•  29
    Tyler Burge's Origins of Objectivity
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 26 (1): 183-200. 2013.
  •  244
    Self-knowledge and commitments
    Synthese 171 (3). 2009.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for…Read more
  •  5
    On the Ontology of Human Embodiment
    Ratio (Misc.) 21 (1): 13-27. 1979.
  •  94
    Jordi Fernández. Transparent Minds. A Study of Self-Knowledge (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 29 (3): 442-445. 2014.
  •  184
    Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?
    Philosophical Investigations 33 (1): 1-23. 2010.
    The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty . It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so-called "naturalist" readings of On Certainty , which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wan…Read more
  • Filosofia Analitica: Temi E Problemi (edited book)
    Carocci. 2007.
  •  91
    Moore’s proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright’s nor Pryor’s readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in …Read more
  •  38
    Replies
    Philosophia 41 (1): 81-96. 2013.
  •  163
    In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is…Read more
  •  57
    How to perceive reasons
    Episteme 13 (1): 77-88. 2016.
    This paper deals with the question whether, and to what extent, perceptions can provide a justification for our empirical beliefs. In particular, it addresses the issue of whether they need to be conceptualized by a subject in order to play a justificatory role. It is argued that the conditions under which a subject can have perceptual representational contents and those under which those representational contents can play a justificatory role differ. The upshot is that perception can provide ju…Read more
  •  72
    It is a striking feature of philosophical reflection on the self that it often ends up being revisionary of our commonsensical intuition that it is identical to a living human being with, intrinsically, physical and psychological properties. As is well known, Descartes identified the self with a mental entity, Hume denied the existence of such an entity and Kant reduced it to a transcendental ego—to a mere condition of possibility for experience and thought. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein follow…Read more
  •  59
    On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1): 41-46. 2002.
  • Lo scetticismo sull'esistenza del mondo esterno
    In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Filosofia Analitica: Temi E Problemi, Carocci. pp. 255--280. 2007.
  •  75
    This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual j…Read more
  •  32
    The Self and Self-Knowledge (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    These thought-provoking essays provide such an analysis and greatly deepen our understanding of these central aspects of our mentality.
  •  58
    Coliva-Belleri_Some-observations-on-François-Recanatis-Mental-Files
  •  94
    The paper offers a critical review of Roberto Farneti’s paper a minor philosophy. The state of the art of philosophical scholarship in Italy , recently published in Philosophia. It is argued that overall the status and interest of philosophy as practiced nowadays in Italy is less disappointing than Farneti makes out. It is also maintained that submitting papers to peer-refereed international journals can help cure the moral and sociological disease that besets the Italian academia, but that, a…Read more
  •  29
    1. Transmission Jim’s teacher has just given him his marked maths exam. Jim knows that his mark is 7.25 out of 22. He also knows that the pass mark is 35%. Does Jim know he has failed? No, he doesn’t. Not yet. As you would expect from his mark, Jim is not very good with numbers. He’ll need a few minutes with pencil and paper to work out that 7.25 is less than 35% of 22. Only then will he know that he has failed. This case exemplifies a common and important phenomenon: someone recognises the vali…Read more
  •  5
    Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2015.
    Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea in On Certainty that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address major problems in epistemology, such as the nature of perceptual justifications, external world skepticism, epistemic relativism, the epistemic status of basic log…Read more
  •  241
    Thought insertion and immunity to error through misidentification
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1): 27-34. 2002.
    John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentificati…Read more
  •  18
    Perceiving reasons?
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 25 (1): 119-134. 2012.
    The paper analyses the discussion in the last decades on whether perceptions can, as such, justify empirical beliefs, and develops it along two fundamental lines: the nature of perceptual content and the nature of the justifications in play. Starting with Sellars' attack on the «Myth of the given», it examines Davidson's, McDowell's, Peacocke's and Burge's positions. On the one hand, it contends that also creatures that aren't endowed with the relevant concepts can have genuine perceptions; on t…Read more
  •  14
    Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.