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23Consciousness, philosophical issues aboutIn L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.
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11If perception is probabilistic, why does it not seem probabilistic?Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 373. 2018.
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11Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 39-70. 1999.
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10Searle's arguments against cognitive scienceIn John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press. pp. 70--79. 2003.
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9Troubles with functionalismIn W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition, University of Minnesota Press. pp. 9--261. 1978.
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4The computer model of mindIn Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Mit Press. 1990.
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3QIn Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2017.qualia include the ways it feels to see, hear and smell, the way it feels to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have mental states. Qualia are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions and, in my view, thoughts and desires as well. But, so defined, who could deny that qualia exist? Yet, the existence of qualia is controversial. Here is what is controversial: whether qualia, so defined, can be characterized in intentional, functional or purely cognitive terms. Oppon…Read more
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2What is FunctionalismIn John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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1What narrow content is notIn Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Blackwell. 1991.
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1Attention as a conduit: reply to Nico Silins and Susanna SiegelIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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1Strong representationism and unconscious perception: reply to Janet LevinIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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1The Mind as Software in the BrainIn John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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1Fading qualia: a response to Michael TyeIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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1Debate on unconscious perceptionIn Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. 2016.
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1Two kinds of lawsIn C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Oxford University Press. 1994.
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Dave Chalmers on shape and colorIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Intuitions and the metaphysics of mind: reply to Joe LevineIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Reply to Frank Jackson on a priori necessitationIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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Optimal attention: reply to Sebastian WatzlIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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On a confusion about a function of consciousnessIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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The philosophy of psychologyIn Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject, Oxford University Press. 1998.
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Max Black's objection to mind-body identityIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Perception |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Neuroscience |
Philosophy of Mind |