Scott Stapleford

Talk of epistemic dilemmas is old talk in epistemology. But are there such things? In this paper I argue for modest skepticism about epistemic dilemmas. In order to do that, I first point out that not all normative conflicts constitute dilemmas: more needs to be the case. Second, I look into the moral dilemmas literature for inspiration and identify a set of conditions that need to be at work for a mere normative conflict to be a genuine normative dilemma. Last, I argue that, while our epistemic life is peppered with epistemic normative conflict, epistemic dilemmas are much harder to find than we thought.

The paper is a sustained analysis of some recent work on transcendental arguments with a view to assessing both its relevance to Kant's philosophy and its historical accuracy. Robert Stern's reading of Kant's philosophical aims is examined and criticized narrowly, and Barry Stroud's influential objection to transcendental arguments as a class is shown to be harmless. Kant is presented as a friend rather than a foe of scepticism, and his ‘proto‐verificationist’ criterion of meaning is shown to underpin, rather than undermine, the sceptical position.

Should our beliefs be proportioned to our evidence? Are we doing something wrong in believing with little or no evidence? And may our beliefs be based partly or wholly on moral or practical considerations? These questions are harder than you think. Scott Stapleford and Elizabeth Jackson agree on the priority of evidence, but they differ on the degree of permissible slack and the relevance of other considerations. In this epistemological main event, Stapleford takes a hard line, defending the extremist view that any discrepancy between what we believe and what our evidence supports is an error that should be corrected. In the economy of our beliefs, evidence alone has a normative grip. Jackson is more forgiving. While evidence regulates belief, its authority is not complete. She takes a more liberal perspective that accords non-evidential factors a lawful role in delimiting the class of permissible beliefs. With echoes of the famous 19th century dispute between the mathematician William Clifford and the psychologist William James, the Stapleford–Jackson debate feels particularly relevant in a time when disagreement runs uncomfortably hot and evidence is treated with contempt. This debate will tempt—and gently instruct—anyone who has ever asked themselves: Can’t I just believe what I want?

This paper examines Hume’s understanding of a third doxastic position distinct from belief and disbelief, arguing that his epistemology presupposes different forms of doxastic neutrality. While Hume does not explicitly discuss this third position, his Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding offer ideas relevant to contemporary debates on suspension of judgement and inquiry. Hume engaged with Pyrrhonian scepticism, finding its suspension of judgement excessive, yet acknowledging that the Pyrrhonian arguments are theoretically difficult to refute. Based on various interpretations of Hume’s critique of Pyrrhonian ideas, we discuss the relevance of his thoughts on suspension of judgement and inquiry through the lens of modern epistemological discussions.

This is the first edited collection dedicated to demonstrating Hume's relevance to contemporary debates in epistemology. It features original essays by Hume scholars and epistemologists that address a wide range of important questions, including: What does a Humean conception of knowledge look like? How do Hume's understanding of belief and suspension of judgement bear on current debates about doxastic attitudes? Is there a Humean way of uniting reasons in the epistemic and practical domains? What is the proper role of reason at the foundations of ethics and epistemology from a Humean point of view? What contribution might an examination of Humean scepticism make to understanding of current sceptical hypotheses? Is Hume a hinge epistemologist? Does naturalized epistemology trace back to Hume? Does Hume have an ethics of belief? What can Hume contribute to virtue and vice epistemology? Some chapters try to bring historically accurate interpretations of Hume's ideas into contact with current issues while others will take ideas merely suggested by Hume and demonstrate their philosophical usefulness. Together, they demonstrate Hume's enduring relevance for debates about knowledge, belief, inquiry and suspension, reasons, modal knowledge, scepticism, hinge epistemology, naturalized epistemology, the ethics of belief and moral epistemology, virtue and vice epistemology, and the epistemology of testimony. Hume and Contemporary Epistemology will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hume, epistemology, and history of philosophy.

