Gerasimos Santas

The paper focuses on Plato’s treatment of equality and inequalities in his best constitution in the Republic and in the second best constitution in the Laws. Plato was aware of the equality solution and various inequalities solutions to the problem of distributing political offices, the burdens of defense, other careers, and property and wealth. In his best constitution he rejected participatory democracy’s solution of equality of political offices, and also rejected inequality distributions of political office on the bases of courage only or wealth only or on force only. He opted for proportional inequality in the distribution of all careers, including ruling, defense, and the provision of goods and services, on the basis of inborn inequalities in intelligence, spirit, abilities in the arts/crafts, and appropriate education. Such a distribution is directed by his principle of social or city justice and justified by his belief that only with such distributions would the city function best. In the economic domain he opted for radical inequality, the abolition of private property and wealth for the ruling classes and the military—a radical divorce between power and wealth, which is his solution to the political problem posed by Thrasymachus. For the remaining and largest class, the providers of basic goods and services, he proposed functional economic floors and ceilings—allowing farmers and craftsmen what they needed, and not more, for doing their jobs well. Later, in his second best constitution, Plato opted for democratic equality in the distribution of the main political offices, for absolute equality in the division of land, and very measured inequalities in other goods and other offices. Plato now seems to think that the very great inequalities of his best constitution/city would create conflicts and factions too difficult to assuage or overcome, since he now cites repeatedly the avoidance of faction as the main reason for his newly found political and economic equality and for the avoidance of extreme inequalities. At the same time, he lowers his earlier and very high standard of the knowledge required for ruling well, which allows many more citizens to participate in ruling the city well; they no longer need to know the form of the Good, but it is sufficient to know the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, the social goods, and the teleological priority of the goods of the soul over all other goods—all the others to be pursued for the sake of the goods of the soul. Looking at both books, it is rather remarkable that all the solutions to the distribution problem of social justice that Plato discusses—equality, proportional inequality, floors and ceilings, and distance between the best off and the worst off—find an echo in modern solutions to the distributions of similar social advantages and burdens.

What is love? Why do we idealize those whom we love? How do we choose whom to love? Are some kinds of love better than others? Each age returns to these questions with renewed perplexity. Gerasimos Santas examinees the two greatest theoretical architectures of love, side by side. It provides a thorough critical description and comparison of these theories, allowing a sophisticated dialogue to emerge between the two thinkers. In the first half of the book Professor Santas reconstructs and explains Plato's theories of eros and philia: erotic love, familial love and friendship. He attempt to show that Plato's was a unified theory in which erotic love has a special connecion with creativity and beauty. He then discusses Freud's notion of love as distinct from, though based on, his general theory of sexuality. He discusses in detail Freud's explanations, before and after narcissism, of idealization and choice of beloved. Freud too, it emerges, had a unified theory of love: all love has its origins in the libidinal instincts of infancy and childhood. The book concludes by showing that, despite Freud's claim that his theory of love is 'Platonic', the two theories are instructively different

The main conversation in the Laches is about courage. But the main conversation does not begin till the middle of the dialogue. In the first half Plato sets the stage for the serious discussion that follows. Two elder men of Athens, Lysimachus and Melesias, are worried about the education of their sons. They themselves are the sons of two eminent Athenians, Thucydides and Aristides, and they feel that while their famous fathers conducted the affairs of the city with great energy they did not show a similar concern for the education of their sons. They feel inferior to their fathers and do not want their own sons to feel the same way. They wish their sons to be like their own fathers, not like themselves--active citizens, not idle aristocrats. In this frame of mind, they are most anxious for expert and sound advice about their sons' education. Someone recommended to them for this purpose a new military exercise, fighting in armor. They invited two eminent generals of the day, Nicias and Laches, to see with them an exhibition of fighting in armor, and now they eagerly seek the generals' opinion about the worth of it.

The problem of economic justice is the division and distribution of income and wealth. Is a just distribution an equal distribution, or are some unequal distributions just, and if so which ones? We critically examine what the ideal theories of justice of Aristotle and Rawls say or imply about a just distribution of wealth and income in the best of circumstances. Rawls’ contractarian view takes strict equality to be the benchmark of justice; Aristotle’s teleological theory claims that the equality appropriate to distributive justice is proportional, equality of ratios among persons’ shares of a good and their respective merits for that good. The applications of the two theories result in different distributional outcomes. Aristotle’s justice principle will result in unequal outcomes if the merits of persons are unequal and in equal outcomes if the merits are equal. An example of the latter is his best polis and constitution--its ideal citizens will have superlative and equal merits and they will justly receive equal political and economic shares. Although he supports reducing economic inequalities in actual cities, serious inequalities in resources will remain. Rawls’ basic principle of justice will produce equal shares. But democracies allow great inequalities in wealth and income, presumably recognizing that some inequalities promote the common good; everyone is better off when some economic incentives are rewarded. But which economic inequalities are just? Rawls in his second principle of justice identifies the most widely held way of answering this question.

Ancient Greek democracies, especially the one that flourished in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, were highly participatory—all decisions were directly made by the citizens themselves—and egalitarian—every citizen had an equal political share. This kind of democratic structure, considered by many a revolution in political thought and practice, appeared in the ancient Greek world after many centuries during which city-states were ruled by kingships, aristocracies, oligarchies, or tyrannies—all of them forms of ruling that extensively restricted citizen participation and were strongly non-egalitarian. Democrats defended equal political shares among citizens by appealing to proportional distributive justice and taking as the relevant merit for distribution freedom, in which all citizens were supposedly equal. But even the most advanced of ancient democracies accepted many serious inequalities—in political participation, in freedom, and especially in resources and wealth —even though democracy itself may have been a catalyst for economic growth and for moderating wealth inequalities. The essays in this volume examine ancient debates about democracy, justice, and equality/inequality and often point to contemporary debates about these issues in present-day representative democracies.