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Functional role, superficialism and commander data: reply to Brian McLaughlinIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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1Strong representationism and unconscious perception: reply to Janet LevinIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Reply to Frank Jackson on a priori necessitationIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Attention affects appearance: response to Marisa CarrascoIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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The direct realist approach to illusion: reply to Bill BrewerIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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On a confusion about a function of consciousnessIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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On a confusion about a function of consciousnessIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness, Polity. 1995.
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1Debate on unconscious perceptionIn Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. 2016.
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2What is FunctionalismIn John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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How Heritability Misleads about RaceIn Bernard Boxill (ed.), Race and Racism, Oxford University Press. 2000.
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791Does the prefrontal cortex play an essential role in consciousness? Insights from intracranial electrical stimulation of the human brainJournal of Neuroscience 1 (41): 2076-2087. 2021.A central debate in philosophy and neuroscience pertains to whether PFC activity plays an essential role in the neural basis of consciousness. Neuroimaging and electrophysiology studies have revealed that the contents of conscious perceptual experience can be successfully decoded from PFC activity, but these findings might be confounded by post- perceptual cognitive processes, such as thinking, reasoning, and decision-making, that are not necessary for con- sciousness. To clarify the involvement…Read more
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767Finessing the Bored Monkey ProblemTrends in Cognitive Sciences 24 (1): 1-2. 2020.This is a response to Ian Phillips and Jorge Morales, "The Fundamental Problem with No-Cognition Paradigms," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2020
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1714What Is Wrong with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix ItTrends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (12): 1003-1013. 2019.Is consciousness based in prefrontal circuits involved in cognitive processes like thought, reasoning, and memory or, alternatively, is it based in sensory areas in the back of the neocortex? The no-report paradigm has been crucial to this debate because it aims to separate the neural basis of the cognitive processes underlying post-perceptual decision and report from the neural basis of conscious perception itself. However, the no-report paradigm is problematic because, even in the absence of …Read more
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Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body IdentityIn Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 2, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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Is Experiencing Just Representing?In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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766Advertisement for a Semantics for PsychologyMidwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 615-678. 1986.
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1825Attention and perceptual adaptationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3): 205-206. 2013.Commentary on Andy Clark's target article on predictive coding.
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145IX*—An Argument for Holism1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1): 151-170. 1995.Ned Block; IX*—An Argument for Holism1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 151–170
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Readings in Philosophy of PsychologyBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (2): 227-230. 1982.
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38Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2. Ned BlockPhilosophy of Science 50 (1): 175-176. 1983.
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11Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 39-70. 1999.
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51Is Experiencing Just Representing?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 663-670. 1998.
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9Troubles with functionalismIn W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition, University of Minnesota Press. pp. 9--261. 1978.
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88Author's responseBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1). 1997.The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Perception |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Neuroscience |
Philosophy of Mind |