Joe Smart

In this book two philosophers, each committed to unambiguous versions of belief and disbelief, debate the central issues of atheism and theism. Considers one of the oldest and most widely disputed philosophical questions: is there a God? Presents the atheism/theism issue in the form of philosophical debate between two highly regarded scholars, widely praised for the clarity and verve of their work. This second edition contains new essays by each philosopher, responding to criticisms and building on their previous work.

THOMASS. KUHN. The essential tension: selected studies in scientific tradition and change. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1977. DAVID L. NORTON, Personal destinies: a philosophy of ethical individualism. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1976. ELIZABETHH ANKINSW OLGAST. Paradoxes of knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. 214 pages. ISBN: 0‐8014‐1090‐8; BD215. W63. LAWRENCEH AWORTH.D ecadence and objectivity. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977. GEORGES CHLESINGERR.e ligion and scientific method. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1977. NICHOLASR ESCHER.P eirce's philosophy of science. South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1978. FRITHJOFB ERGMANN.O n being free. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. D. W. HAMLYN. Experience and the growth of understanding. Boston, Mass.: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978 BRUCE AUNE. Reason and action. Holland and the U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1977.

As the editors remark in their preface, the neglect of F. H. Bradley during the last forty years or so is partly due to the dearth of good secondary literature. This book amply rectifies this situation. Something like nineteenth-century idealism is once more in the air, as Dummett and his followers run together questions of truth with those of warranted assertability. H. H. Joachim talked horribly of something he called “truth-or-knowledge,” and in the end Bradley may not always have kept the two things distinct. However, at least in the Principles of Logic Bradley did make the distinction clearly. See James Allard’s essay in the present volume, p. 180.