When their landmark paper, “Evidentialism” (1985), first appeared, Conee and Feldman expressed some surprise that the theory needed any defense at all. But the need for a defense has become increasingly apparent in the last forty years as a wide variety of non-evidentialist epistemologies have emerged. The initial paper was the launching point for an enormous research program in epistemology—many epistemologists define their points of view at least partly in terms of how they relate to evidentialism. Interest in evidentialism and related issues has not waned since 1985, and it promises to continue going strong. The range of fresh ideas in this cutting-edge collection, marking the 40th anniversary of “Evidentialism”, will appeal to anyone working on evidentialism, evidence, the nature of justification, evidential support, or any of a host of related topics in epistemology.

This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions. Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many questions about seemings that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. What kinds of seemings are there? How do seemings justify? Are seemings connected to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry? The chapters in this volume offer a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas about seemings, the nature of justification and evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference. Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.

In this paper we distinguish between epistemic dilemmas, epistemic quasi-dilemmas, and quasi epistemic dilemmas. Our starting point is the commonsense position that S faces a genuine dilemma only when S must take one of two paths and both are bad. It’s the “must” that we think is key. Moral dilemmas arise because there are cases where S must perform A and S must perform B—where ‘must’ implies a moral duty—but S cannot do both. In such a situation, S is doomed to violate a moral obligation. Analogously, S face’s a genuine epistemic dilemma only if she has an epistemic duty to believe that p and at the same time an epistemic duty to not believe that p (either because she has a duty to believe ~p or a duty to suspend judgment). We argue that such cases never arise because there is no epistemic duty to adopt a particular doxastic attitude towards any particular proposition (ever). Hence, there are no epistemic dilemmas. Nevertheless, one might suppose there are situations in which one’s evidence pulls in different directions without determining a uniquely justified doxastic attitude. Such epistemic quasi-dilemmas aren’t full-fledged dilemmas, but they are arguably close enough to pose a genuine problem for the believer. But we argue that there are no genuine epistemic quasi-dilemmas either: They are all resolvable in principle. Fans of dissonance will not be totally disappointed, however, since we argue that there may well be quasi-epistemic dilemmas. These are genuinely unwinnable situations in which one’s moral or pragmatic obligations to do epistemically-relevant things make incompatible demands.

It seems plausible that there can be “no win” moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmatic situations—situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? A team of top epistemologists address these and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. Anyone interested in epistemic dilemmas, the nature of justification and evidential support, higher-order requirements, or suspension of judgment will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.

An evidentialist can be extreme about epistemic requirements in a couple of different ways. At the reductionist end of the spectrum are those who think our epistemic obligations are fully satisfied by the mere having of evidential fit—where having implies nothing about doing. Your beliefs ought to align with your evidence, in other words, but there’s nothing you’re obligated to do in order to get yourself into the epistemically optimal position. At the expansionist end of the spectrum are those who think we ought to do more—epistemically-speaking—than just bring about a state of evidential fit. We ought to get more evidence, for instance, if it’s somehow relevant to our beliefs. Rather leery of extremists, we prefer a moderate account of epistemic obligation. It’s a conjunction of three theses: (1) We never have an epistemic duty to believe any particular proposition; (2) We’re epistemically obligated to reflect on our evidence in order to produce a state of evidential fit; (3) We’re never epistemically obligated to acquire any additional evidence. Our aim is to make these plausible.

Containing all of the key writings leading up to the publication of his Philosophical Essays in 1777, this volume presents complete works by Johann Nicolaus Tetens (1736-1807) in English for the very first time. These important essays focus on method in metaphysics and mathematics, the analysis of language, and various anthropological questions that occupied thinkers of the period. Key features of the volume include: · Accurate, readable translations · Detailed scholarly notes · A substantial introduction situating Tetens's works in historical context · A German-English glossary This collection marks a significant contribution to scholarship on Kant and 18th-century German philosophy.

There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open- mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will fi nd a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting- edge anthology.

Logic Works is a critical and extensive introduction to logic. It asks questions about why systems of logic are as they are, how they relate to ordinary language and ordinary reasoning, and what alternatives there might be to classical logical doctrines. It considers how logical analysis can be applied to carefully represent the reasoning employed in academic and scientific work, better understand that reasoning, and identify its hidden premises. Aiming to be as much a reference work and handbook for further, independent study as a course text, it covers more material than is typically covered in an introductory course. Topics include: translation, proofs, and trees for sentential and predicate logic with identity, definite descriptions, and functional terms; normal forms; proofs and trees for the principal normal modal systems; an introduction to second order and quantified modal logic; formal syntax and semantics; mathematical induction; metatheory for many of these systems; semantics and trees for free logic, intuitionistic logic, and three-valued and paraconsistent logics. A companion website contains a detailed student solutions manual with a running commentary on all starred exercises and a set of editable slides for instructors to customize their courses.

