Gal Yehezkel

My purpose in this book is to put forward a philosophical research project, which is complementary to the empirical study of nature. The purpose of this project is to describe the conceptual structure of nature, thus providing a general framework for understanding nature, which I term “internal relationalism.” My inquiry is likened to an attempt to establish nature from nothing, gradually introducing the key features of existence, such as time, the laws of nature, and finally space, thus explaining both their essence and their affinity.

This chapter is dedicated to better understanding the conception of nature that was introduced in the previous chapters, which I term “internal relationalism.” I begin by explaining the implications of the conclusion that existence is a relation. I then explain the meaning of the laws of nature and how they constitute time and space. Following this, I return to the notion of time and rely on these insights to explain the arrow of time. Finally, I show how the ancient riddle “why is there something rather than nothing?” is answered by the internal relationalism conception of nature, by showing that it implies that nature necessarily exists.

In this chapter, I explore the necessary conditions for using contingent propositions for describing nature. For this purpose, I construct the conceptual apparatus that allows attributing conflicting truth-values to the same proposition without a contradiction. This conceptual apparatus is found to be identical to the temporal indexical expressions of past, present, and future. Hence, time, and more specifically the “flow of time,” is found to be a necessary and the most fundamental feature of nature. I further explore this conceptual structure and show that it relies on a notion of objectivity, which distinguishes between propositions and what they describe.

In this chapter, I define the structure of time and space. I begin by constituting time as an objective feature of nature, by showing how, based on the laws of nature, the relations of simultaneity and precedence can be given objective meaning, and how distances in time can be measured. Next, I introduce and develop the notion of space by giving meaning to the idea of locality and defining spatial relations in terms of the temporal order of reciprocal determinations. Finally, I show that there is a fundamental constant speed of determination between occurrences in space, and further explain how this can be used for measuring space. The entities in space and time are shown to be reciprocally determining elements, which are themselves constituted by temporo-spatial relations.

In this chapter I explain how a conceptual scheme can formulate an objective description of nature from a limited point of view in time. I show that this notion of objectivity, which is implied here, ultimately relies on the existence of laws of nature, and further uncovers their necessary structure. Nature is found to be necessarily subject to laws of nature, which connect occurrences at different times, such that occurrences at one time are both necessary and sufficient conditions for occurrences at other times. The structure of the laws of nature is further developed and explained, and it is shown that all occurrences in nature must be reciprocally connected by these laws.

In this chapter I summarize the conclusions of this investigation, and pave the way for its expansion. This expansion will have to take into account contingent aspects of human life. For it is obvious that, as human agents, we are subjected to moral obligations that derive from the unique contingent aspects of our lives, such as the fact that we are born and develop in the company of our own kind, and hence are tied by familial and social obligations to other agents. Obviously, this investigation must also pay attention to the non-rational aspects of human existence, that is, our desires, feelings, fears, and so on. Hence, it must not only be a conceptual investigation, but also an empirical one.

In this chapter I outline a rationalist theory of agency. I begin with a minimalist conception of reason, according to which reason only serves an instrumental role. I argue that the use of reason is a necessary condition for determining ends, and thus for agency. Hence, every agent is a rational agent. Furthermore, reason sets a demand that every agent ought to follow, which is to act rationally. This conclusion implies that the end of rational agency ought to be gaining knowledge of reality. Finally, I explain the implications of this conclusion regarding the place of desires and the search for happiness in practical reasoning, and identify happiness with a rational mental state, that is, a state of mind that is directed toward gaining knowledge of reality.

My intention in this chapter it to achieve better understanding of the rational categorical obligation by exploring its implications for a variety of moral problems and dilemmas regarding the value of life. I begin by arguing that the identification of the final end of rational agency with gaining knowledge of reality does not imply that mindless killing or abusing creatures that lack these minimal rational abilities is morally permitted. I then examine the conditions for the legitimacy of suicide and mercy killing; argue that the lives of all agents are morally equal; and finally discuss some of the moral problems and dilemmas that arise due to the identification of the life of each individual agent as a final end.

