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Arguments pro and con on Adam Pautz's external directedness principleIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Geoff Lee's hegemony of the third personIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Sydney shoemaker on transparency and the inverted spectrumIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Tyler Burge on perceptual adaptationIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Intuitions and the metaphysics of mind: reply to Joe LevineIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Dave Chalmers on shape and colorIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Puzzled about sensory qualities: reply to Bill LycanIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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1Fading qualia: a response to Michael TyeIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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1Attention as a conduit: reply to Nico Silins and Susanna SiegelIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Concepts and percepts: reply to Hilary PutnamIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Functional role, superficialism and commander data: reply to Brian McLaughlinIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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1Strong representationism and unconscious perception: reply to Janet LevinIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Reply to Frank Jackson on a priori necessitationIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Attention affects appearance: response to Marisa CarrascoIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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The direct realist approach to illusion: reply to Bill BrewerIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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On a confusion about a function of consciousnessIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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On a confusion about a function of consciousnessIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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1Debate on unconscious perceptionIn Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. 2016.
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2What is FunctionalismIn John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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How Heritability Misleads about RaceIn Bernard Boxill (ed.), Race and Racism, Oxford University Press. 2000.
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797Does the prefrontal cortex play an essential role in consciousness? Insights from intracranial electrical stimulation of the human brainJournal of Neuroscience 1 (41): 2076-2087. 2021.A central debate in philosophy and neuroscience pertains to whether PFC activity plays an essential role in the neural basis of consciousness. Neuroimaging and electrophysiology studies have revealed that the contents of conscious perceptual experience can be successfully decoded from PFC activity, but these findings might be confounded by post- perceptual cognitive processes, such as thinking, reasoning, and decision-making, that are not necessary for con- sciousness. To clarify the involvement…Read more
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770Finessing the Bored Monkey ProblemTrends in Cognitive Sciences 24 (1): 1-2. 2020.This is a response to Ian Phillips and Jorge Morales, "The Fundamental Problem with No-Cognition Paradigms," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2020
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1745What Is Wrong with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix ItTrends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (12): 1003-1013. 2019.Is consciousness based in prefrontal circuits involved in cognitive processes like thought, reasoning, and memory or, alternatively, is it based in sensory areas in the back of the neocortex? The no-report paradigm has been crucial to this debate because it aims to separate the neural basis of the cognitive processes underlying post-perceptual decision and report from the neural basis of conscious perception itself. However, the no-report paradigm is problematic because, even in the absence of …Read more
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Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body IdentityIn Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 2, Oxford University Press Uk. 2006.
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Is Experiencing Just Representing?In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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232Advertisement for a Semantics for PsychologyMidwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 615-678. 1986.
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1022Attention and perceptual adaptationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3): 205-206. 2013.Commentary on Andy Clark's target article on predictive coding.
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Perception |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Neuroscience |
Philosophy of Mind |