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286Persistence and DeterminationRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 197-212. 2008.Roughly speaking, perdurantism is the view that ordinary objects persist through time by having temporal parts, whilst endurantism is the view that they persist by being wholly present at different times. (Speaking less roughly will be important later.) It is often thought that perdurantists have an advantage over endurantists when dealing with objects which appear to coincide temporarily: lumps, statues, cats, tail-complements, bisected brains, repaired ships, and the like. Some cases – persona…Read more
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44Review of Knowledge on Trust. (review)Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250): 170-171. 2013.This is a short review of 'Knowledge on Trust' by Paul Faulkner. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 240. Price £37.00.) For a more extended discussion, please see my 'The Trust Game and the Testimony Game' in Abstracta (2012).
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46VII—Vagueness and ExistenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2): 125-140. 2002.Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation
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304How things persistOxford University Press. 2001.Katherine Hawley explores and compares three theories of persistence -- endurance, perdurance, and stage theories - investigating the ways in which they attempt to account for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, she concludes by advocating stage theory.
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74Review of Empty Ideas (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (Dec 18). 2014.A review of Peter Unger's Empty Ideas (OUP 2014)
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281Types of Personal IdentityCogito 11 (2): 117-122. 1997.This is a paper, aimed at students, which sets out some issues regarding personal identity over time.
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24Pumped up Physicalism (review)Metascience 14 (2): 277-281. 2005.This is a review of Physicalism, by Andrew Melynyk.
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37II—Katherine Hawley: Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier VarianceAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 233-249. 2007.
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177N eo-F regeanism and Q uantifier V arianceAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 233-249. 2007.In his paper in the same volume, Sider argues that, of maximalism and quantifier variance, the latter promises to let us make better sense of neo-Fregeanism. I argue that neo-Fregeans should, and seemingly do, reject quantifier variance. If they must choose between these two options, they should choose maximalism.
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43The Trust Game and the Testimony GameAbstracta 6 (S6): 84-91. 2012.This is part of a symposium on Paul Faulkner's book 'Knowledge on Trust'. The symposium also includes pieces by Guy Longworth, Arnon Keren, Edward S. Hinchman, and Peter J. Graham, with précis and replies by Paul Faulkner. For a more straightforward account of the book, see my review in Philosophical Quarterly 63.1 (2013), 170-71.
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726Cut the Pie Any Way You Like? Cotnoir on General IdentityOxford Studies in Metaphysics 8 323-30. 2013.This is a short response to Aaron Cotnoir's 'Composition as General Identity', in which I suggest some further applications of his ideas, and try to press the question of why we should think of his 'general identity relation' as a genuine identity relation.
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139David Lewis on PersistenceIn Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis, Wiley. 2015.This chapter explores the connections between David Lewis's perdurance theory and his Humean supervenience, arguing that his influential argument about temporary intrinsics is best seen in this light. It presents domestic dispute within the anti‐endurantist camp and analyzes the following questions: why does Lewis identify ordinary objects with world‐bound parts of transworld objects, but not with time‐bound parts of transtemporal objects? Given that Lewis is a counterpart theorist about modalit…Read more
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337Success and Knowledge-HowAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1). 2003.In this paper, I argue that there is a notion of 'counterfactual success' which stands to knowledge how as true belief stands to propositional knowledge. (I attempt to avoid the question of whether knowledge how is a type of propositional knowledge.)
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