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75Nomic Probability and the Foundations of InductionOxford University Press. 1990.In this book Pollock deals with the subject of probabilistic reasoning, making general philosophical sense of objective probabilities and exploring their ...
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80New foundations for practical reasoningMinds and Machines 2 (2): 113-144. 1992.Practical reasoning aims at deciding what actions to perform in light of the goals a rational agent possesses. This has been a topic of interest in both philosophy and artificial intelligence, but these two disciplines have produced very different models of practical reasoning. The purpose of this paper is to examine each model in light of the other and produce a unified model adequate for the purposes of both disciplines and superior to the standard models employed by either.The philosophical (…Read more
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26Locally Global PlanningThinking About Acting. 2011.This chapter reiterates the proposition that practical cognition should not aim at finding optimal solutions to practical problems. A rational cognizer should instead look for good solutions, and replace them with better solutions if any are found. Solutions come in the form of plans. In general, a change to the master plan may consist of deleting several local plans and adding several others. This theory is still fairly schematic. It leaves most details to the imagination of the reader, and in …Read more
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111Causal probabilitySynthese 132 (1-2). 2002.Examples growing out of the Newcomb problem have convinced many people that decision theory should proceed in terms of some kind of causal probability. I endorse this view and define and investigate a variety of causal probability. My definition is related to Skyrms' definition, but proceeds in terms of objective probabilities rather than subjective probabilities and avoids taking causal dependence as a primitive concept.
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134Rational choice and action omnipotencePhilosophical Review 111 (1): 1-23. 2002.Counterexamples are constructed for the theory of rational choice that results from a direct application of classical decision theory to ordinary actions. These counterexamples turn on the fact that an agent may be unable to perform an action, and may even be unable to try to perform an action. An alternative theory of rational choice is proposed that evaluates actions using a more complex measure, and then it is shown that this is equivalent to applying classical decision theory to "conditional…Read more
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172Plans And DecisionsTheory and Decision 57 (2): 79-107. 2004.Counterexamples are constructed for classical decision theory, turning on the fact that actions must often be chosen in groups rather than individually, i.e., the objects of rational choice are plans. It is argued that there is no way to define optimality for plans that makes the finding of optimal plans the desideratum of rational decision-making. An alternative called “locally global planning” is proposed as a replacement for classical decision theory. Decision-making becomes a non-terminating…Read more
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114A resource-bounded agent addresses the newcomb problemSynthese 176 (1): 57-82. 2010.In the Newcomb problem, the standard arguments for taking either one box or both boxes adduce what seem to be relevant considerations, but they are not complete arguments, and attempts to complete the arguments rely upon incorrect principles of rational decision making. It is argued that by considering how the predictor is making his prediction, we can generate a more complete argument, and this in turn supports a form of causal decision theory
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