•  709
    About Property Identity
    Auslegung 5 (3): 139-146. 1978.
    W.V.O. Quine has famously objected that (1) properties are philosophically suspect because (2) there is no entity without identity and (3) the synonymy criterion for property identity won't do because there's no such concept as synonymy. (2) and (3) may or may not be right but do not prove (1). I reply that Leiniz's Law handles property identity, as it does for everything else, then respond to a variety of objections and confusions.
  •  1361
    Semantic Epistemology Redux: Proof and Validity in Quantum Mechanics
    Logos and Episteme 7 (3): 287-303. 2016.
    Definitions I presented in a previous article as part of a semantic approach in epistemology assumed that the concept of derivability from standard logic held across all mathematical and scientific disciplines. The present article argues that this assumption is not true for quantum mechanics (QM) by showing that concepts of validity applicable to proofs in mathematics and in classical mechanics are inapplicable to proofs in QM. Because semantic epistemology must include this important theory, re…Read more
  •  98
    Nonexistence without nonexistents
    Philosophical Studies 33 (4): 409-412. 1978.
    Platonism considers existence as well as nonexistence as genuine properties. Kant and others have denied the former and the latter seems absurd. I reply that critics have forgotten that Platonism means accepting properties that are neither exemplified (like being a unicorn) nor exemplifiable (like nonexistence). I also present a Platonist analysis of negative existentials without appealing to nonexistence.
  • About belief de re
    Logique Et Analyse 20 (77): 138. 1977.