•  116
    The philosophy and neuroscience movement
    Analyze and Kritik 26 (1): 3-23. 2007.
    A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent …Read more
  •  112
    Philosophy meets the neurosciences
    with William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale
    In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader, Blackwell. 2001.
  •  109
    Though the following problem is not explicitly raised by her, it seems sufficiently similar to an issue of pertinence to Akins's "Black and White and Color" (this volume) to merit the moniker, Akins's Problem : Can there be a visual experience devoid of both color phenomenology and black-and-white phenomenology? The point of the present paper is to draw from Akins's paper the materials needed to sketch a case for a positive answer to Akins's Problem. I am unsure about how much of what follows Ak…Read more
  •  107
    Representational parts
    with Rick Grush
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4): 389-394. 2002.
    In this reply we claim that, contra Dreyfus, the kinds of skillful performances Dreyfus discusses _are_ representational. We explain this proposal, and then defend it against an objection to the effect that the representational notion we invoke is a weak one countenancing only some global state of an organism as a representation. According to this objection, such a representation is not a robust, projectible property of an organism, and hence will gain no explana- tory leverage in cognitive scie…Read more
  •  103
    The introspectibility of brain states as such
    In Brian Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland, Cambridge University Press. 2006.
    Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can percei…Read more
  •  94
    The Myth of Color Sensations, or How Not to See a Yellow Banana
    Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1): 228-240. 2017.
    I argue against a class of philosophical views of color perception, especially insofar as such views posit the existence of color sensations. I argue against the need to posit such nonconceptual mental intermediaries between the stimulus and the eventual conceptualized perceptual judgment. Central to my arguments are considerations of certain color illusions. Such illusions are best explained by reference to high-level, conceptualized knowledge concerning, for example, object identity, likely li…Read more
  •  90
    The present paper has three aims. The first and foremost aim is to introduce into philosophy of mind and related areas (philosophy of language, etc) a discussion of Slow Earth, an analogue to the classic Twin Earth scenario that features a difference from aboriginal Earth that hinges on time instead of the distribution of natural kinds. The second aim is to use Slow Earth to call into question the central lessons often alleged to flow from consideration of Twin Earth, lessons having to do with r…Read more
  •  88
    I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci.
  •  83
    Philosophy of Science
    with William Bechtel
    In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Macmillan. 2002.
    00192001 Philosophy of science is primarily concernedto provide accounts of the principles and processes of scientific explanation. Early in the twentieth century, philosophers of science focusedon the logical structure of scientific thought, whereas in the later part of the century logic was de-emphasized in favour of other frameworks for conceptualizing scientific reasoning andexplanation, andan emphasis on historical andsociological factors that shape scientific thinking. While tracing throug…Read more
  •  75
    I argue for the superiority of non-gappy physicalism over gappy physicalism. While physicalists are united in denying an ontological gap between the phenomenal and the physical, the gappy affirm and the non-gappy deny a relevant epistemological gap. Central to my arguments will be contemplation of Swamp Mary, a being physically intrinsically similar to post-release Mary (a physically omniscient being who has experienced red) but has not herself (the Swamp being) experienced red. Swamp Mary has p…Read more
  •  69
    Cognitive cellular automata
    In Complex Biological Systems:, Icfai University Press. 2008.
    In this paper I explore the question of how artificial life might be used to get a handle on philosophical issues concerning the mind-body problem. I focus on questions concerning what the physical precursors were to the earliest evolved versions of intelligent life. I discuss how cellular automata might constitute an experimental platform for the exploration of such issues, since cellular automata offer a unified framework for the modeling of physical, biological, and psychological processes. I…Read more
  •  63
    I develop advice to the reductionist about consciousness in the form of a transcendental argument that depends crucially on the sorts of knowledge claims concerning consciousness that, as crucial elements in the anti-reductionists’ epistemicgap arguments, the anti-reductionist will readily concede. The argument that I develop goes as follows. P1. If I know that I am not a zombie, then phenomenal character is (a certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content. P2. I know that I am not a zombie…Read more
  •  57
    Review of Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain? (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4). 2009.
  •  40
    Introduction: What is philosophy of mind? -- The key terms -- The key thinkers -- The key texts.
  •  37
    Synthetic neuroethology
    In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Metaphilosophy, Blackwell. pp. 11-29. 2002.
    Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied…Read more
  •  35
    Points of view from the brain's eye view: Subjectivity and neural representation
    In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader, Blackwell. pp. 312. 2001.
  •  13
    Book reviews (review)
    with James H. Fetzer, Henry Cribbs, Morten H. Christiansen, Peggy DesAutels, Douglas G. Winblad, Wayne Christensen, and David Blumenfeld
    Philosophical Psychology 10 (1): 113-137. 1997.
  •  5
    Synthetic Neuroethology
    Metaphilosophy 33 (1‐2): 11-29. 2002.
  •  1
    Cognitive Science is a major new guide to the central theories and problems in the study of the mind and brain. The authors clearly explain how and why cognitive science aims to understand the brain as a computational system that manipulates representations. They identify the roots of cognitive science in Descartes - who argued that all knowledge of the external world is filtered through some sort of representation - and examine the present-day role of Artificial Intelligence, computing, psychol…Read more
  • Objectivity Without Space
    Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6. 1998.