In this chapter I refute skepticism about freedom of the will. I explain how the rationalist moral theory developed earlier in this book gives meaning to the idea of freedom in a deterministic world, by explicating it in terms of rationality. My analysis also sheds light on the notions of responsibility and punishment, which are an essential part of any normative theory of conduct. The conclusions of this chapter are that freedom is compatible with determinism, and that freedom, morality, and rationality are interdependent. A (perfectly) rational agent is also a moral and a free agent.

In this book, I establish a foundation for a rationalist moral theory, based on a rationalist theory of agency, thus grounding morality in the general demands of agency. The theory of agency, and the moral theory which emerges from it, are developed from a minimalist conception of reason, and based on an analysis of the concept of intentional action. From this analysis, a final end of rational agency emerges. This end is the basis for a rational categorical obligation – the obligation of every agent to pursue knowledge of reality. This basic obligation is the cornerstone of our conception of morality, and the source for our moral obligations, which bind every agent, whether human or not.

In this chapter I show how morality can be justified by reducing moral obligations to practical reason, thus grounding morality in the general demands of agency. I argue that practical reasoning presumes a rational categorical obligation, which sets as an end gaining knowledge of reality. Following this conclusion, I show how a basic moral obligation – the moral prohibition on murder – follows from the rational categorical obligation, and how the reduction of morality to practical reason explains some of the most salient features of our moral convictions.

This book offers a solution to the ancient philosophical problem regarding the nature and the justification of morality. The importance of this subject matter is obvious, not merely as an abstract philosophical problem, but perhaps even more as a practical challenge, regarding the way we ought to live our lives: the values that ought to direct us, and the ends that we ought to pursue. In the course of this inquiry, a wide array of philosophical topics is explored: the nature of intentional action, and the role played by reason and desires in agency; the question of the final end of agency – better known in ancient terminology as the question of the purpose of life, and in modern terms as the question of the meaning of life; the nature of moral obligations and their rational justification; the challenge posed by determinism for the freedom of the will, with its implications on fatalism and moral responsibility; and normative questions regarding the value of life.

McTaggart's negative thesis in his proof for the unreality of time, which contends that the A-series is contradictory, is still today upheld as a proof of the unreality of the properties of past, present, and future, and of the `flow of time'. In my paper, I defend the possibility of a complete and consistent description of the A-series, thus refuting McTaggart's negative thesis. I show that the failure to acknowledge the possibility of such a description is due to an ambiguity in natural language. Once this ambiguity is clarified, and in light of the disanalogy between time and space, the usual description of the A-series, `Event e was future, is present, and will be past', is shown to be a successful description of the change in the temporal A-properties (the `flow of time')

Lucretius points out a puzzling asymmetry in our attitudes towards our prenatal non-existence and our post-mortem non-existence. Normally, we view birth as a happy occasion, and death as a sad event. Some philosophers argue that these asymmetry in our attitude is justified by the A-theory of Time, which reflects the common sense way of thinking about time, and so they discredit the B-theory of Time. In this paper I critically examine these claims and argue that this belief is false. Our attitude is neither justified nor discredited by anything which is in debate between the A-Theory and the B-theory of time. Thus the existence of this asymmetry does not favor one theory over the other, and the dispute between the two theories will have to be settled on other grounds.

In this chapter I analyze the concept of self-consciousness in order to uncover its conceptual structure. The conclusions of this analysis describe some of the necessary categories of conscious experience. The concept of the self, the concept of consciousness, the concept of objectivity, the temporal distinctions between past, present, and future, and finally the idea of natural regularities, are found to be necessary categories for conscious experience, and hence describe the fundamental cognitive structure of self-conscious beings.

In this paper I defend the rejection of fatalism about the past by showing that there are possible circumstances in which it would be rational to attempt to bring about by our decisions and actions a necessary and sufficient condition, other things being equal, for something which we see as favorable to have occurred in the past. The examples I put forward are analogous to our attempts to bring about the occurrence of future events, and demonstrate the symmetry between the past and the future in this respect.

ABSTRACT According to the Symmetry Argument against the fear of death, our attitudes towards birth and death should be identical. In this paper I defend the Deprivation Account of the badness of death, according to which death is bad because it deprives one of future goods. After rejecting previous attempts to explain and justify the asymmetry in our attitudes towards birth and death I argue that the asymmetry in our attitudes is both explained and justified by the fact that contrary to birth, death is not viewed as a nomologically necessary condition for life, and therefore death is viewed as an unnecessary limitation of life.

