Jens Lemanski

+++Englisch Translation in "Proceedings of Schopenhauer Congresses 2018-2020 (JSPS)"+++ Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, warum es in Arthur Schopenhauers System keine Abhandlung über japanische Gärten gibt. Zunächst wird erläutert, dass die Systemphilosophie des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts auf Vollständigkeit in der begrifflichen Darstellung abzielte. Schopenhauer behandelt daher neben vielen anderen Künsten auch die nationalen Besonderheiten der Gartenkunst in Europa und Asien und bestimmt begrifflich deren Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede. Aufgrund der Isolation Japans hatte Schopenhauer jedoch keine Kenntnis von japanischen Gärten. Im letzten Teil des Aufsatzes wird argumentiert, dass japanische Gärten gut in Schopenhauers System gepasst hätten, da der Steingarten, der Teichgarten, der Moosgarten usw. gut mit den Ideen korrespondieren, die Schopenhauers Ästhetik begründen.

Arthur Schopenhauer’s system, as elaborated in The World as Will and Representation (1st ed.: 1819) and in the Berlin Lectures (1820s), is divided into four parts: 1. the so-called ‘epistemology’, 2. metaphysics (of nature), 3. metaphysics of the beautiful or aesthetics, 4. metaphysics of morals or ethics. The part on ‘epistemology’ is divided into two parts: the doctrine of cognition and the doctrine of reason. Whereas the doctrine of cognition discusses the three conditions for the possibility of cognition, i.e., space, time, and causality, the doctrine of reason is divided into three faculties: language, (science of) knowing, and practical reason. This paper gives an informal overview of the research on the doctrine of reason, especially on logic, that has been conducted in recent years.

Die Unterscheidung zwischen einer großen und kleinen Logik geht auf den scholastischen Unterricht zurück, in dem Bakkalaren eine grundlegende parva logicalia und Magistranden eine auf Vollständigkeit zielende logica magna zu absolvieren hatten. Erst im Laufe des 19. Jh.s wurde die begriffliche Unterscheidung weniger auf die Studiengangszuordnung, als vielmehr auf den Umfang von logischen Texten angewandt: Fand man von Autoren sowohl ausschweifende als auch knappe Darstellungen der Logik, so wurden diese salopp als ›große‹ und als ›kleine Logik‹ bezeichnet. In diesem Sinn muss man auch die begriffliche Unterscheidung zwischen einer großen und mehreren kleineren Logiken in der Schopenhauer-Forschung verstehen.

The paper examines the definitions of the concept ›philosophy‹ resp. ›the philosopher‹ in Florentine renaissance Platonism, namely Marsilio Ficino and his scholar Francesco di Zanobi Cattani da Diacceto. Following Socrates and Pythagoras, Ficino distinguishes between mundane philosophy and divine sapientia. In contrast to his teacher, Diacceto's Aristotelism rejects the Pythagoreanism and connects philosophy with sapientia. In order to show how the differences between Ficino and Diacceto emerge, three more contemporaries are taken into consideration: Christoforo Landino, Angelo Poliziano and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. As a result of this examination, it can be said that the definition of ›philosophy‹ in Florentine renaissance Platonism tends either to Pythagoreism or to Aristotelism or to both. Closely connected with the debate on philosophy are topics and maxims such as meditatio mortis, theologia negativa, docta ignorantia, scio ne scio, nosce te ipsum, ne quid nimis et al.

What is the relationship between the world and logic, between intuition and language, between objects and their quantitative determinations? Rationalists, on the one hand, hold that the world is structured in a rational way. Representationalists, on the other hand, assume that language, logic, and mathematics are only the means to order and describe the intuitively given world. In World and Logic, Jens Lemanski takes up three surprising arguments from Arthur Schopenhauer’s hitherto undiscovered Berlin Lectures, which concern the philosophy of language, logic, and mathematics. Based on these arguments, Lemanski develops a new position entitled ‘rational representationalism’: the world is always structured by human beings according to linguistic, logical, and mathematical principles, but the basic vocabulary of these structural descriptions already contains metaphors taken from the world around us.

Around 1800, Johann Gottlieb Fichte's primary circle of recipients consisted not only of philosophers, but above all of theologians, religiously engaged laymen, educators, writers and caricaturists, medical practitioner, civil servants and lawyers. The entire reception in post-Kantian philosophy is limited to the years between 1792 and 1810. This period can be divided into two phases: namely the phase up to 1799, in which Fichte acquired students and followers, and the phase from 1799 onwards, in which Fichte's reception was related to the atheism controversy. The discussion about Fichte began to wane in 1810, so that Beneke even claimed in 1833 that Fichte's philosophy "must be regarded as completely lost". Among others, the paper reports on Fichte's disciples such as August Ludwig Hülsen, Johann Gottfried Immanuel Berger, Johann Baptist Schad and sympathisers of Fichte such as Johann Christian Gottlieb Schaumann, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Gottlieb Ernst Mehmel, and Johann Neeb.

