Michael Hauskeller

This paper argues that the goal the proponents of radical life extension wish to attain is in fact unattainable, and that with regard to this goal, the whole project of conquering ageing and death is therefore likely to fail. What we seek to achieve is not the prolongation of life as such, but rather the prolongation of a healthy and youthful life. Yet even though it may one day be possible to prevent the body from ageing beyond a certain stage , it may never be possible to arrest the ageing of the mind, which is what we desire most of all

‘What’s wrong – fundamentally wrong – with the way animals are treated (…) isn’t the pain, the suffering, isn’t the deprivation. (…) The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals as our resources, here for us – to be eaten, or surgically manipulated, or exploited for sport or money.’\n\nTom Regan made this claim 20 years ago. What he maintains is basically that the fundamental wrong is not the suffering we inflict on animals but the way we look at them. What we do to them, what we believe we are allowed to do to them, is dependent on how we perceive or conceptualize them. We not only treat them as resources but prior to this we already think of them as resources, and when we look at them, all we tend to see is resources. In our perception of them they exist not for themselves but ‘for us’. But obviously it can only be fundamentally wrong in a moral sense to view them that way if it is wrong in a factual sense, that is, if animals are in fact not ‘for us’. But is it wrong?

In Phenomenological Bioethics: Medical Technologies, Human Suffering, and the Meaning of Being Alive, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus aims to show how the continental tradition of phenomenology can enrich bioethical debates by adding important but often‐ignored perspectives, namely, that of lived experience. Phenomenology focuses not on supposedly objective, scientifically validated facts, but on the “life world” of the individuals affected by a situation. Individuals' life worlds consist of their experience of their own lived bodies (or Leiber) and the meaning structures of their everyday worlds. A phenomenologically informed and oriented bioethics would seek to take those life worlds into account when considering what should be done in a particular ethically challenging situation.Svenaeus reminds us that there is generally more to an illness than just a malfunction of the body that can be causally explained and treated accordingly. The fundamental insight that Svenaeus develops in his new book is that our illnesses are often, if not always, crises of meaning.

The papers collected in this volume examine moral enhancement: the idea that we should morally improve people through the manipulation of their biological constitution. Whether moral enhancement is possible or even desirable is highly controversial. Proponents argue that it is necessary if we are to address various social ills and avert catastrophic climate change. Detractors have raised a variety of concerns, some of a practical nature and others of principle. Perhaps most fundamentally, however, the proposal forces us to ask anew what being moral actually means, in order for the idea of moral enhancement to make sense at all. The present collection both addresses these issues and moves the debate beyond its current parameters, bringing together authors with a wide range of perspectives and areas of expertise. Chapters variously draw on experimental psychology, social philosophy, pragmatism, Kantian and Aristotelian moral philosophy, and the ethics of care, sex, and psychedelics.

The worst of all possible worlds: Arthur Schopenhauer -- The despair of not being oneself: Soren Kierkegaard -- The interlinked terrors and wonders of God: Herman Melville -- The hell of no longer being able to love: Fyodor Dostoyevsky -- The inevitable end of everything: Leo Tolstoy -- The joy of living dangerously: Friedrich Nietzsche -- The dramatic richness of the concrete world: William James -- The only life that is really lived: Marcel Proust -- Our hopeless battle against the boundaries of language: Ludwig Wittgenstein -- The benign indifference of the world: Albert Camus.

Written from a broadly atheist point of view, this paper explores the religious dimension of moral experience, that is, whether in order to be moral and/or to live a life that in our own eyes means something it is necessary to believe in something that transcends what we can verify through science or direct observation and even what we can clearly articulate. I investigate the question through an interpretation of the work of four very different writers, namely Hans Jonas, Alfred North Whitehead, Albert Camus, and Cormac McCarthy, who all contribute valuable insights that suggest the impossibility of a moral life, and indeed any decent human life at all, that is based purely on tangible reality and the rationally justifiable.

Developments in medical science have afforded us the opportunity to improve and enhance the human species in ways unthinkable to previous generations. Whether it's making changes to mitochondrial DNA in a human egg, being prescribed Prozac, or having a facelift, our desire to live longer, feel better and look good has presented philosophers, medical practitioners and policy-makers with considerable ethical challenges. But what exactly constitutes human improvement? What do we mean when we talk of making "better" humans? In this book Michael Hauskeller explores these questions and the ideas of human good that underpin them. Posing some challenging questions about the nature of human enhancement, he interrogates the logic behind its processes and examines the justifications behind its criteria. Questioning common assumptions about what constitutes human improvement, Hauskeller asks whether the criteria proposed by its advocates are convincing. The book draws on recent research as well as popular representations of human enhancement from advertising to the internet, and provides a non-technical and accessible survey of the issues for readers and students interested in the ethics and politics of human enhancement

In an age characterised by an increasing integration of advanced technology into our everyday lives, posthumanism has developed into a major intellectual force. It affects research agendas, economic developments, social policies, philosophical theories, and ultimately the way we understand ourselves. This handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the various aspects of posthumanism and how they are represented, discussed and exemplified in the cultural medium of film and television. Understood broadly as any critical engagement with the possibility that the human condition is no longer a given, that it is more fluid than we once thought, and that we are, or will soon be, free to remould our constitutive framework and value systems, posthumanism is the next step in critical engagement in the humanities. It reflects upon the malleability of the human condition and acknowledges the fact that we are no longer the beings we thought we were, and that perhaps we never were.

Genetic engineering is still considered morally wrong by a large proportion of the public. Yet many scientists are puzzled about the public concern over a technology that, in their view, promises great benefits to humans and does not seem to cause more harm to animals than other practices which are rarely questioned. In this book, Michael Hauskeller takes public fears seriously and offers the idea of 'biological integrity' as a clarifying principle which can then be analyzed to show that seemingly irrational public concerns about genetic engineering are not so irrational and that a philosophically sound justification of those concerns can indeed be given.