David Archard

Consider the following examples of behavior by Smith: 1. Smith, seated at her restaurant table, gives an order to the waiter; 2. Smith gets into a cab and names a destination; 3. Smith agrees to Jones's suggestion that they go back to Jones's apartment for a few drinks; 4. Smith casts her vote in some election. In each of these instances what can Smith be understood as consenting to? Is she consenting to pay the bill for whatever meal she orders; pay the fare for the journey to her named destination; sexual intimacy with Jones; and accept the authority of whatever individual or political part is elected? The fact that Smith does not actually express her consent to each of these states of affairs or outcomes need not mean that she is not giving her consent to them. The idea that individuals can give their consent in ways other than by means of a formal verbal expression of agreement is a familiar, if controversial, one.

Filial regard is the special consideration that children, even as adults, show their parents and filial morality the demonstration that such a regard is demanded of them. The three main accounts of filial morality, based upon ideas of gratitude, role obligations, and friendship, are shown to be unsatisfactory. The article explores the idea, found in traditional Chinese thinking, that filial regard is the ‘root’ of goodness, and suggests that the Chinese model has been viewed unsympathetically due to an understanding both of the family's role in moral education and of the nature of modern morality.

I criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve.

Given that in our view the child has a fundamental right to be heard in all collective deliberative processes determining his or her future, we set out, firstly, what is required of such processes to respect this right – namely that the child's authentic voice is heard and makes a difference – and, secondly, the distance between this ideal and practice exemplified in the work of child welfare and child protection workers in Norway and the UK, chiefly in their display of an instrumental attitude to children's views.

This book undertakes a systematic comparative analysis of the political philosophies of Sartre and mealeau-Ponty between 1929 and 1960. It critically explores their pre-war discovery of Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger; It records the impact of the second world war and the subsequent founding of Les Temps Modernes. It also reviews their post-war writing, both journalistic and philosophical. Their eventual divergence of views is hows as developing, against the background of world events, from their initial philosophical outlooks. The book sheds new light on the work of both writers, and sets the question of Marxism's relation to existentialism in historical context.

According to Stephen Macedo, ‘[liberal], democratic politics is not only about individual rights and limited government, it is also about justification … political justification … understood politically.’ ‘Political justification,’ he asserts, ‘is a core liberal goal.’ Gerald Gaus, similarly, writes that the ‘idea of public justification is at the heart of a contractual liberalism.’ Very many other contemporary political philosophers believe that the politics of a liberal polity must be justifiable to its citizens. In what follows I shall seek to understand the basis for such a belief and, in particular, to expose two possible sources in the views of Locke and Kant. Neither source, I shall argue, provides any warrant for the demand in question. First the bald claim—that the politics of a polity needs justifying—must be unpacked. By way of initial clarification I shall say something about, respectively, ‘justification’ and ‘politics.’