According to a common view of human agency, desires determine at least some of the ends that agents set for themselves. In this paper, I argue that this view is false. I show that without reason’s ability to determine the means to an end it is impossible to determine ends. Furthermore, even when an end is determined in light of a desire, only reason can make sense of the distinction between an end and merely a means to that end. In fact, in many cases the end which is determined in light of desires is to remove these desires, rather than to “serve and obey” them. Hence, reason is necessary for determining our ends, and thus explaining the teleological aspect of agency.

In this paper I attempt to refute the instrumental conception of practical reason, and thus defend a rationalist conception of practical reason. I argue that, far from merely playing an instrumental role, reason can be used by an agent to evaluate, that is, to approve or reject, final ends, which might be suggested by desires, and further to determine final ends independently of any desires, whether actual or potential, that the agent might have. My argument relies on an analysis of the concept of intention, and, more specifically, on the distinction between want and intention. I argue that the notion of an intentional action entails that reason can be used to evaluate and determine final ends.

Many believe that Goodman’s new riddle of induction proves the impossibility of a purely syntactical theory of confirmation. After discussing and rejecting Jackson’s solution to Goodman’s paradox, I formulate the “new riddle of deduction,” in analogy to the new riddle of induction. Since it is generally agreed that deductive validity can be defined syntactically, the new riddle of induction equally does not show that inductive validity cannot be defined syntactically. I further rely on the analogy between induction and deduction in order to explain why some predicates, such as “grue,” are unprojectible.

In this article I offer an explanation of the need for contingent propositions in language. I argue that contingent propositions are required if and only if there is a need for propositions which can be both true and false in different circumstances. Indexical expressions enable the same proposition to be expressed in different contexts, thus allowing it to be both true and false. Examination of the different indexical expressions shows that temporal indexical expressions are the ones that do this. Furthermore, describing the change in the temporal A-determinations of past, present, or future, requires using contingent propositions. The conclusion of this article is that change in the temporal A-determinations is the explanation for the need for contingent propositions in language.

In my paper I identify both the conceptual tools needed to establish claims for the existence of conceptual ties, as well as the principles governing the use of those tools, and present a model of conceptual analysis. I identify and justify those principles in light of the conditions for the meaningfulness of expressions in language, which I extract from an analysis of the concept of meaning. The conclusions of this analysis are organized into a schematic model of the workings of a language. According to this model, the meaning of every word in any language is determined by its role in the systematic mapping of all possible states of affairs included in its conceptual scheme.

An important aspect of the debate between the A-theory and the B-theory of time relates to the supposed implications of each for some of the most basic human attitudes and stances. The asymmetry in our attitudes towards past and future events in our life (pleasant and unpleasant), and towards the temporal limits of our existence, that is, toward birth and death, is supposedly considered differently by the two theories. I argue that our attitudes are neither justified nor discredited by anything which is in debate between the A-Theory and the B-theory, and therefore that neither theory of time is supported by the asymmetry in our attitudes

The principle of the "uniformity of nature" states that reality is subject to natural laws. In this paper I argue that a weak version of the principle of the uniformity of nature is a necessary truth. According to this weakened principle, every reality for which the question of its subjection to natural laws can arise is subject to natural laws. I argue that this question arises only for a subject who knows of the existence of objective reality, qua objective (that is, reality which is independent of any knowledge of it). I show that a necessary condition for knowledge of objective reality, qua objective, is that the subject can acquire knowledge of past and future events, which he does not perceive directly through his senses, and that only natural (contingent) regularities enable the subject to do so. Hence, I conclude that every reality for which the question of its subjection to natural laws can arise is subject to natural laws.

Abstract: This article considers the conceptual connections between self-consciousness, objectivity, and time. The model of conceptual analysis employed examines the necessary conditions of the meaningfulness of expressions in language. In the course of this analysis two distinct options for the explanation of self-consciousness are identified and examined. According to the first (Strawsonian) view, self-consciousness is based upon the distinction between the self and other subjects of consciousness; according to the second (Kantian) view, self-consciousness is based upon the distinction between the self and the world. The first option is rejected, and a variation of the second option is adopted. According to it, in self-consciousness one is conscious of oneself as a temporally extended point of view (consciousness) over an objective and temporal realm of reality.