The Uniqueness thesis says that any body of evidence E uniquely determines which doxastic attitude is rationally permissible regarding some proposition P. Permissivists deny Uniqueness. They are charged with arbitrarily favouring one doxastic attitude out of the set of attitudes they regard as rationally permissible. Simpson claims that an appeal to differences in cognitive abilities can remove the arbitrariness. I argue that it can't. Impermissivists face a challenge of their own: The problem of fine distinctions. I suggest that meeting this challenge requires impermissivists to loosen up at higher levels – when comparing belief-forming systems that differ in the fineness of their doxastic outputs. This more relaxed take on Uniqueness is a kind of ‘intraspecies impermissivism’.

The paper is a sustained analysis of some recent work on transcendental arguments with a view to assessing both its relevance to Kant's philosophy and its historical accuracy. Robert Stem's reading of Kant's philosophical aims is examined and criticized narrowly, and Barry Stroud's influential objection to transcendental arguments as a class is shown to be harmless. Kant is presented as a friend rather than a foe of scepticism, and his 'proto-verificationist' criterion of meaning is shown to underpin, rather than undermine, the sceptical position.

Hume's Enquiry: Expanded and Explained includes the entire classical text of David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in bold font, a running commentary blended seamlessly into the text in regular font, and analytic summaries of each section. The commentary is like a professor on hand to guide the reader through every line of the daunting prose and every move in the intricate argumentation. The unique design helps students learn how to read and engage with one of modern philosophy's most important and exciting classics. Key Features: Includes the entire original text. Provides helpful summaries of each paragraph. Offers commentary on every line of text. Removes the gap between commentary and text.

The paper is a limited defence of one of P. F. Strawson's least popular declarations about the nature of Kant's transcendental idealism. An attempt is made to relate Strawson's reading to an interpretative controversy that emerged in the years immediately following the publication of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Johann Christian Gottlob Schaumann, an otherwise unremarkable figure, is considered as an early defender of the thoroughly idealistic interpretation in the distinctive form articulated by Strawson.

This article is an extended analysis of the most recent scholarly work on Locke's account of sensitive knowledge. Lex Newman's "dual cognitive relations" model of sensitive knowledge is examined in detail. The author argues that the dual cognitive relations model needs to be revised on both philosophical and historical grounds. While no attempt is made to defend Locke's position, the aim is to show that it is at least consistent, contrary to the received view. The final section provides textual support for the interpretation.

The paper is an attempt to explain what a transcendental argument is for Kant. The interpretation is based on a reading of the 'Discipline of Pure Reason', Sections 1 and 4 of the first Critique. The author first identifies several statements that Kant makes about the method of proof he followed in the 'Analytic of Principles' which seem to be inconsistent. He then tries to remove the apparent inconsistencies by focusing on the idea of instantiation and drawing a distinction between the intension and the extension of a concept. Finally, the results are applied to the second 'Analogy of Experience' for the purposes of illustration. The paper should be seen as an attempt to provide an historical answer to a question that has been treated thematically in much of the recent literature.

Mark Nelson argues that we have no positive epistemic duties. His case rests on the evidential inexhaustibility of sensory and propositional evidence—what he calls their ‘infinite justificational fecundity’. It is argued here that Nelson’s reflections on the richness of sensory and propositional evidence do make it doubtful that we ever have an epistemic duty to add any particular beliefs to our belief set, but that they fail to establish that we have no positive epistemic duties whatsoever. A theory of epistemic obligation based on Kant’s idea of an imperfect duty is outlined. It is suggested that such a theory is consistent with the inexhaustibility of sensory and propositional evidence. Finally, one feature of our epistemic practice suggestive of the existence of imperfect epistemic duties is identified and promoted