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79Metaphysics and relativityIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.This is a very introductory introduction to some ways in which the special and general theories of relativity may bear upon metaphysical questions about the nature of time and space, and the persistence of objects.
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245Weak discernibilityAnalysis 66 (4). 2006.Simon Saunders argues that, although distinct objects must be discernible, they need only be weakly discernible (Saunders 2003, 2006a). I will argue that this combination of views is unmotivated: if there can be objects which differ only weakly, there can be objects which don’t differ at all.
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191Indeterminism and indeterminacyAnalysis 58 (2): 101-106. 1998.E.J. Lowe claims that quantum physics provides examples of ontic indeterminacy, of vagueness in the world. Any such claim must confront the Evans-Salmon argument to the effect that the notion of ontic indeterminacy is simply incoherent (Evans 1978, Salmon 1981: 243-46). Lowe argues that a standard version of the Evans-Salmon argument fails quite generally (Lowe 1994). Harold Noonan (1995) has outlined a non-standard version of the argument, but Lowe argues that this non-standard version fails fo…Read more
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203Borderline Simple or Extremely SimpleThe Monist 87 (3): 385-404. 2004.In his Material Beings, Peter van Inwagen distinguishes two questions about parthood. What are the conditions necessary and sufficient for some things jointly to compose a whole? What are the conditions necessary and sufficient for a thing to have proper parts? The first of these, the Special Composition Question (SCQ), has been widely discussed, and David Lewis has argued that an important constraint on any answer to the SCQ is that it should not permit borderline cases of composition. This is …Read more
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16Thomas S. Kuhn's mysterious worldsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2): 291-300. 1996.An essay review of two books about Kuhn and Kuhnian ideas.
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22Review. The possibility of metaphysics; substance, identity and time. E J Lowe (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3): 478-482. 1999.
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1431Ontological InnocenceIn A. J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity, Oxford University Press. pp. 70-89. 2014.In this chapter, I examine Lewis's ideas about ontological innocence, ontological commitment and double-counting, in his discussion of composition as identity in Parts of Classes. I attempt to understand these primarily as epistemic or methodological claims: how far can we get down this route without adopting radical metaphysical theses about composition as identity?
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183Knowing How and Epistemic InjusticeIn John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press. pp. 283-99. 2011.In this chapter I explore how epistemic injustice (as discussed by Miranda Fricker) can arise in connection with knowledge how. I attempt to bypass the question of whether knowledge how is a type of propositional knowledge, and instead focus on some distinctive ways in which knowledge how is sometimes sought, identified or ignored.
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288Vagueness and ExistenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1): 125-140. 2002.Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation
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271Fission, fusion and intrinsic factsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3): 602-621. 2005.Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it’s hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justif…Read more
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82Persistence and TimeIn Steven Luper (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, Cambridge University Press. pp. 47-63. 2014.In this chapter I outline some metaphysical views about time, and about persistence, and discuss how they can help us clarify our thinking about life and death.
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59Trust: A Very Short IntroductionOxford University Press. 2012.Katherine Hawley explores the key ideas about trust in this Very Short Introduction. Drawing on a wide range of disciplines including philosophy, psychology, and evolutionary biology, she emphasizes the nature and importance of trusting and being trusted, from our intimate bonds with significant others to our relationship with the state
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279Principles of composition and criteria of identityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4). 2006.I argue that, despite van Inwagen’s pessimism about the task, it is worth looking for answers to his General Composition Question. Such answers or ‘principles of composition’ tell us about the relationship between an object and its parts. I compare principles of composition with criteria of identity, arguing that, just as different sorts of thing satisfy different criteria of identity, they may satisfy different principles of composition. Variety in criteria of identity is not taken to reflect o…Read more
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232Mereology, modality and magicAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1). 2010.If the property _being a methane molecule_ is a universal, then it is a structural universal: objects instantiate _being a methane molecule_ just in case they have the right sorts of proper parts arranged in the right sort of way. Lewis argued that there can be no satisfactory account of structural universals; in this paper I provide a satisfactory account.
