Jukka Varelius

Conspiracy theorizing can sometimes have regrettable features that speak for suppressing it. Yet, given that an adequately knowledgeable citizenry is a prerequisite of a healthy democracy, the public should be informed about politically important events, including political conspiracies. In this article, I focus on the relationship between informing citizens about political conspiracies and the kind of conspiracy theorizing that arguably should be suppressed. More precisely, I maintain that informing citizens about political conspiracies threatens to lead to the kind of conspiracy theorizing there is reason to suppress, and I examine how the potential drawback ought to be dealt with. I propose that informing citizens about political conspiracies should both proceed in light of pertinent research on conspiracy theorizing and pay heed to adequate knowledge about the circumstances in which conspiracies are publicized.

This book provides novel perspectives on ethical justifiability of assisted dying in the revised edition of New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Going significantly beyond traditional debates about the value of human life, the ethical significance of individual autonomy, the compatibility of assisted dying with the ethical obligations of medical professionals, and questions surrounding intention and causation, this book promises to shift the terrain of the ethical debates about assisted dying. The novel themes discussed in the revised edition include the role of markets, disability, gender, artificial intelligence, medical futility, race, and transhumanism. Ideal for advanced courses in bioethics and healthcare ethics, the book illustrates how social and technological developments will shape debates about assisted dying in the years to come.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Still Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental DisorderJukka Varelius (bio)Keywordsmental disorder, definition, psychological capacity for autonomy, Matthews, SavulescuI thank Eric Matthews and Julian Savulescu for their thought-provoking comments. Unfortunately, I am not here able to discuss all the important points they raise, but must settle for briefly addressing their main criticisms of my view.Reply to MatthewsI believe that some arguments are rationally irresolvable, but do not think that about all philosophical arguments. In terms of moral philosophical argumentation, though not only that, I share the rather common belief that we should proceed by seeking reflective equilibrium between requirements of logic, the best factual knowledge about ourselves and our environment, and our strongly held evaluative intuitions. (This is not to say that there would always be a clear distinction between facts and values.) By such intuitions I refer, for example, to the intuition that it is morally wrong to torture babies for fun. If we are considering whether it is morally permissible to act in a particular way and realize that acting in that way is in the morally relevant respects similar to torturing babies for fun, we conclude that it is not morally permissible to act in that way. That question is solved for persons who accept the moral intuition that it is wrong to torture babies for fun and wish to take facts and logic into account. This method is useful in the context of defining mental disorder, too.Although we have some strongly held intuitions as to what mental disorder is about, such as that person A is a paradigm case of a mentally disordered person, referring to them has not sufficed to solve the controversy concerning the demarcation of mental disorder. Therefore, I want to consider the possibility that referring also to the goals we have for demarcating mental disorder could help us in solving it. At this stage of enquiry at least, I thus believe that the controversy is solvable, but only among persons who share certain points of departure. Accordingly, the "our" in expressions like 'our goals for demarcating mental disorder,' whose reference Matthews enquires about, refer to those who share the intuition that A is a paradigm example of a mentally disordered person, consider the demarcation goals significant, want to take [End Page 67] facts into account, and wish to make logically valid inferences.If one cares about the other things but does not want to consider A's case, one can focus on some other case of a person whose psychological capacity for autonomy is diminished. (Unless, of course, one thinks that no such persons exist and all whom we believe to lack psychological capacity for autonomy are really playacting, malingering, etc.) I, however, now continue with A's case. We have, ex hypothesi, sufficient reason to believe that A lacks not merely relevant information, but also the psychological capacity that understanding it and making use of it in assessing her beliefs and desires presupposes. If someone who knows this about A still insists that A is in perfect mental health and wants, say, to treat her as an object of entertainment in a human zoo, my argument is unlikely to reach him. But who is he to say that we should not care about A's loss of capacity for autonomy and the misfortunes it involves?And of course, also rationally establishing that a person who lacks such capacity is mentally healthy or that the controversy on the nature of mental disorder is not rationally resolvable presupposes that the discussants share some points of departure, including evaluative intuitions. Instead of the intuitions that to be ill is essentially to suffer harm, that behavior governed by one's feelings is always autonomous, and so on, that Matthews refers to, proponents of such views are, however, well advised to resort to less obscure and less controversial intuitions. What, for example, is meant by 'harm'? Is a person who is so overwhelmed by emotions that she is unable to think clearly always autonomous with respect to the actions she performs while in that state? If one takes that all intuitions are useless...

