-
81Utterer's meaning revisitedIn Richard E. Grandy & Richard Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, Oxford University Press. pp. 131--55. 1986.
-
Some remarks concerning an argument for anti-individualismFilosoficky Casopis 50 (3): 401-428. 2002.
-
106How Self-Knowledge Can't be Naturalized (Some Remarks on a Proposal by Dretske)Philosophical Studies 95 (3): 311-328. 1999.In his book Naturalizing the Mind, Fred Dretske, among other things, gives what he thinks is a naturalist account of what he calls introspective knowledge.1 I shall not quarrel with his labels; I shall quarrel with what he tries to sell by using them. For him, introspective knowledge is “the mind’s direct knowledge of itself”,2 and he concentrates on knowledge of one’s own current mental occurrences, especially those which belong to the realm of sensory perception. An example he discusses is the…Read more
-
26Frege über den Sinn des Wortes „Ich”Grazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1): 1-22. 1996.Frege hat an seiner metaphysischen und semantischen Lehre der frühen 90er Jahre Veränderungen vorgenommen, um Besonderheiten des Sinns von „ich” Rechnung zu tragen. Diese Veränderungen betreffen zum einen den Status von Gedanken als objektiven Entitäten, zum andern betreffen sie die sprachlogische Behandlung von Ausdrücken, deren Sinn erst im Zusammenspiel mit dem Verwendungskontext einen selbständigen Gedankenteil ergibt. Diese Veränderungen lassen die alte Lehre in ihrem Kern unberührt. Doch o…Read more
-
54First person authority without glamorous self-knowledgeIn Winfried Christoph Löffler Jäger (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement – Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium, . 2012.
-
19The idea [Vorstellung] is all there is about which all philosophers agree that it is real. At least if there is anything at all about which there is agreement in the philosophical world, it is the idea; no idealist, no egoist, no dogmatic skeptic can deny 1 the existence of the idea.
-
60It is often assumed that Paul Grice, in one way or another, has made an important contribution to the theory of speech acts} Grice, as far as I can see, never expressly addresses Austin’s theory in his published work. He hardly ever uses the speech act terminology of "illocution", "perlocution", etc.2 So what does the more or less implicit Gricean contribution to the theory of speech acts consist in'? There is more than one good answer to this question. I shall concentrate on a particularly infl…Read more
-
50The Conceptual Inexhaustibility of PersonhoodTsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy 1 (1): 368-399. 2015.Some leading neuro-scientists recently proclaimed an obviously false view that a human person is his/her brain. This falsity arises partly from the conceptual difficulties concerning personhood/a person. By revealing inexhaustible richness of the characteristics of this concept of a person, this essay explains why the concept is so utterly puzzling. The author contrasts Descartes’ concept of a person with Locke’s. For Descartes, the concept has four features: (1) it is the concept of the mind/bo…Read more
-
32Lockes Wahrnehmungstheorie dient einem klaren philosophischen Ziel.1 Sie soll dazu beitragen, seine empiristische Grundthese zu untermauern, dass alle unsere Ideen letztlich aus der Erfahrung kommen – entweder aus der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung äußerer Gegenstände, oder aus der Reflexion, d.h. aus der inneren Wahrnehmung dessen, was im eigenen Geist gegeben ist. Jede Idee ist entweder komplex (d.h. das Ergebnis geistiger Operationen wie denen des Zusammenfügens, Vergleichens, Erweiterns und Abstrahi…Read more
-
Freges Begrifflehre, ohne ihr angebliches ParadoxIn Mark Siebel & Mark Textor (eds.), Semantik Und Ontologie, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 39--62. 2004.
-
21Die Denkbarkeit des ganz eigenen IchsArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 75 (3): 299-318. 1993.
-
506Kripke's Principle of Disquotation and the Epistemology of Belief AscriptionFacta Philosophica 8 (1-2): 119-143. 2006.among philosophers and therefore a short reminder will do. Pierre was a normal speaker of French, before he moved to London and learnt English without ever using any dictionary or similar devices. During his time in France he had heard about London, and because of what he..
-
24" As it were picturesIn Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, Mentis. pp. 43. 2004.
-
45Gedanken und ihre TeileGrazer Philosophische Studien 37 (1): 1-30. 1990.Gemäß Freges Lehre bestehen Gedanken nicht aus Teilen, sie sind allerdings in Teile zerlegbar. Es gibt unterschiedliche Zerlegungen desselben Gedankens, die in allen objektiven Hinsichten gleichwertig sind. Freges einziges Identitätskriterium für Gedanken war sein Äquipollenzprinzip, demzufolge zwei simple Sätze denselben Gedanken ausdrücken, wenn sie unmöglich verschiedene Wahrheitswerte haben. Zerlegung von Gedanken ist für menschliche Erkenntnis unerläßlich, enthält aber ein Moment subjektive…Read more
-
16I don't have any serious quarrels with John Searle's approach to speech act theory.' There's a lot of little things that I do not really understand. (Example: what is a direction of fit?) There are a few mmor points which I think are wrong. (Example: the doctrine about "underlying rules" which are "manifested or realized" by conventions, and, to be frank, the whole thing about so called constitutive rules. Why should a statement like "Greeting in a normal context cotmts as a corteous recognition…Read more
-
23Über Künne über Kripke über Künne über FregeZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (3): 389-402. 2011.
-
54There is ample evidence for this claim, both in time-honoured works and in recent publications. Before I concentrate on some of the old stuff, let me briefly turn to recent examples. The following sample of quotations from a Nobel Laureate, a leading neuroscientist and a German professor of ‘neuro-didactics’ may illustrate how deep the confusion about what a person is can go among the educated, even today. Francis Crick stated his Astonishing Hypothesis as follows: “You” [...] are in fact no mor…Read more
-
73“The property of being red” On Frank Jackson’s opacity puzzle and his new theory of the content of colour-experienceErkenntnis 66 (1-2): 187-202. 2007.Frank Jackson has a new objectivist and representationalist account of the content of colour-experience. I raise several objections both against the account itself and, primarily, against how he tries to support it. He argues that the new account enables us to see what is wrong with the so-called Opacity Puzzle. This alleged puzzle is an argument in which a seemingly implausible conclusion is derived from three premises of which seem plausible to an representationalist. Jackson
-
56Frege und die Redundanztheorie der WahrheitIn Dirk Greimann (ed.), Das Wahre und das Falsche. Studien zu Freges Auffassung von Wahrheit, Olms. pp. 29-38. 2003.Was Frege Liber Wahrheit sagt, lasst sich, mit ein wenig Gewalt, in zwei Schubfacher auiteilen} Das erste Schubfach — es trtigt die Aufschritt ,,Konstrul~:tives" enthalt die Lehre von der Wahrheit als Gegenstand und als Satzbedeutung. Das andere Schubfach —- mit der Aufschrift ,,Destruktives" —e ist reicher gefiilltg es finden sich hier Arguniente gegen die Korrespondenztheorie, gegen die De— iinierbarkeit von Wahrheit, gegen den Nutzen eines Walirheitsprttdikats und insbesondere Diagnosen dafur…Read more
LMU Muenchen
Alumnus, 1976
Heidelberg, Baden-Württemberg, Germany
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy, Misc |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
History of Western Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
7 more