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246Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations Be- tween Physical Objects and TimesProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2). 1998.Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on intrinsic properties is misleading. For my …Read more
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179Critical Notice of Every Thing Must GoMetascience 19 (2): 174-179. 2010.This is a critical notice of Ladyman and Ross et al's Every Thing Must Go. I argue that they mischaracterise much of so-called 'analytic metaphysics', and that they could have usefully drawn upon the resources of current metaphysics in order to articulate their own views more clearly. The piece appears in a symposium which also includes contributions by Kyle Stanford and Paul Humphreys, with responses from Ladyman and Ross
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105The Structure of Objects (review)International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3): 336-339. 2010.Short review of The Structure of Objects by Kathrin Koslicki.
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349Science as a Guide to Metaphysics?Synthese 149 (3): 451-470. 2006.Analytic metaphysics is in resurgence; there is renewed and vigorous interest in topics such as time, causation, persistence, parthood and possible worlds. We who share this interest often pay lip-service to the idea that metaphysics should be informed by modern science; some take this duty very seriously.2 But there is also a widespread suspicion that science cannot really contribute to metaphysics, and that scientific findings grossly underdetermine metaphysical claims. For some, this prompts …Read more
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286Persistence and DeterminationRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 197-212. 2008.Roughly speaking, perdurantism is the view that ordinary objects persist through time by having temporal parts, whilst endurantism is the view that they persist by being wholly present at different times. (Speaking less roughly will be important later.) It is often thought that perdurantists have an advantage over endurantists when dealing with objects which appear to coincide temporarily: lumps, statues, cats, tail-complements, bisected brains, repaired ships, and the like. Some cases – persona…Read more
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44Review of Knowledge on Trust. (review)Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250): 170-171. 2013.This is a short review of 'Knowledge on Trust' by Paul Faulkner. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 240. Price £37.00.) For a more extended discussion, please see my 'The Trust Game and the Testimony Game' in Abstracta (2012).
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46VII—Vagueness and ExistenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2): 125-140. 2002.Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation
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304How things persistOxford University Press. 2001.Katherine Hawley explores and compares three theories of persistence -- endurance, perdurance, and stage theories - investigating the ways in which they attempt to account for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, she concludes by advocating stage theory.
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74Review of Empty Ideas (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (Dec 18). 2014.A review of Peter Unger's Empty Ideas (OUP 2014)
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281Types of Personal IdentityCogito 11 (2): 117-122. 1997.This is a paper, aimed at students, which sets out some issues regarding personal identity over time.
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24Pumped up Physicalism (review)Metascience 14 (2): 277-281. 2005.This is a review of Physicalism, by Andrew Melynyk.
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37II—Katherine Hawley: Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier VarianceAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 233-249. 2007.
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177N eo-F regeanism and Q uantifier V arianceAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 233-249. 2007.In his paper in the same volume, Sider argues that, of maximalism and quantifier variance, the latter promises to let us make better sense of neo-Fregeanism. I argue that neo-Fregeans should, and seemingly do, reject quantifier variance. If they must choose between these two options, they should choose maximalism.
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726Cut the Pie Any Way You Like? Cotnoir on General IdentityOxford Studies in Metaphysics 8 323-30. 2013.This is a short response to Aaron Cotnoir's 'Composition as General Identity', in which I suggest some further applications of his ideas, and try to press the question of why we should think of his 'general identity relation' as a genuine identity relation.
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43The Trust Game and the Testimony GameAbstracta 6 (S6): 84-91. 2012.This is part of a symposium on Paul Faulkner's book 'Knowledge on Trust'. The symposium also includes pieces by Guy Longworth, Arnon Keren, Edward S. Hinchman, and Peter J. Graham, with précis and replies by Paul Faulkner. For a more straightforward account of the book, see my review in Philosophical Quarterly 63.1 (2013), 170-71.
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