Schopenhauer's struggles with Christianity and mysticism are considered in this paper under three aspects: (1) methodology and defnitions, (2) doxography of dogmatics, (3) mystology and hagiology. In the first section, Schopenhauer's approaches and opinions in dealing with Christianity are described. In the second section, relevant passages from Schopenhauer's work on Christian dogmatic topics are compiled and systematized. In the third section, the function and significance of the Christian mystics and saints for Schopenhauer's life and work are presented.

In the history of philosophy, Arthur Schopenhauer’s system appears to bethe first one which is concerned with Christian as well as Buddhist saintsand claims that there is an association between them. In recent research,this association has been the source of many special problems,but it actually has never been discussed in general why this association is so important, or why it was necessary for Schopenhauer to relate to Buddhistor Hinduist as well as to Christian saints. Moreover, this issue seems toreveal other problems which are topics in recent discussion. The paper addresses these problems and argues for a descriptive interpretation of Schopenhauer's concept of the denial of the Will-to-live.

In his Berlin Lectures of the 1820s, the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) used spatial logic diagrams for philosophy of language. These logic diagrams were applied to many areas of semantics and pragmatics, such as theories of concept formation, concept development, translation theory, clarification of conceptual disputes, etc. In this paper we first introduce the basic principles of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language and his diagrammatic method. Since Schopenhauer often gives little information about how the individual diagrams are to be understood, we then make the attempt to reconstruct, specify and further develop one diagram type for the field of conceptual analysis.

The paper entitled "Knowledge, Science, and Science of Knowledge" uses two relevant texts from German idealism to ask whether philosophy is a science. It is first argued that science presupposes knowledge, but that the concept of knowledge has long been subject to strong scepticism due to Fitch's paradox of knowability and especially the Gettier problem. Only in recent years have historians of philosophy made it clear that the so-called standard analysis of knowledge was not even advocated by many classical authors. This is also the case with the texts under investigation: Fichte's early Wissenschaftslehre and Schopenhauer's Berlin Lectures. Both texts argue for a very different concept of knowledge, which then also determines the concept of science and philosophy. Fichte argues that philosophy must be founded from axioms and is therefore a subordinating science. Schopenhauer argues against this and points out that philosophy can only be a coordinating science. The last part of the paper argues that Fichte's and Schopenhauer's definitions of philosophy as a coordinating or subordinating science can still be applied today.

›Bottom-up‹ und ›top-down‹ sind heutzutage gängige Methodenbezeichnungen in allen Bereichen der Wissenschaft. Dennoch sind beide Methoden keine Entdeckung der Moderne, sondern wurden unter Begriffen wie beispielsweise ›Auf-‹ und ›Abstieg‹, ›Induktion‹ und ›Deduktion‹ in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte häufig verwendet, um komplexe Wissensbestände vollständig aufzuarbeiten und zu strukturieren. Paradigmatisch für eine derartige Aufarbeitung stehen die mittelalterliche Summa und das neuzeitliche System. Aktuellen Studien zufolge hat aber bereits Dionysius Areopagita in der Spätantike eine derartige Summe verfasst, während in der Neuzeit erst J. G. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre (1804) allen Systemansprüchen genügen konnte. Daher beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Studie mit den Auf- und Abstiegsmethoden bei Dionysius und Fichte, ihrer antiken Vorgeschichte und kontrastiert ihre Methoden mit der aktuellen Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Dabei zeigt sich, dass beide Autoren bei der Aufstiegs- bzw. bottom-up-Methode bislang unberücksichtigte Strategien zur Lösung des Induktionsproblems anwenden.

The encyclopaedia presents Arthur Schopenhauer's work and explains the basic concepts of his philosophy. It offers 200 entries by 76 authors from 18 countries. Beside an overview of works and central concepts, a history of Schopenhauer's influence is given. The Schopenhauer encyclopaedia can be read as a complete introduction or used as a reference work and compendium. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Das Lexikon stellt Arthur Schopenhauers Werk vor und erläutert die Grundbegriffe seiner Philosophie. Es bietet 200 Einträge von 76 Autorinnen und Autoren aus 18 Ländern. Der Überblick über Werke und zentrale Begriffe wird durch eine Darstellung der Wirkungsgeschichte abgerundet. Das Schopenhauer-Lexikon kann als vollständige Einführung gelesen oder als Nachschlagewerk verwendet werden.

