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45Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in EpistemologyPhilosophical Review 104 (4): 621. 1995.For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalis…Read more
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163BonJour on explanation and skepticismStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4): 413-421. 2010.Laurence BonJour, among others, has argued that inference to the best explanation allows us to reject skeptical hypotheses in favor of our common-sense view of the world. BonJour considers several skeptical hypotheses, specifically: our experiences arise by mere chance, uncaused; the simple hypothesis which states merely that our experiences are caused unveridically; and an elaborated hypothesis which explains in detail how our unveridical experiences are brought about. A central issue is whethe…Read more
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257The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 875-887. 1993.
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7Can skepticism be refutedIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 72--84. 2013.
Unknown
Department Of Philosophy
Alumnus
Amherst, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |