-
59Davidson on Turing: Rationality Misunderstood?Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2). 2005.Alan Turing advocated a kind of functionalism: A machine M is a thinker provided that it responds in certain ways to certain inputs. Davidson argues that Turing’s functionalism is inconsistent with a cer-tain kind of epistemic externalism, and is therefore false. In Davidson’s view, concepts consist of causal liasons of a certain kind between subject and object. Turing’s machine doesn’t have the right kinds of causal li-asons to its environment. Therefore it doesn’t have concepts. Therefore it d…Read more
-
4Can one grasp propositions without knowing a language?Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 24 (2): 43-63. 2005.
-
40Non-Declarative Sentences and the Theory of Definite DescriptionsPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (1): 119-154. 2004.This paper shows that Russell’s theory of descriptions gives the wrong semantics for definite descriptions occurring in questions and imperatives. Depending on how that theory is applied, it either assigns nonsense to perfectly meaningful questions and assertions or it assigns meanings that diverge from the actual semantics of such sentences, even after all pragmatic and contextual variables are allowed for. Given that Russell’s theory is wrong for questions and assertions, it must be wrong for …Read more
-
428Some non-revisionist solutions to some semantic antinomiesPhilosophical Inquiry 37 (3-4): 51-61. 2013.It is shown that Russell's Paradox can be solved without advocating the Theory of Types, and also that the Liar's Paradox can be solved in much the same way. Neither solution requires that any of our commonsense-based beliefs be revised, let alone jettisoned. It is also shown that the Theory of Types is false.
-
59Is Mind an Emergent Property?Cogito 13 (2): 117-119. 1999.It is often said that (M) "mind is an emergent property of matter." M is ambiguous, the reason being that, for all x and y, "x is an emergent property of y" has two distinct and mutually opposed meanings, namely: (i) x is a product of y (in the sense in which a chair is the product of the activity of a furniture-maker); and (ii) y is either identical or constitutive of x, but, relative to the information available at a given time t, x-statements are not analytic consequences of y-statements. If …Read more
-
51Why definite descriptions really are referring termsGrazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1): 45-79. 2005.According to Russell, '... the phi ...' means: 'exactly one object has phi and ... that object ...'. Strawson pointed out that, if somebody asked how many kings of France there were, it would be deeply inappropriate to respond by saying '... the king of France ...': the respondent appears to be presupposing the very thing that, under the circumstances, he ought to be asserting. But it would seem that if Russell's theory were correct, the respondent would be asserting exactly what he was asked to…Read more
-
39A Solution to the Paradox of AnalysisMetaphilosophy 29 (4): 313-330. 1998.This essay attempts to solve the so‐called paradox of analysis: if one is to have any questions about x, one must know x; but if one knows x, one has no questions about x. The obvious solution is this: one can inquire into x if one knows some, but not all, of x's parts. But this solution is erroneous. Let x′ be those parts of x with which one is acquainted, and let S be the percipient in question. As with x, either S knows x′, in which case he has no questions about it; or S does not know x′, in…Read more
-
535A brief but rigorous description of the logical structure of mathematical truth.
-
Elements of Virtualism: A Study in the Philosophy of PerceptionDartford: Traude Junghans Cuxhaven Verlag. 2002.
-
42Two Arguments Against the Cognitivist Theory of EmotionsPhilosophy in the Contemporary World 11 (2): 65-72. 2004.According to one point of view, emotions are recognitions of truths of a certain kind -- most probably valuative truths (truths to the effect that something is good or bad). After giving the standard arguments for this view, and also providing a new argument of my own for it, I set forth two arguments against it. First, this position makes all emotions be epistemically right or wrong. But this view is hard to sustain where certain emotions (especially desire) are concerned. Second, this position…Read more
-
1530 Laws of LogicJOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI. 2016.The most important laws of the propositional calculus are clearly and succinctly stated.
-
555Another argument against the thesis that there is a language of thoughtCommunication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 37 (2): 83-103. 2004.One cannot have the concept of a red object without having the concept of an extended object. But the word "red" doesn't contain the word "extended." In general, our concepts are interconnected in ways in which the corresponding words are not interconnected. This is not an accidental fact about the English language or about any other language: it is inherent in what a language is that the cognitive abilities corresponding to a person's abilities to use words cannot possibly be reflected in seman…Read more
-
587The concept of a symbol and the vacuousness of the symbolic conception of thoughtSemiotica 2005 (154 - 1/4): 243-264. 2005.Linguistic expressions must be decrypted if they are to transmit information. Thoughts need not be decrypted if they are to transmit information. Therefore thought-processes do not consist of linguistic expressions: thought is not linguistic. A consequence is that thought is not computational, given that a computation is the operationalization of a function that assigns one expression to some other expression (or sequence of expressions).
-
20EmotivismJOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI. 2016.Emotivism is the doctrine that ethical beliefs are nothing more than projections of emotion. In this concise study, it is shown that emotions themselves embody ethical beliefs and that, for that reason, emotivism implicitly presupposes the truth of a non-emotivism conception of ethical truth and therefore fails.
