylomorphic accounts of each.

Notwithstanding that there is now widespread interest in the rights of victims, little has been written about the theoretical justification of state compensation. Here we offer an initial exploration of the field in the hope that others might venture further and examine the points at which issues of compensation connect with other general and specific themes in social and political philosophy. For example, there has been much discussion about communitarian conceptions of civil society but the practical implications of such views, other than those relating to multiculturalism, have been largely ignored. The application of theory to social policy needs to take account of existing laws and institutions and these vary from one society and jurisdiction to another. In what follows we are principally concerned with the situation obtaining in the United Kingdom but the underlying issues are general ones [1].

ABSTRACT The essay is concerned with the widely held view that contemporary fine art is obscurantist, shallow and unrewarding of attention. It is argued that the opposition between common opinion and the advocates of modernism rests upon a philosophical disagreement about the nature and value of art. An account of aesthetic experience is then presented and illustrated by reference to Raphael's The School of Athens. This account shows the reasoning implicit in modernism to rest upon a fallacy relating to the possible forms of explanation. The essay concludes by endorsing Augustine's claim that culcural intelligibility rests not on abstract reasoning but on shared affections. This sets a requirement for artists to return to making work that engages the interests of their fellow citizens.

One need not hold a religious view to think that as well as equipping pupils with knowledge and skills, education might seek to give or enable them to form some conception of the meaning or significance of life. Conjoined with notable failures to provide a credible alternative to traditional forms of moral education such considerations have contributed to a movement from the deontological (rules and principles), to the instrumentally prudential (clarity and coherence), to the axiological (values), to the aretaic (character and virtue), and most recently to the teleological seeing the role of virtue as relating instrumentally and constitutively to leading a flourishing life. This approach faces significant challenges, however, which need to be addressed before it can hope to be adopted across a range of educational contexts but particularly within schooling. These relate to the form and content of statements concerning human flourishing. The appeal to flourishing as an educational aim is difficult first and most abstractly because flourishing is a more logically complex and metaphysically substantial notion than is sometimes recognised; and second, because in the context of contested ends and purposes appeals to flourishing face some of the same challenges as do older educational schemes intended to prepare for life and for death.

In the heyday of conceptual analysis philosophical psychology was practised without regard to the ontology of mind as that was associated with disputes between materialism and non-materialism. The rise of functionalism, however, led philosophical psychology in the direction of materialism, though with a residue deriving from phenomenal consciousness. This is now widely viewed as ‘the hard problem’ for physicalism and probably an insuperable one for it, raising the spectre of epiphenomenalism. I argue that in fact sensory consciousness is not the greatest challenge to materialism, for that lies with the conceptual intentionality of abstract thought. I make these points in connection with the views of Aquinas and consider two of his arguments (from ST, Ia, q. 75) for the immateriality ofintellectual acts. While finding one inadequate for reasons internal to the Thomist account of cognition, I defend the second against recent critics.

Education is twice over concerned with human nature, most extensively as it is presupposed in the pursuit of diverse aims, and more specifically, as understanding it and applying such understanding are themselves made objects of study and teaching. The latter was a principal concern of ancient, renaissance and enlightenment humanists. These and others who focussed on the human condition have tended to arrive at one of the three attitudes: the celebratory, the gloomy and the condemnatory. Recent decades have seen tyrannies, global wars, campaigns of genocide, economic crises, seemingly irreconcilable political polarisation, man‐made environmental degradation and other evils. Besides posing practical challenges, these put in question ideas of historical progress, of social harmony and of personal flourishing, and thereby have implications for an understanding of the human condition and for what to teach concerning it, and what qualities of character to seek to inculcate.

Virtuous leadership is the focus of a growing body of academic literature but is little discussed by contemporary philosophers. Current treatments tend to over-generalisation: assimilating diverse features to a few broad categories and applying simplified ethical theories. This essay argues that virtue and character education need to be keyed to specific activities, that “virtuous leadership” is in danger of being confused with extrinsic activism, and that the history of ethics in health care provides an instructive example of thinking ethically about practice. Questions commonly posed in the literature—What specific virtues are required for leadership? How may these be formed?—are unduly simple and often rest on faulty assumptions about the nature of leadership and of the structure of virtuous action. Philosophers engaged in advising professionals about the virtues of leadership would do well to consider how the relevant points apply to their own practice.