What mental disorder means is controversial. I attempt to solve that controversy by applying the method of defining a phenomenon in terms of the goals we have for demarcating that phenomenon from other phenomena to the case of mental disorder. I thus address the question about the nature of mental disorder by paying attention to the goals we have for demarcating mental disorder. I maintain that these goals, which embody the reasons why we consider mental disorder a significant phenomenon for us, have a common denominator: they refer to psychological capacity for autonomy. I present a conceptual foundation for defining mental disorder on the basis of that psychological capacity and argue that this way of understanding the nature of mental disorder avoids the main problems of the central contemporary theories of mental disorder. Then I explain why this conception of the nature of mental disorder is not undermined by anti-psychiatric criticisms to the effect that mental illness does not exist, that the mentally ill should not be treated differently from others, and that seeing problems of the mentally disordered as psychiatric problems is unjustified medicalization. I conclude by suggesting that the presented conceptual foundation for defining mental disorder would benefit from being complemented by results of empirical psychology.

This article examines the emerging field of today's superscience—biotechnology— within the context of the national innovation system of one small country, namely Finland. This context is explored primarily through the practices of one particular Finnish biotechnology center, BioCity. The Silicon Valley rhetoric, which every self-respecting technology project around the world seems to incorporate into its own vocabulary, is compared with the everyday “reality” of this biotechnology center. The article focuses on the implementation of technology policy, organized following the “triple helix” model, in the field of biotechnology. Some comparisons with different countries are also made to give a picture of Finland in relation with the European life sciences industry. The article is concluded by a consideration of the future prospects of BioCity and Finnish biotechnology.

It has been proposed that reoffending could be reduced by manipulating the neural underpinnings of offenders’ criminogenic mental features with what have been called neurocorrectives. The legitimacy of such use of neurotechnology – criminal neurorehabilitation, as the use is called – is usually seen to presuppose valid consent by the offenders subjected to it. According to a central criticism of nonconsensual criminal neurorehabilitation, nonconsensual use of neurocorrectives would express a degrading attitude towards offenders. In this article, I consider this criticism of nonconsensual criminal neurorehabilitation. By using cases of autonomous persons who lead a subservient existence as an example, I propose that nonconsensual criminal neurorehabilitation need not express a more degrading attitude towards offenders than consensual criminal neurorehabilitation. The argument of this article does not show that nonconsensual criminal neurorehabilitation is morally or legally acceptable. Yet, in view of the argument, criticizing nonconsensual criminal neurorehabilitation for expressing a degrading attitude towards offenders is not compatible with simultaneously endorsing consensual criminal neurorehabilitation.

It has been proposed that the ways in which the criminal justice system treats offenders with Autism spectrum condition should duly account for how the condition influences the offenders’ behavior. While the recommendation appears plausible, what adhering to it means in practice remains unclear. A central feature of ASC is seen to be that people with the condition have difficulties with understanding and reacting to the mental states of others in what are commonly considered as adequate ways. This article aims to clarify how the difficulties affect the moral weight to be given to the good and bad motives of offending in sentencing offenders with ASC. I start by explicating the main points of departure of the endeavor. After that I assess the moral significance of the good and bad motives of offenders with ASC in view of four cases and a comparison with how we commonly treat people who are not as able to understand and react to the mental states of others as neurotypical adults. I suggest that considerations pertaining to what has been called the primary orientation of morality provide grounds for deeming the good motives of offenders with ASC as morally significant as those of otherwise similar neurotypical offenders and the bad motives of offenders with ASC as less morally significant than those of otherwise similar neurotypical offenders. After considering three possible objections to the suggestion, I conclude by briefly elucidating its purported import.

It has been suggested that neuroenhancements could be used to improve the abilities of criminal justice authorities. Judges could be made more able to make adequately informed and unbiased decisions, for example. Yet, while such a prospect appears appealing, the views of neuroenhanced criminal justice authorities could also be alien to the unenhanced public. This could compromise the legitimacy and functioning of the criminal justice system. In this article, I assess possible solutions to this problem. I maintain that none of them qualifies as a satisfactory general solution to it, a solution that could reasonably be taken to solve the problem or to suffice for dealing with it in at least most cases. Yet I also suggest that, depending on contingent empirical circumstances, the responses – either singly or together – can sometimes amount to a sufficient answer to it.

It has been suggested that neuroenhancements could be used to improve the abilities of criminal justice authorities. Judges could be made more able to make adequately informed and unbiased decisions, for example. Yet, while such a prospect appears appealing, the views of neuroenhanced criminal justice authorities could also be alien to the unenhanced public. This could compromise the legitimacy and functioning of the criminal justice system. In this article, I assess possible solutions to this problem. I maintain that none of them qualifies as a satisfactory general solution to it, a solution that could reasonably be taken to solve the problem or to suffice for dealing with it in at least most cases. Yet I also suggest that, depending on contingent empirical circumstances, the responses – either singly or together – can sometimes amount to a sufficient answer to it.

