•  1
    Probability Theory
    In Sven Ove Hansson & Vincent F. Hendricks (eds.), Introduction to Formal Philosophy, Springer. pp. 417-430. 2012.
    This chapter covers the epistemic or information-based interpretations of probability: logical, subjective, objective Bayesian, and group level. It explains how these differ from aleatory or world-based interpretations of probability, presents each in detail, and then discusses its strengths and weaknesses.
  •  28
    Can scientific evidence outstretch what scientists have mentally entertained, or could ever entertain? This article focuses on the plausibility and consequences of an affirmative answer in a special case. Specifically, it discusses how we may treat automated scientific data-gathering systems—especially AI systems used to make predictions or to generate novel theories—from the point of view of confirmation theory. It uses AlphaFold2 as a case study.
  •  228
    Stance and rationality: a perspective
    Synthese 178 (1): 1-5. 2011.
    We offer an overview of some ways of examining the connections between stance and rationality, by surveying recent work on four central topics: the very idea of a stance, the relations between stances and voluntarism, the metaphysics and epistemology that emerge once stances are brought to center stage, and the role that emotions and phenomenology play in the empirical stance
  •  290
    _Popper’s Critical Rationalism_ presents Popper’s views on science, knowledge, and inquiry, and examines the significance and tenability of these in light of recent developments in philosophy of science, philosophy of probability, and epistemology. It develops a fresh and novel philosophical position on science, which employs key insights from Popper while rejecting other elements of his philosophy. Central theses include: Crucial questions about scientific method arise at the level of the group…Read more
  •  7
    Book Forum
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 98 (C): 9-11. 2023.
  •  37
    First, I show that the semantic thesis of scientific realism may be relaxed significantly—to allow that some scientific discourse is not truth-valued—without making any concessions concerning the epistemic or methodological theses that lie at realism’s core. Second, I illustrate how relaxing the semantic thesis allows realists to avoid positing abstract entities and to fend off objections to the “no miracles” argument from positions such as cognitive instrumentalism. Third, I argue that the sema…Read more
  •  28
    This paper argues that representationalism of a Fodorian variety can accommodate the fact that beliefs come in degrees. First, it responds to two key arguments to the contrary. Second, it builds upon these responses and outlines a novel representationalist theory of degrees of beliefs. I call this theory dispositional representationalism, as it involves direct appeal to our dispositions to form representations and propositional attitudes concerning them.
  •  55
    Studies A, B, and C merger
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. forthcoming.
  •  99
    Peer Review May Not Be Such a Bad Idea: Response to Heesen and Bright
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (4): 927-940. 2022.
    In a recent article in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Heesen and Bright argue that prepublication peer review should be abolished and replaced with postpublication peer review (provided the matter is judged purely on epistemic grounds). In this article, I show that there are three problems with their argument. First, it fails to consider the epistemic cost of implementing the change to postpublication peer review. Second, it fails to consider some potential epistemic benefits…Read more
  •  4
    Framework
    In Kocku von Stuckrad & Robert A. Segal (eds.), Vocabulary for the Study of Religion: F-O, Brill. 2015.
    This entry discusses frameworks of inquiry. It focuses on Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm, or a “disciplinary matrix.”
  •  15
    Which threats to humanity should we teach about? Decision theoretic guides
    Educational Philosophy and Theory 52 (8): 844-845. 2020.
    Volume 52, Issue 8, July 2020, Page 844-845.
  •  51
    Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief
    Philosophical Psychology 32 (8): 1204-1220. 2019.
    A major problem posed by cases of self-deception concerns the inconsistent behavior of the self-deceived subject (SDS). How can this be accounted for, in terms of propositional attitudes and other mental states? In this paper, we argue that key problems with two recent putative solutions, due to Mele and Archer, are avoided by “the shifting view” that has been advanced elsewhere in order to explain cases where professed beliefs conflict with actions. We show that self-deceived agents may possess…Read more
  •  448
    A methodological argument against scientific realism
    Synthese 198 (3): 2153-2167. 2019.
    First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which va…Read more
  •  93
    Roughly, instrumentalism is the view that science is primarily, and should primarily be, an instrument for furthering our practical ends. It has fallen out of favour because historically influential variants of the view, such as logical positivism, suffered from serious defects. In this book, however, Darrell P. Rowbottom develops a new form of instrumentalism, which is more sophisticated and resilient than its predecessors. This position—‘cognitive instrumentalism’—involves three core theses. F…Read more
  •  569
    Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3): 505-523. 2019.
