Darrell P. Rowbottom

Must we appeal to the notion of knowledge, in the subjective sense typically discussed by epistemologists, in the philosophy of science? Many scientific realists appear to think so, in so far as they assert that we can achieve knowledge of unobservable things, and of theories concerning them. As a natural result, perhaps, this has recently led Bird to suggest that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge, rather than merely truth. But I would instead suggest that making scientific progress consists in acquiring useful information. I will argue for this by pointing out the scientific importance of collecting information that is not and will not ever be believed, is false, and is truly believed without being justifiably believed. I will also say something about the different ways that ‘useful’ may be understood, with special reference to the property of truth and its role in positions such as constructive empiricism and structural realism. My own view is that even fictions may be both useful and informative; and this gels nicely with some recent work, e.g. by Frigg, on scientific models

This article explores the practical significance of the notion of ‘World 3’ – a domain of abstract entities – for inquiry and education. First, it explains how ‘objectifying’ our thoughts and statements, viz. treating them as if they are objective, can help in inquiry to: promote impartiality towards ideas on the basis of their source and the manner in which they are presented; enable more effective communication; and encourage wider participation in debates. Second, the article examines how ‘objectification’ can be useful in group learning scenarios, insofar as these involve group inquiry.

How should educational research be contracted? And is there anything wrong with the way that public funding of educational research is currently administered? We endeavour to answer these questions by appeal to the work of two of the most prominent philosophers of science of the twentieth century, namely Popper and Kuhn. Although their normative views of science are radically different, we show that they would nonetheless agree on a number of key rules concerning the extent to which scientific practice should be influenced ‘from the outside’. We then show that these rules are often broken in the way that research is publicly funded in the UK.

This paper argues that an intersubjective interpretation of probability is indispensable in understanding the rationality of science from the point of view of confirmation. It shows how intersubjective probabilities are superior to their subjective counterparts in a number of key respects, in a peculiar class of circumstances relevant to scientific practice. It also shows how group probabilities can be superior to individual probabilities even if rationality constraints other than coherence, e.g. as advocated by Objective Bayesians, are required of degrees of belief. Key considerations are the improved error correction that can occur, and the increased background knowledge that becomes available, through interaction and group decision-making

Popper repeatedly emphasized the significance of a critical attitude, and a related critical method, for scientists. Kuhn, however, thought that unquestioning adherence to the theories of the day is proper; at least for ‘normal scientists’. In short, the former thought that dominant theories should be attacked, whereas the latter thought that they should be developed and defended. Both seem to have missed a trick, however, due to their apparent insistence that each individual scientist should fulfil similar functions. The trick is to consider science at the group level; and doing so shows how puzzle solving and ‘offensive’ critical activity can simultaneously have a legitimate place in science. This analysis shifts the focus of the debate. The crucial question becomes ‘How should the balance between functions be struck?’ In this talk, Rowbottom would show why this is the crucial question, and also strive to make some new headway in answering it

What constitutes cognitive scientific progress? This Element begins with an extensive survey of the contemporary debate on how to answer this question. It provides a blow-by-blow critical summary of the key literature on the issue over the past fifteen years, covering the central positions and arguments therein. It also draws upon older literature, where appropriate, to inform the treatment. The Element then enters novel territory by considering meta-normative issues concerning scientific progress. It focuses on how the standards involved in assessing progress arise. Does science have aims, which determine what counts as progress, as many authors assume? If so, what is it to be an aim of science? And how does one identify such things? If not, how do normative standards arise? After arguing that science does not have overarching aims, the Element proposes that the standards are ultimately subjective.