Extensions of traditional syllogistics have been increasingly researched in philosophy, linguistics, and areas such as artificial intelligence and computer science in recent decades. This is mainly due to the fact that syllogistics is seen as a logic that comes very close to natural language abilities. Various forms of extended syllogistics have become established. This paper deals with the question to what extent a syllogistic representation in CL diagrams can be seen as a form of extended syllogistics. It will be shown that the ontology of CL enables numerically exact assertions and inferences.

"Christentum im Atheismus" (Christianity in Atheism) analyses the history of the development of a normative ethic of imitation, mimesis and role model that sprang from Platonism and Christianity and was transformed in the atheistic or agnostic philosophy of modernity. The first volume describes the development of this ethics from antiquity to the Enlightenment using the example of several philosophical and theological writings. It is shown that even the descriptive representation of exemplary behaviour can have a normative function.

“Dialectic” has been a matter of growing interest in contemporary philosophy. The present article analyzes dialectical methods and positions them by reference to two paradigmatic texts of German idealism and analytic philosophy, i.e. J.G. Fichte’s Science of Knowing (1804) and J. McDowell’s Mind and World. Both dialectical approaches will be interpreted with regard to their contribution in the debate on reductionism and anti-reductionism: both Fichte and McDowell claim that philosophical positions and logical terms stand in a dualistic relationship to one another, on the one hand, but are separated by a gulf, on the other. I will argue that for McDowell dialectic seems to be an alternative to one-sided reductionisms as well as to normal anti-reductionistic holism. Furthermore, for Fichte dialectic is an adequate method for describing the relationship of reductionism and anti-reductionism itself. Both see in dialectic a technique for bridging the gulf between binary opposite terms of logic as well as mutually exclusive positions, such as mind and world, subject and object, or idealism and realism.

In his Berlin Lectures of the 1820s, the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) used spatial logic diagrams for philosophy of language. These logic diagrams were applied to many areas of semantics and pragmatics, such as theories of concept formation, concept development, translation theory, clarification of conceptual disputes, etc. In this paper we first introduce the basic principles of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language and his diagrammatic method. Since Schopenhauer often gives little information about how the individual diagrams are to be understood, we then make the attempt to reconstruct, specify and further develop one diagram type for the field of conceptual analysis.

Reism or concretism are the labels for a position in ontology and semantics that is represented by various philosophers. As Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Jan Woleński have shown, there are two dimensions with which the abstract expression of reism can be made concrete: The ontological dimension of reism says that only things exist; the semantic dimension of reism says that all concepts must be reduced to concrete terms in order to be meaningful. In this paper we argue for the following two theses: (1) Arthur Schopenhauer has advocated a reistic philosophy of language which says that all concepts must ultimately be based on concrete intuition in order to be meaningful. (2) In his semantics, Schopenhauer developed a theory of logic diagrams that can be interpreted by modern means in order to concretize the abstract position of reism. Thus we are not only enhancing Jan Woleński’s list of well-known reists, but we are also adding a diagrammatic dimension to concretism, represented by Schopenhauer.

In the year 1714, Johann Christian Lange published a baroque textbook about a logic machine, supposed to simulate human cognitive abilities such as perception, judgement, and reasoning. From today’s perspective, it can be argued that this blueprint is based on an inference engine applied to a strict ontology which serves as a knowledge base. In this paper, I will first introduce Lange’s approach in the period of baroque logic and then present a diagrammatic modernization of Lange’s principles, entitled Calculus CL. Finally, I would like to discuss the possibilities of how to apply CL to modern cases of concern by using an example from epidemiology.

The question of naturalness in logic is widely discussed in today’s research literature. On the one hand, naturalness in the systems of natural deduction is intensively discussed on the basis of Aristotelian syllogistics. On the other hand, research on “natural logic” is concerned with the implicitly existing logical laws of natural language, and is therefore also interested in the naturalness of syllogistics. In both research areas, the question arises what naturalness exactly means, in logic as well as in language. We show, however, that this question is not entirely new: In his Berlin Lectures of the 1820s, Arthur Schopenhauer already discussed in depths what is natural and unnatural in logic. In particular, he anticipates two criteria for the naturalness of deduction that meet current trends in research: (1) Naturalness is what corresponds to the actual practice of argumentation in everyday language or scientific proof; (2) Naturalness of deduction is particularly evident in the form of Euler-type diagrams.