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22Review of Gregory McCulloch, The Life of the Mind: An Essay on Phenomenological Externalism (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (10). 2003.
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58Is the brain a memory box?Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3): 271-278. 2005.Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience
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152Mental representations: What philosophy leaves out and neuroscience puts inPhilosophical Psychology 16 (2): 189-204. 2003.This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not …Read more
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Lynne Rudder Baker, Explaining Attitudes. A Practical Approach to the Mind (review)Philosophy in Review 15 375-377. 1995.
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47Empathy, primitive reactions and the modularity of emotionIn Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The modularity of emotions, University of Calgary Press. pp. 95-113. 2008.
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16Empathy, Primitive Reactions and the Modularity of EmotionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1): 95-113. 2006.Are emotion-producing processes modular? Jerry Fodor, in his classic introduction of the notion of modularity, holds that its most important feature is cognitive impenetrability or information encapsulation. If a process possesses this feature, then, as standardly understood, “what we want or believe makes no difference to how [it] works”.In this paper, we will start with the issue of the cognitive impenetrability of emotion-producing processes. It turns out that, while there is abundant evidenc…Read more
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10The faux, fake, forged, false, fabricated, and phony: Problems for the independence of similarity-based theories of conceptsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 215-215. 2010.
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Fred Dretske, Explaining Behavior. Reasons in a World of Causes (review)Philosophy in Review 9 306-310. 1989.
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