-
6What is an Intention?Amazon Digital Services LLC. 2016.In this briskly written volume, a case is made that a value is a belief as to how one live one's life if one's psychological architecture is to retain its integrity, and a case is thereby made that intention is an operationalized value. This analysis makes it possible to distinguish between minds that do and minds that do not host selves. (Selves are minds that have values; minds that are not selves do not.) The relationship between weakness of the will and self-deception is made clear, and it i…Read more
-
39Determinism, Freedom, and PsychopathyAmazon Digital Services LLC. 2015.Even though the world is governed by laws, human beings are able to be free. In fact, there is no difference between being genuinely free and having a distinctively human psychological architecture. But self-deception and rationalization can result in the replacement of actual beliefs with operational pseudo-beliefs. When this happens, the result is a sociopathic pseudo-person. The difference between a sociopath and a psychopath is that, whereas the sociopath once had a distinctively human psych…Read more
-
9The Mathematics of the InfiniteAmazon Digital Services LLC. 2015.This book clearly explains what an infinite number is, how infinite numbers differ from finite numbers, and how infinite numbers differ from one another. The concept of recursivity is concisely but thoroughly covered, as are the concepts of cardinal and ordinal number. All of Cantor's key proofs are clearly stated, including his epoch-making diagonal proof, whereby he proved that that there are more reals than rationals and, more generally, that there are infinitely large, non-recursive classes.…Read more
-
14Aggregative Properties and Emergent PropertiesAmazon Digital Services LLC. 2016.It is said what aggregative properties are and also what emergent properties are, and examples are given each of kind of property. It is also explained why, even though all emergent properties are aggregative properties, not all aggregative properties are emergent properties. It is further made clear that, strictly speaking, emergence is a property of one's knowledge of a given kind of aggregate, and not of such aggregates themselves, this being why a property that is emergent at one time will, …Read more
-
6Quantum Physics and Universal Determinism: A DialogueAmazon Digital Services LLC. 2016.It is clearly explained how quantum physics is deterministic and how it is indeterministic, and it is also clearly said what Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is.
-
7Free Content Why Definite Descriptions Really are Referring TermsGrazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1): 45-79. 2005.According to Russell, '... the phi ...' means: 'exactly one object has phi and ... that object ...'. Strawson pointed out that, if somebody asked how many kings of France there were, it would be deeply inappropriate to respond by saying '... the king of France ...': the respondent appears to be presupposing the very thing that, under the circumstances, he ought to be asserting. But it would seem that if Russell's theory were correct, the respondent would be asserting exactly what he was asked to…Read more
-
7Morbid Reflections: Short Papers on PsychopathologyAmazon Digital Services LLC. 2016.The following topics are discussed, from psychoanalytic, philosophical, and empirical perspectives: *Sociopathy *Pedantry *The nature of bureaucrats *The nature of bureaucratic institutions *Rationalization and Repression *The relationship between ignorance and mental health *The relationship sapience and mental illness *The relationship between ignorance and the ability to act *The relationship between hyper-sapience and the inability to act. *The psychological underpinnings of addict…Read more
-
455A quasi-materialist, quasi-dualist solution to the mind-body problemKriterion: Journal of Philosophy 45 (109): 81-135. 2004.
-
13Frege, Logic, and LogicismAmazon Digital Services LLC. 2016.Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) invented the discipline of mathematical logic. In this short work, it is clearly stated what Frege did and did not accomplish
-
39Are any of our beliefs about ourselves non-inferential or infallible?Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (1): 20-45. 2001.We are aware of truths (e.g. the truth that the shoes I'm now wearing are uncomfortably tight) and also of states of affairs (e.g. the uncomfortable tightness of said shoes). My awareness of the tightness of my shoes---not, be it emphasized, of the corresponding truth, but of the shoe-related mass-energy-distribution underlying that truth---is an instance, not of truth-awareness, but of fact-awareness or, as I prefer to put, object-awareness. The aforementioned truth-awareness corresponding to t…Read more
-
122Some arguments against intentionalismActa Analytica 19 (32): 107-141. 2004.According to a popular doctrine known as "intentionalism," two experiences must have different representational contents if they have different phenomenological contents, in other words, what they represent must differ if what they feel like differs. Were this position correct, the representational significance of a given affect (or 'quale'---plural 'qualia'--to use the preferred term), e.g. a tickle, would be fixed: what it represented would not be a function of the subject's beliefs, past expe…Read more
-
17Do We Think in Words?JOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI. 2016.This briskly written little book rigorously establishes that in order to be able to use language, it is necessary to be able to think and, consequently, that linguistic ability is not constitutive of cognitive ability. But it is also explained why it is that linguistic ability so greatly enhanced cognitive ability. Wittgenstein's famous Private Language and Rule Following Arguments are assiduously analyzed and decisively refuted. At the same time, so Kuczynski demonstrates, a viable analysis of …Read more
-
57Time TravelPHILOSOPHYPEDIA. 2016.It is clearly stated what time-travel would be, were it possible, and it is thereby shown that the very concept of time-travel is incoherent.
University of California, Santa Barbara
PhD, 2006
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |