Maël Lemoine

English summary: Based on the famous essay by Georges Canguilhem on what is normal and pathological (originally published in 1943), extensive philosophical literature (mainly Anglo-Saxon) has attempted to define these concepts and analyze their status. The main discussion focuses on the following question: can you describe health and illness as natural phenomena or are they states that are determined by values? French text. French description: Depuis le celebre essai de Georges Canguilhem sur le normal et le pathologique publie initialement en 1943 et dont l'un des objectifs etait la clarification des concepts de sante et de maladie, une litterature philosophique abondante, principalement anglo-saxonne, s'est attachee a definir ces concepts et a analyser leur statut. Le principal debat de ce domaine emergent de la philosophie de la medecine porte sur la question: peut-on decrire la sante et la maladie comme des phenomenes naturels ou s'agit-il d'etats qui sont determines par des valeurs? Tous les textes presentes dans ce volume ont participe de cette controverse. Ceux de la premiere section accordent une part importante a la composante biologique. Ceux de la seconde donnent le primat a la notion d'action. Ceux de la derniere section mettent en question l'utilite ou la possibilite meme de definir les deux concepts.

If the healthy and the pathological are not merely judgments qualifiers, but real phenomena, it must be possible to define both of them positively, which, in this context, means as factual contraries. On the other hand, only a privative definition, either of the pathological as ‘non-healthy’, or of the healthy as ‘non-pathological’, can rationally circumscribe all possible states of an organism. This fluctuation between two meanings of the ‘healthy’–‘pathological’ opposition, factual vs. rational, characterizes the ordinary usage of these concepts and puts all philosophical definitions in a hopeless situation. Although a scientific definition may conceal this equivocation by adequately setting out the terms of the problem of discriminating between the ‘healthy’ and the ‘pathological’, it could explain some of the difficulties met in determining ‘gold standards’, in the choice of separators, and in the assessment of the diagnostic qualities of tests.

Because biologization of psychiatric constructs does not involve derivation of laws, or reduce the number of entities involved, the traditional term of ‘reduction’ should be replaced. This paper describes biologization in terms of redefinition, which involves changing the definition of terms sharing the same extension. Redefinition obtains through triangulation and calibration, that is, respectively, detection of an object from two different spots, and tweaking parameters of detection in order to optimize the picture. The unity of the different views of the same object does not occur through derivation from one of them, as reduction suggests, nor does it obtain through mechanistic unity or the goal of explaining one mechanism, as the phrase ‘mosaic unity’ suggests. Instead, it depends on finding a specific angle of observation, from which linguistic consistency matches sound localization in the brain, so that all observations make sense together, just as an anamorphic picture makes clear sense only when observed from the right spot.

M. Henry voit à tort chez Maine de Biran la distinction entre trois figures du corps propre: corps objectif (extérieur et mondain), corps organique (terme résistant de l'effort), et corps subjectif (confondu avec l'ego). Maine de Biran distingue bien trois corps, mais le troisième, loin d'être confondu avec l'ego, est un corps de pure passivité duquel l'ego est absent. Cet état d'affectivité pure étudié par Biran répond à la critique par M. Henry de sa théorie de la passivité, et corrige la théorie de l'auto-affection. M. Henry misunderstands Maine de Biran's distinction between three dimensions of the body: while the former makes a difference between the objective body (in the external world), the organic body (resistant term of the effort), and the subjective body (identified with the ego), the latter considers the third to be a body of mere passivity from which the ego is absent. The description Biran makes of this state of pure sensitivity answers M. Henry's critique of his theory of passivity, and modifies the theory of « auto-affection »

Durée et nature sont chez Bergson deux termes liés en ce que l'intuition majeure du philosophe, qui est l'expérience de se replacer dans la durée, induit une nouvelle conception, dynamique et évolutive de la nature. Loin d'introduire dans un subjectivisme métaphysique, Bergson avec la durée nous ouvre une nouvelle philosophie de la nature. Le but de cet ouvrage est de contribuer à replacer Bergson dans le débat contemporain en passant par la voie royale de sa philosophie, l'intuition de la durée.