A moral problem arises when a patient refuses a treatment that would save her life. Should the patient be treated against her will? According to an influential approach to questions of biomedical ethics, certain considerations pertaining to individual autonomy provide a solution to this problem. According to this approach, we should respect the patient’s autonomy and, since she has made an autonomous decision against accepting the treatment, she should not be treated. This article argues against the view that our answer to the question of whether or not the refusing patient ought to be treated should be based on these kinds of considerations pertaining to individual autonomy and maintains that finding a plausible answer to this question presupposes that we resolve questions concerning subjectivity and objectivity of individual wellbeing

Suicidal ideation would often appear to relate to ideas about life’s meaninglessness. In this chapter, I consider the suicidal thoughts of an elderly person in light of the recent philosophical discussion on the meaning of life. I start by distinguishing between two importantly different questions about life’s meaning and explaining how they differ from certain other issues sometimes treated as questions about the meaning of life. Then I address the two questions about life’s meaning in turn, connecting them to the example case. After that, I briefly consider how the elderly person’s committing suicide would appear from the viewpoint of the philosophical debate on life’s meaning. I conclude by summing up how the philosophical discussion on the meaning of life I have referred to might help a person like the one in the example case.

It has been argued that voluntary euthanasia (VE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) are morally wrong. Yet, a gravely suffering patient might insist that he has a moral right to the procedures even if they were morally wrong. There are also philosophers who maintain that an agent can have a moral right to do something that is morally wrong. In this article, I assess the view that a suffering patient can have a moral right to VE and PAS despite the moral wrongness of the procedures in light of the main argument for a moral right to do wrong found in recent philosophical literature. I maintain that the argument does not provide adequate support for such a right to VE and PAS.

Opponents of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide often maintain that the procedures ought not to be accepted because ending an innocent human life would both be morally wrong in itself and have unfortunate consequences. A gravely suffering patient can grant that ending his life would involve such harm but still insist that he would have reason to continue living only if there were something to him in his abstaining from ending his life. Though relatively rarely, the notion of meaning of life has figured in recent medical ethical debate on voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. And in current philosophical discussion on meaning of life outside the medical ethical debate on voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide several authors have argued that being moral and having a meaningful existence are connected to each other. In this article, I assess whether his intentionally refraining from causing the harm related to voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide would involve something to such a patient in the sense that it would promote the meaningfulness of his life.

When it is considered to be in their best interests, withholding and withdrawing life-supporting treatment from non-competent physically ill or injured patients – non-voluntary passive euthanasia, as it has been called – is generally accepted. A central reason in support of the procedures relates to the perceived manner of death they involve: in non-voluntary passive euthanasia death is seen to come about naturally. When a non-competent psychiatric patient attempts to kill herself, the mental health care providers treating her are obligated to try to stop her. Yet it has been suggested that death by suicide can be a part of the natural course of a severe mental illness. Accordingly, if the perceived naturalness of the deaths occurring in connection with non-voluntary passive euthanasia speaks for their moral permissibility, it could be taken that a similar reason can support the moral acceptability of the suicidal deaths of non-competent psychiatric patients. In this article, I consider whether the suicidal death of a non-competent psychiatric patient would necessarily be less natural than those of physically ill or injured patients who die as a result of non-voluntary passive euthanasia. I argue that it would not.

Services of ethics committees are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as health care, public administration, business, law, engineering, and scientific research. It is taken that as their members have expertise in ethics, these committees can have valuable contributions to make in solving practical moral problems. It has, however, also been maintained that it is simply absurd to claim that one has some special knowledge and skills in moral matters; in connection with moral questions there is no expertise to be had. In this paper, I assess this criticism of the use of ethics committees and ethics consultants. I argue that there is no sufficient reason to reject the possibility of ethical expertise

In an article recently published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, I assessed the position that voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide can be appropriate only in cases of persons who are suffering unbearably because they are ill or injured, not in cases of unbearably distressed persons whose suffering is caused by their conviction that their life will never again be worth living. More precisely, I considered one possible way of defending that position, the argument that the latter kind of distress—to which I referred to as existential suffering—does not qualify as grounds for VE and PAS because doctors are not experts on questions pertaining to the meaning, value and purpose of life: existential questions, as I called them. I maintained that cases of VE and PAS related to illness and injury involve existential questions relevantly similar to those faced in connection with existential suffering. Therefore, I concluded, if VE and PAS based on suffering arising from illness or injury falls within the domain of medical expertise, it is consistent that VE and PAS cannot be denied in cases of purely existential suffering by maintaining that the professional expertise of doctors does not extend to existential questions.1The article inspired some interesting discussion. Robert Young offered two reasons for thinking that its argument is of limited practical significance.2 Julian Savulescu maintained that, within current medical ethics and human rights, there already is a method of assisted suicide: voluntary palliated starvation , which allows that existential distress can sometimes provide grounds for assisted dying and which could fall within the limits of the law.3 The discussion by Young and Savulescu suggest that my argument, or rather the nature of the project of which it is purported to be a part, could benefit from some clarification. That …