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Induction and the Aims of InquiryIn Ernest Nagel, Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton White (eds.), Philosophy, science, and method, St. Martin's Press. pp. 99. 1969.
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210Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and EntrenchmentSynthese 152 (1). 2006.We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure pro…Read more
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29Obligation and permission when there is a second best and when there is a second worstAnálisis Filosófico 26 (2): 356-372. 2006.A comparison is made between the criterion of choice of E-admissibility I proposed in Levi, 1974 and elaborated in Levi, 1980 and 1986, and the ideas about norms elaborated by Alchourrón and Bulygin with an emphasis on the fact that choice cannot always be evaluated in terms of binary comparisons as the distinction between second worst and not second worst illustrates. Se establece una comparación entre el criterio de E-admisibilidad propuesto en Levi,1974 y elaborado en Levi,1980 y 1986 y las i…Read more
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39Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3): 342-343. 1981.
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1Convexity and Separability in Representing ConsensusIn Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement and Volume Ii: Society, Institutions, and Development, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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42Rationality, prediction, and autonomous choiceCanadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (sup1): 339-363. 1993.
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46Knowledge as True BeliefIn Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science, Springer. pp. 269--302. 2011.
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1FeasibilityIn Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1--20. 1992.
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1Dewey's logic of inquiryIn Molly Cochran (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Dewey, Cambridge University Press. pp. 80-100. 2010.
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57The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through InquiryCambridge University Press. 1991.Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an ag…Read more
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7IrrelevanceIn A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications, D. Reidel. pp. 263--273. 1978.
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44Book Review:Probabilistic Metaphysics Patrick Suppes (review)Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 646-. 1988.In the introduction to Probabilistic Metaphysics, Patrick Suppes declares his intention to refute each of five central tenets of “neotraditional metaphysics”. These tenets run as follows:The future is determined by the past.Every event has a sufficient determinant cause.Knowledge must be grounded in certainty.Scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete.Scientific knowledge and method can in principle be unified.
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9Dissonance and Consistency according to Shackle and ShaferPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978. 1978.
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92Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgmentPhilosophy of Science 52 (3): 390-409. 1985.Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey
Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |