•  153
    In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore’s proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure is more than enough, Davies has recently challenged this view: appare…Read more
  •  99
    Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing-as
    Synthese 186 (1): 121-148. 2012.
    The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all
  •  83
    Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3): 233-252. 2017.
    The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the…Read more
  •  50
  •  13
    Origins of Objectivity di Tyler Burge
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 26 (1): 183-200. 2013.
  •  1
    Wittgenstein Today (edited book)
    with Eva Picardi
    Il poligrafo. 2004.
  •  281
    The paradox of Moore's proof of an external world
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231). 2008.
    Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in …Read more
  •  65
    Self-Knowledge for Humans (review)
    Analysis 76 (2): 246-252. 2016.
  •  101
    Peacocke's self-knowledge
    Ratio 21 (1). 2008.
    knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
  •  152
    Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1): 101-116. 2010.
    In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic projects called res…Read more
  •  169
    Which Hinge Epistemology?
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3): 79-96. 2016.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 79 - 96 The paper explores the idea of a “hinge epistemology,” considered as a theory about justification which gives center-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of _hinges_. First, some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on Wittgenstein’s texts and more theoretically committed work are put forward. Then, the main problems raised in _On Certainty_ and the most influential interpretative lines it has given ris…Read more
  •  134
    How to Commit Moore’s Paradox
    Journal of Philosophy 112 (4): 169-192. 2015.
    Moore’s paradox is taken to be emblematic of peculiarities in the first person point of view, and to have significant implications for several issues in epistemology, in philosophy of language and mind. Yet, its nature remains elusive. In the first part of the paper, the main kinds of analysis of it hereto proposed in the literature are criticized. Furthermore, it is claimed that there are cases in which its content can be legitimately judged. Close inspection of those cases reveals that they de…Read more