•  1430
    Semantic Epistemology Redux: Proof and Validity in Quantum Mechanics
    Logos and Episteme 7 (3): 287-303. 2016.
    Definitions I presented in a previous article as part of a semantic approach in epistemology assumed that the concept of derivability from standard logic held across all mathematical and scientific disciplines. The present article argues that this assumption is not true for quantum mechanics (QM) by showing that concepts of validity applicable to proofs in mathematics and in classical mechanics are inapplicable to proofs in QM. Because semantic epistemology must include this important theory, re…Read more
  •  99
    Nonexistence without nonexistents
    Philosophical Studies 33 (4): 409-412. 1978.
    Platonism considers existence as well as nonexistence as genuine properties. Kant and others have denied the former and the latter seems absurd. I reply that critics have forgotten that Platonism means accepting properties that are neither exemplified (like being a unicorn) nor exemplifiable (like nonexistence). I also present a Platonist analysis of negative existentials without appealing to nonexistence.
  • About belief de re
    Logique Et Analyse 20 (77): 138. 1977.
  •  95
    Self-Relations
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (4): 321-327. 1978.
    According to Platonism, "Socrates is wise" expresses the exemplification by Socrates of the property of being wise; while "Simmias is taller than Socrates" expresses the exemplification by of the relation of being taller than. What about "Socrates is as tall as Socrates"? Is this property or relation exemplification? I show there is an answer that solves Russell's Paradox, Plato's "Third Man" argument, and the Greeling-Nelson paradox of non-self-applying terms.
  • A Platonist Theory of Properties
    Dissertation, Brown University. 1977.