•  204
    The New Riddle of Induction and the New Riddle of Deduction
    Acta Analytica 31 (1): 31-41. 2016.
    Many believe that Goodman’s new riddle of induction proves the impossibility of a purely syntactical theory of confirmation. After discussing and rejecting Jackson’s solution to Goodman’s paradox, I formulate the “new riddle of deduction,” in analogy to the new riddle of induction. Since it is generally agreed that deductive validity can be defined syntactically, the new riddle of induction equally does not show that inductive validity cannot be defined syntactically. I further rely on the analo…Read more
  •  96
    Contingency and Time
    Logos and Episteme 3 (4): 591-615. 2012.
    In this article I offer an explanation of the need for contingent propositions in language. I argue that contingent propositions are required if and only if there is a need for propositions which can be both true and false in different circumstances. Indexical expressions enable the same proposition to be expressed in different contexts, thus allowing it to be both true and false. Examination of the different indexical expressions shows that temporal indexical expressions are the ones that do th…Read more
  •  110
    A model of conceptual analysis
    Metaphilosophy 36 (5): 668-687. 2005.
    In my paper I identify both the conceptual tools needed to establish claims for the existence of conceptual ties, as well as the principles governing the use of those tools, and present a model of conceptual analysis. I identify and justify those principles in light of the conditions for the meaningfulness of expressions in language, which I extract from an analysis of the concept of meaning. The conclusions of this analysis are organized into a schematic model of the workings of a language. Acc…Read more