Matthew Henry Kramer

This note will challenge G. A. Cohen's view of the interaction between legal systems and economic structures; such interaction raises the so‐called problem of legality, which Cohen sets out to solve in the eighth chapter of Karl Marx's Theory of History (Cohen 1978, 216–47). In the course of this note, we shall interrogate the presumed rigor of Cohen's theory of base/superstructure relations, to which his understanding of law is central. His approach will not be simply destroyed, but will be resituated in a network of problems that can highlight a certain fissure between his aspirations and his performance.

In the final main section of his essay “Kelsen Visited,” H. L. A. Hart grappled with some of Hans Kelsen’s reflections on deontic conflicts and logical contradictions. Hart’s discussion was not entirely free of missteps, but most of his criticisms of Kelsen’s lines of thought are sound. As for Kelsen, his frequently deep confusion on the matters of deontic conflicts and logical contradictions was accompanied by some deep insights. Although this article is philosophical rather than a contribution to intellectual history, it will engage to some degree with the ruminations of each of these great legal philosophers on this matter.

Throughout the English-speaking world, and in the many other countries where analytic philosophy is studied, Hillel Steiner is esteemed as one of the foremost contemporary political philosophers. This volume is designed as a festschrift for Steiner and as an important collection of philosophical essays in its own right. The editors have assembled a roster of highly distinguished international contributors, all of whom are eager to pay tribute to Steiner by focusing on topics on which he himself has concentrated. Some of the contributors engage directly with Steiner's work, whereas others focus not directly on his writings but instead grapple with issues that have figured prominently therein. Each essay seeks to advance the debates in which Steiner himself has so notably participated. The study concludes with a response by Steiner himself.

H.L.A. Hart is among the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, with an especially great influence on the philosophy of law. His 1961 book _The Concept of Law_ has become an enduring classic of legal philosophy, and has also left a significant imprint on moral and political philosophy. In this volume, leading contemporary legal and political philosopher Matthew H. Kramer provides a crystal-clear analysis of Hart’s contributions to our understanding of the nature of law. He elucidates and scrutinizes every major aspect of Hart’s jurisprudential thinking, ranging from his general methodology to his defense of legal positivism. He shows how Hart’s achievement in _The Concept of Law_, despite the evolution of debates in subsequent decades, remains central to contemporary legal philosophy because it lends itself to being reinterpreted in light of new concerns and interests. Kramer therefore pays particular attention to the strength of Hart’s insights in the context of present-day disputes among philosophers over the reality of normative entities and properties and over the semantics of normative statements. This book is an invaluable guide to Hart’s thought for students and scholars of legal philosophy and jurisprudence, as well as moral and political philosophy.

For three decades, Wil Waluchow has been one of the world’s premier legal philosophers and in particular has been one of the world’s premier legal positivists. In this essay, I explore the complexities of hard cases—cases in which there is substantial disagreement among judges or other legal experts over the correct answers to any questions at issue—in order to reflect upon the implications of those complexities for the legal-positivist theses which Waluchow has defended. The upshot is a more nuanced presentation of those theses.

Throughout the English-speaking world, and in the many other countries where analytic philosophy is studied, Hillel Steiner is esteemed as one of the foremost contemporary political philosophers. This volume is designed as a festschrift for Steiner and as an important collection of philosophical essays in its own right. The editors have assembled a roster of highly distinguished international contributors, all of whom are eager to pay tribute to Steiner by focusing on topics on which he himself has concentrated. Some of the contributors engage directly with Steiner's work, whereas others focus not directly on his writings but instead grapple with issues that have figured prominently therein. Each essay seeks to advance the debates in which Steiner himself has so notably participated. The study concludes with a response by Steiner himself.

How moral principles can enter into the law -- Throwing light on the role of moral principles in the law : further reflections -- On morality as a necessary or sufficient condition for legality -- Of final things : morality as one of the ultimate determinants of legal validity -- Legal positivism defended -- On the moral status of the rule of law -- On the separability of law and morality -- Moral rights and the limits of the 'ought'-'implies'-can principle : why impeccable precautions are no excuse.

In line with my 2021 book Freedom of Expression as Self-Restraint – albeit in a much shorter compass – this essay will argue against the moral defensibility of hate-speech laws like those in the United Kingdom and Canada and the Antipodes and most countries of western Europe. Such laws contravene the moral principle of freedom of expression, and therefore contravene one of the central precepts of liberal democracy. Under that principle, a necessary condition for the moral permissibility of any law that proscribes some type or instance of communicative activity is that the activity in question is constitutive of serious communication-independent wrongdoing. Given the centrality of the notion of communication-independent wrongdoing to the principle of freedom of expression, we should begin here with an explication of that notion.

Peter Cane has written an impressively wide-ranging and illuminating book on the complex notion of responsibility in our legal and moral practices. Although he focuses primarily on a multitude of legal doctrines in the common-law systems of the English-speaking world, he continually makes clear how his discussions bear on the moral judgments involved in holding people accountable for their actions and decisions. Moral philosophers will profit from this volume nearly as much as legal philosophers. Best known hitherto as a theorist of tort law and public law, Cane here deals at length with several other areas of law as well. He does so, moreover, without losing sight of the deeper connections between the legal doctrines and many basic problems of human agency and identity. Although the volume occasionally reads slightly like a textbook on tort law or criminal law, most of its discussions shed valuable light on the similarities and dissimilarities between fundamental legal and moral concepts.

This paper first recapitulates the objections by H.L.A. Hart to the ways in which John Austin’s command model of law obfuscated the importance and the very existence of power-conferring laws. Although those objections are familiar in the world of contemporary legal philosophy, their insightfulness is highlighted here because they contrast so sharply with Hart’s own neglect of power-conferring laws at some key junctures in his theorizing. In the second half of this paper, I ponder a few of the junctures where Hart failed to heed the admonitions which he had so deftly leveled against Austin.

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 473-483, May 2022. In my recent book Freedom of Expression as Self-Restraint, I expound and defend the moral principle of freedom of expression. This article recounts a few of the main strands of the exposition in that book, and it touches upon the justification for the principle of freedom of expression. Supplementing the abstract ideas broached in the article are several illustrative examples that render the abstractions more accessible.

This book is an uncompromising defense of legal positivism that insists on the separability of law and morality. After distinguishing among three facets of morality, Kramer explores a variety of ways in which law has been perceived as integrally connected to each of those facets. The book concludes with a detailed discussion of the obligation to obey the law--a discussion that highlights the strengths of legal positivism in the domain of political philosophy as much as in the domain of jurisprudence.

Consequentialist doctrines have often been criticized for their excessive demandingness, in that they require the thorough instrumentalization of each person’s life as a vehicle for the production of good consequences. In turn, the proponents of such doctrines have often objected to what they perceive as the irrationality of the demandingness of deontological duties. In this paper, I shall address objections of the latter kind in an effort to show that they are unfounded. My investigation of this matter will unfold by reference to a scenario that strikingly and concretely exemplifies the demandingness of deontological duties. That scenario, which involves a situation of torture (specifically, placatory torture – in other words, torture undertaken for the purpose of appeasing people who have demanded that it be administered), will serve as a springboard for my endeavor to vindicate the rationality of deontological absolutes and will help to illuminate the endeavor’s practical implications.