    An important suggestion of objective Bayesians is that the maximum entropy principle can replace a principle which is known to get into paradoxical difficulties: the principle of indifference. No one has previously determined whether the maximum entropy principle is better able to solve Bertrand’s chord paradox than the principle of indifference. In this paper I show that it is not. Additionally, the course of the analysis brings to light a new paradox, a revenge paradox of the chords, that is …Read more
  •  21
    Indoctrination and science education
    Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. 2016.
    Can students be trained to be excellent scientists purely, or failing that mainly, by means of indoctrination? And if not, what role, if any, should indoctrination play in science education? These are the main questions discussed in this entry. They are epistemic and pragmatic, rather than moral, in character.
  •  8
    Conceptual Framework
    Vocabulary for the Study of Religion. 2015.
    This entry discusses frameworks of inquiry. It focuses on Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm, or a “disciplinary matrix.”
  •  37
    Chance
    Vocabulary for the Study of Religion. 2018.
    This entry explains that a chance is a kind of probability in the world, introduces a number of ways to understand probabilities in the world, and discusses how the existence of chances bears on the issue of determinism.
  •  175
    Book review : Objective Bayesianism defended? (review)
    Metascience 21 (1): 193-196. 2011.
    Darrell P. Rowbottom reviews the book "In defense of objective Bayesianism" by Jon Williamson.
  •  23
    P. K. Feyerabend: The Tyranny of Science
    Science & Education 22 (5): 1229-1231. 2013.
  •  22
    This paper is a critique of Contessa’s. First, I show that Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery argues against the view that the logical probability of a hypothesis is identical to its degree of confirmation, rather than against Bayesianism. Second, I explain that his argument to this effect does not depend on the assumption that ‘the universe is infinite’. Third, and finally, I refine Popper’s case by developing an argument which requires only that some universal laws have a logical prob…Read more
  •  30
    When a doctor tells you there’s a one percent chance that an operation will result in your death, or a scientist claims that his theory is probably true, what exactly does that mean? Understanding probability is clearly very important, if we are to make good theoretical and practical choices. In this engaging and highly accessible introduction to the philosophy of probability, Darrell Rowbottom takes the reader on a journey through all the major interpretations of probability, with reference to …Read more
  •  16
    In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a novel distinctio…Read more
  •  18
    Bertrand's Paradox Revisited: Why Bertrand's 'Solutions' Are All Inapplicable
    Philosophia Mathematica 21 (1): 110-114. 2013.
    Bertrand's Paradox Revisited: Why Bertrand's 'Solutions' Are All Inapplicable.
  •  18
    This chapter presents and criticizes the two dominant accounts of thought experiments in science, due to James Robert Brown and John Norton; the mechanical thought experiment of Simon Stevin is used as an exemplar. The chapter argues that scientific thought experiments are strongly analogous to their ‘real’, actual physical, counterparts. In each kind of experiment, theoretical context affects which arguments are generated and/or thought to be sustainable on the basis of the states of affairs in…Read more
  •  15
    This paper is a supplement to, and provides a proof of principle of, Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level. It illustrates how calculations may be performed in order to determine how the balance between different functions in science—such as imaginative, critical, and dogmatic—should be struck, with respect to confirmation functions and rules of scientific method.
  •  77
    Popper repeatedly emphasised the significance of a critical attitude, and a related critical method, for scientists. Kuhn, however, thought that unquestioning adherence to the theories of the day is proper; at least for ‘normal scientists’. In short, the former thought that dominant theories should be attacked, whereas the latter thought that they should be developed and defended. Both seem to have missed a trick, however, due to their apparent insistence that each individual scientist should fu…Read more
  •  24
    An alternative account of epistemic reasons for action: In response to Booth
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1): 191-198. 2008.
    In a recent contribution to Grazer Philosophische Studien, Booth argues that for S to have an epistemic reason to ψ means that if S ψ's then he will have more true beliefs and less false beliefs than if he does not ψ. After strengthening this external account in response to the objection that one can improve one's epistemic state in other fashions, e.g. by having a gain in true beliefs which outweighs one's gain in false beliefs, I provide a challenge to it. My main objection, which I advance wi…Read more