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Rationality, Prediction, and Autonomous ChoiceCanadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 19 339-363. 1993.Principles of rationality are invoked for several purposes: they are often deployed in explanation and prediction; they are also used to set standards for rational health for deliberating agents or to furnish blueprints for rational automata; and they are intended as guides to perplexed decision makers seeking to regulate their own attitudes and conduct. These purposes are quite different. It is far from obvious that what serves well in one capacity will do so in another. Indeed, I shall argue l…Read more
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41Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifferenceAnalysis 55 (1): 2-5. 1995.The anti- Humean proposal of constructing desire as belief about what would be good must be abandoned on pain of triviality. Our central result shows that if an agent's belief- desire state is represented by Jeffrey's expected value theory enriched with the Desire as Belief Thesis (DAB), then, provided that three pairwise inconsistent propositions receive non- zero probability, the agent must view with indifference any proposition whose probability is greater than zero. Unlike previous results a…Read more
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115Corroboration and rules of acceptanceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52): 307-313. 1962.
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103Undercutting and the Ramsey test for conditionalsSynthese 101 (2): 157-169. 1994.There is an important class of conditionals whose assertibility conditions are not given by the Ramsey test but by an inductive extension of that test. Such inductive Ramsey conditionals fail to satisfy some of the core properties of plain conditionals. Associated principles of nonmonotonic inference should not be assumed to hold generally if interpretations in terms of induction or appeals to total evidence are not to be ruled out
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11Chance, Cause, Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific EvidenceNoûs 16 (4): 619-622. 1982.
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4Dissonance and Consistency according to Shackle and ShaferPSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978 (2): 466-477. 1978.R.A.Fisher introduced the fiducial argument as a means for obtaining something from nothing. He thought that on some occasions it was legitimate to obtain a posterior probability distribution over a range of simple statistical hypotheses without commitment to a prior distribution [4].H.Jeffreys thought he could tame Fisher by casting his argument in a Bayesian mold through a derivation of the fiducial posterior from a suitably constructed ignorance prior via Bayes’ theorem and conditionalization…Read more
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2Critical Notice: Patrick Suppes' Probabilistic MetaphysicsPhilosophy of Science 55 (4): 646-652. 1988.In the introduction to Probabilistic Metaphysics, Patrick Suppes declares his intention to refute each of five central tenets of “neotraditional metaphysics”. These tenets run as follows:The future is determined by the past.Every event has a sufficient determinant cause.Knowledge must be grounded in certainty.Scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete.Scientific knowledge and method can in principle be unified.
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Convexity and Separability in Representing ConsensusIn Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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16Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Episternic States by Peter Gärdenfors (review)Journal of Philosophy 88 (8): 437-444. 1991.
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23Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem (review)Journal of Philosophy 58 (9): 241-249. 1961.
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8Probabilistic MetaphysicsPhilosophy of Science 55 (4): 646-652. 1988.In the introduction to Probabilistic Metaphysics, Patrick Suppes declares his intention to refute each of five central tenets of “neotraditional metaphysics”. These tenets run as follows:The future is determined by the past.Every event has a sufficient determinant cause.Knowledge must be grounded in certainty.Scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete.Scientific knowledge and method can in principle be unified.
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9The Logic of Consistency and the Logic of TruthDialectica 58 (4): 461-482. 2004.In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed.
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Abduction and demands for informationIn Ilkka Niiniluoto & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), The Logic and epistemology of scientific change, North-holland Pub. Co.. pp. 30--405. 1979.
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12A Paradox for the BirdsIn R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Reidel. pp. 371--378. 1976.
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Is a miss as good as a mileIn Sami Pihlström, Panu Raatikainen & Matti Sintonen (eds.), Approaching truth: essays in honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto, College Publications. pp. 209--223. 2007.
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1Convexity and Separability in Representing ConsensusIn Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement and Volume Ii: Society, Institutions, and Development, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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42Rationality, prediction, and autonomous choiceCanadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (sup1): 339-363. 1993.
Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |